PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
1970

FERMENT IN THE USSR

Lewis S. Feuer:
Intellectual Opposition

Maurice Friedberg:
Soviet Jewry Under Pressure

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Edward Taborsky:
The Return to "Normalcy"

Merle Fainsod:
Moscow's USA

SOVIET UNDERGROUND BALLADS

Book Reviews: Carl J. Friedrich • George L. Kline • Edmund Demaitre

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOV-DEC 1970
VOL XIX
6

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

HOW TO SUBSCRIBE: Outside of the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $3.00.

Editor: ***Theodore Frankel***
Managing Editor: ***Marie Thompson House***
Associate Editors: ***Clarke H. Kawakami, Wayne Hall***

Cover: *Dee Fairchild*

THE SOVIET UNION

1 The Intelligentsia in Opposition, *by Lewis S. Feuer*
17 The Plight of Soviet Jews, *by Maurice Friedberg*
27 Ballads from the Underground, *translated by Misha Allen*

EASTERN EUROPE

31 Czechoslovakia: The Return to "Normalcy," *by Edward Taborsky*

BOOKS

42 The Poverty of Marxism-Leninism, *by George L. Kline*
46 The Uses of Terror, *by Carl J. Friedrich,*
49 Man and God in Marx, *by Edmund Demaitre*
54 Reviews in Brief

NOTES & VIEWS

59 Through Soviet Eyes, *by Merle Fainsod*
65 Index to Vol. XIX

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Intelligentsia in Opposition

By Lewis S. Feuer

It is now forty years since the aging Fabian Socialist, Sidney Webb, called upon his fellow social scientists to study the portentous new reality of the Soviet planned economy. Today again, a novel set of phenomena has arisen in the USSR: within the interstices of Soviet society and despite rigid controls and repressions, open disaffection has spread among the Soviet intellectual elite, and for the first time an opposition has arisen which is not Marxist in its premises. It is not a "deviationist" opposition such as we saw in the 1920's or the 1930's; it does not found itself on the texts of Marx or Lenin and indeed rejects the whole dialectical mode of thought. Instead, its appeal is to scientific method in conjunction with a universalistic ethic, both cutting across all classes, social systems, and races.

Lewis S. Feuer is Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto and author of, among other works, Conflict of Generations, *(New York, Basic Books, 1969) and* Marx and the Intellectuals *(Garden City, Doubleday and Co., 1969).* *This essay was written with the help of a grant from the Canada Council, Social Sciences and Humanities Division.*

Whereas Trotsky, for instance, always expressed his total indifference to the concerns of what he called Kantian "normative" philosophy, these are precisely the concerns that are most significant to the new Opposition. Thanks to the hardihood and courageous spirit of many of its members, the materials are at hand to study these first nuclei which may generate energies capable of transforming Soviet existence. The present discussion will confine itself to the two foremost disaffected groups, which I shall call the Scientific Opposition and the Literary Opposition.

Stalinist Subjugation of Science

When the Bolshevik Revolution took place, Lenin expected that scientists, above all, would be the linchpin of Soviet victory. "One after another," he told Maxim Gorky, "we shall win over all the Russian and European Archimedes, and then the world will have to change, whether it wants to or not!" And he declared, "If only we could give all these technical engineers ideal conditions for their work, in twenty-five years Russia would be the fore-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most country in the world." [1] After the mid-1930's, however, Soviet science nearly succumbed to the awful blight of Stalinism. For many long years Soviet scientists were deprived of contacts with their foreign colleagues and were often assigned arbitrarily to military-oriented research. When the dean of Soviet physicists, Piotr Kapitsa, resisted such an assignment, he was placed under house arrest for seven years, and other scientists suffered fates far worse.

Then, as American physicist Freeman Dyson reported in 1956, the death of Stalin brought to "Soviet scientists a new experience of freedom," and with it a fresh enthusiasm.[2] As the ideological shackles on scientific research were relaxed, as scientists—once again able to act freely—abandoned military projects for purely scientific inquiry, as scientific publication was encouraged and attendance at scientific congresses allowed, the creativity of Soviet scientists reasserted itself and burgeoned. Robert Marshak, then chairman of the physics department of the University of Rochester, predicted, after attending an international conference of physicists in Moscow in 1956, that the return of favorable "moral and spiritual conditions for independent and creative research" in the USSR would "unquestionably lead to an efflorescence of Soviet science." [3] And when, in the same year, Americans were invited to attend a congress of Soviet mathematicians—the first such meeting to be convened in more than twenty years—they were struck not only by the warm reception accorded them, but also by the manner in which their Soviet colleagues rebuked the political theologians, shelved the whole subject of Marxist ideology, and confided how the caliber of their students had declined during the period when the criterion of political orthodoxy replaced that of mathematical talent.[4]

It is this "experience of freedom" which the Scientific Opposition in the Soviet Union is now trying to preserve against considerable odds. For during a quarter of a century every science without exception ran the humiliating and destructive gauntlet of Stalinist power. What Stalinism meant to Soviet scientists is illustrated by the story of the advent to power of a fanatical and incompetent agronomist named Trofim Lysenko through the personal favor of Stalin. This story has long been known in outline, but today it is being revealed in much fuller detail inside the Soviet Union through the circulation of typewritten copies of a remarkable book, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, by Zhores A. Medvedev.[5] Medvedev's book is a classic in the sociology of science, the first significant sociological book to appear in the Soviet Union—albeit without bureaucratic sanction—since Nikolai Bukharin's *Historical Materialism*. Its rich factual account makes possible a fuller understanding of the sociological nature of Stalinism. Every domain of science had its Lysenko, its embittered, jealous mediocrity who, driven by envy of those who had made genuine contributions, contrived to obtain administrative power over them by denouncing them to his fellow mediocrities in the political apparatus.

For the party apparatus is, above all, the ambitious mediocracy of all fields, drawn from all classes and social institutions, and endowed with dictatorial power. It would be a mistake to think of it as primarily a coalition of interest groups articulating, according to their respective numbers, the aims of the technical managers, the workers, the collective farms, the army. For while the apparatus recruits and coopts its members from all these classes, its criterion of choice is primarily a psychological one: a mediocratic simplicism, an absence of brilliance, a colorless anonymity, an absence of any impulse to dissent from a decision handed down from above. Pareto thought that the challenging elite, the foxes, the speculators, would be marked by vigorous intellectual powers and initiative. The remarkable characteristic of the Stalinist apparatus which terrorized the Soviet scientists was that its members were intellectually inferior to those whom they destroyed; their bond was a mediocratic union and a thirst for power unrestrained by any moral considerations.[6] An unsuccessful but envious grad-

[1] Maxim Gorky, *Days with Lenin*, New York, International Publishers, 1932, pp. 41, 56.

[2] Freeman Dyson, "Science and Freedom," *Science*, (Washington, D.C.), Sept. 7, 1956, p. 433.

[3] Robert E. Marshak, "Scientific Research in the Soviet Union," *Ibid*, Dec. 7, 1956, p. 1126.

[4] A. J. Lohwater, "Mathematics in the Soviet Union," *Ibid.*, May 17, 1957, p. 985.

[5] Cf. Zhores A. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, translated by I. Michael Lerner, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

[6] Today, writes Leonid Vladimirov, "the dead wood consists of party members. . . . Politics can still play an important role if a scientist wishes to get on in his field. There is little chance for a graduate to become a postgraduate if he is critical of the government." "Soviet science—a native's opinion," *New Scientist*, (London), Nov 28, 1968, p. 488. Cf. also Mikhail A Klochko, *Soviet Scientist in Red China*, tr. Andrew MacAndrew, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, pp. 192-193.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uate student could achieve upward mobility by denouncing his professor, and much the same sort of role was played by the young specialist Shudenko, who headed the investigation of the famed geneticist, Nikolai Vavilov. Interrogated a hundred times in the course of eleven months, Vavilov eventually died in a labor camp.

If genetics had its Lysenko, agronomy had its Vilyams, who set out to destroy the school of his eminent rival, Dmitri N. Prianishnikov, by accusing his pupils of sabotage. The result, as Medvedev describes it, was that after 1948 the level of Soviet biology dropped sharply as the way was opened "for a large number of people incapable of real and serious creative work . . . and with a personal interest in continued persecution of genetics and biology to receive scientific degrees and positions." [7] A group of mediocrities adept at intrigue and more concerned with ideology and defaming their opponents than with science came to dominate the editorial boards and research institutes.

To the authentic Soviet scientist, Stalinism was a society in which a Beria could write to a Molotov asking clearance for the arrest and destruction, intellectual and physical, of a creative scientist and teacher like Vavilov. To the Soviet scientist today, it is the memory of the abrogation of scientific evidence by denunciation and the pressures of the "collectivity" and the secret police. Medvedev concludes his book with an appeal for a pluralistic system of decentralized universities, colleges, and institutes, all independent of any governmental administrative organs, because "this kind of system insures against the spread, especially by coercion, of false doctrines such as Lysenkoism." [8]

Obninsk—Cradle of Soviet Democracy?

Medvedev wrote his book while he was in charge of a laboratory at the Institute of Medical Radiology in Obninsk. This town deserves more than passing attention, for if Leningrad has gone down in legend as the cradle of the proletarian revolution, Obninsk may yet go down in the history books as the birthplace of the democratic movement in the Soviet Union.

Located about two hours' drive southeast of Moscow, Obninsk was virtually brought into being by a decision to make it the site of the world's first atomic power station. When preparatory operations began in June 1954, three research institutes were established in the environs. It was above all a town of the new generation of scientists: almost half the staff members in 1968 were still young, their ages averaging between 28 and 32.[9] Obninsk became a favorite subject for Soviet journalists, whose articles throughout the Khrushchevian era lauded its vitality and high cultural level. One such article spoke proudly of the town's talented residents who had often "come straight from their student desks and . . . become candidates and doctors of science"—"some of them . . . only just thirty or not even thirty years old." [10]

By 1967, however, such enthusiastic reports ceased, and the Soviet press became increasingly hostile toward Obninsk, evincing much disquietude over the activities of its personnel. Newspaper articles spoke critically of the indifference of the young specialists toward so-called "public work" and their propensity to shun ideology in favor of science. One report told of an opinion poll taken among the 215 young scientists at the Physical Power Institute, of whom only 14 percent stated that they found it "a pleasure" to do "public work." Another report complained of the prevalence of negative attitudes among the scientists, who had even ventured to criticize Obninsk's drab, stereotyped architecture.

But this was just the beginning. In 1968, some Obninsk scientists who had travelled abroad began publishing articles in their local newspaper, the Obninsk *Vperiod* (Forward), depicting the Western countries they had visited in a favorable light. The party theoretical organ *Kommunist* thereupon took the offending scientists to task, complaining that "our scientific institutions sometimes send people abroad who are not notably marked by principles or maturity" and who failed to perceive "the cruel realities" of bourgeois society. *Kommunist* was especially exercised over a series of articles written by a scientist in the Obninsk Physics and Electric Power Institute giving his impressions of

[7] Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 142. See also pp. 56, 129.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

[9] N. Sviridov, "Party Concern for the Upbringing of the Scientific-Technical Intelligentsia," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 18, Dec. 1968, pp. 36-45; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, (New York), Jan. 22, 1969, p. 4.
[10] A. Pavlova, "The Komsomolsk of the Sixties", *Izvestia* (Moscow), Aug. 25, 1964. Cited in Peter Dornan, "Who are the Passive Scientists in Obninsk?", Radio Liberty *Research Paper*, 1968, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a visit to Denmark.[11] After noting that the author had not only been "entranced by the packaging of goods and the abundance of automobiles and one-family homes," but also, "of all things . . . had had some kind words for the king of Denmark," the journal called this clear evidence of the "political helplessness" and lack of a "class approach" to capitalist reality that characterized this particular scientist-traveler as well as "other scientists who decided to share their impressions of trips abroad." The traveler to Denmark, said *Kommunist,* had forgotten that it was the exploited working class which paid "for splendidly packaged goods." [12]

However, the main burden of *Kommunist's* indictment of the Obninsk scientific establishment was that its members were becoming imbued with a scientific rather than an ideological standpoint and were taking the stand that "a scientist should deal only with science." Thus, according to the party journal, only 17 out of the 79 persons holding important posts in the Obninsk Physics and Chemistry Institute were involved in political work. Furthermore, party organizers in the various institutes had encountered a distressing pattern: whenever there was a propagandist-educational assignment to be carried out, it was given to some underling to perform so that the time of the more important researchers would not be wasted—in other words, the most mediocre were being honored with party chores.

Given the critical mood and temper of the younger generation of Obninsk scientists, the lot of the party organizer assigned to raise the level of their political consciousness was indeed an unenviable one. Imagine, for instance, a meeting called in 1970 to celebrate the centenary of Lenin's birth. The party secretary first recites the text of the Central Committee resolution hailing Lenin as the greatest philosopher of science of modern times, then perhaps follows up with some readings from Lenin's classic *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.* Suddenly, some young scientist raises his hand and, with a straight face, asks: "Would the Comrade Secretary please explain why Comrade Lenin assailed the principle of relativity?" While the party secretary fumbles for an answer, the questioner goes on to ask if it wasn't Ernst Mach, denounced by Lenin as the Judas of science, who had inspired the work of Einstein. And how could Lenin attack the principle of economy in scientific thought which all scientists employed?

On can understand, then, why the turnover of secretaries in the Obninsk Young Communist League Committee was exceedingly rapid. There were complete turnovers in 1961, 1963, and 1968; moreover, in 1967-68, there was actually a 70 to 80-percent turnover in the entire membership of the committees and bureaus in the YCL and the primary party organizations at the Obninsk scientific institutions.[13]

The Scientific Opposition

Apart from Zhores Medvedev, three men have emerged as the principal spokesmen of the Scientific Opposition: Piotr Kapitsa, Lev Landau, and Andrei Sakharov. Kapitsa, the elder statesman of Soviet physicists, has been the foremost critic of the intrusion of Marxist ideology in physics. He wrote in 1962 that if Soviet scientists had obeyed the Marxist philosophers, the conquest of space would have been impossible because the Marxists rejected cybernetics; and that advances in nuclear physics would likewise have ceased because the Marxist philosophers opposed the theory of relativity. Ideological anxiety, he said, was still operating to retard the development of Soviet science, since one of its indirect effects was to lead young Soviet physicists to avoid experimental work unduly in favor of theoretical studies. Speaking from his experience as editor of the leading journal of physics, Kapitsa noted that, of the articles submitted to him for publication, those dealing with theoretical physics outnumbered those in the experimental field by three or even four to one. He suggested that this was due to the preference of young physicists to avoid involvement with the collectivity, with collective research: the experimentalist had to negotiate with administrators and accept the controls of a research group; he had to make applications for

[11] The author of this series of articles has been identified as Valeri Alekseevich Pavlinchuk, who died in July 1968 though only about thirty years of age. Formerly secretary of his party cell, he was both dismissed from his job as a physicist and expelled from the party. In addition to his articles, he was co-author of a book entitled *Fiziki shutiat* (The Physicists are Joking). Cf. D. Pospielovsky, "Two Years of the Chronicle of Current Events", Radio Liberty *Research Paper,* No. 37, 1970, p. 18. A second enlarged edition of the book entitled *Fiziki prodolzhaiut shutit* (The Physicists Keep on Joking) was published in 1968 by Mir, Moscow. Its authors were Yu Konobeev, V. Pavlinchuk, N. Ratonov, and V. Turchin. Cf. *Knizhnaia Letopis,* No. 11, 1969, p. 16.

[12] N. Sviridov, *loc. cit. supra,* p. 4.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

equipment, to persuade the committee in charge, and to consult with planning officials. And then there was something called Marxist dialectics, which seemed to acquire a peculiar potency when collectivity was involved. The result, according to Kapitsa, was that young physicists preferred the isolation and loneliness of theoretical studies, thus causing a gross imbalance in Soviet physics. Under optimal conditions, he said, there ought to be 20-30 experimentalists for each theorist, and the fact that the ratio was actually almost the reverse presumably reflected the distortion caused largely by ideological and social anxiety. We must allow for some overstatement on Kapitsa's part because of his own calling as an experimental physicist. What is significant in any case is that he accounts for the disproportion in physical research in terms of the pressures imposed by the ideological and political environment.[14] Scientific researchers still try to avoid projects which would make them dependent on political functionaries. In other words, political anxiety still haunts the experimentalist.

The late Lev Landau, regarded by many as the most gifted theoretical mind in Soviet physics, also deserves recognition as a leading figure of the Scientific Opposition. In the last years of his life, which was tragically shortened by an automobile accident that left him incapacitated until his death in 1968, he published his personal and philosophical views. He had lived through the Stalinist ordeal. He recalled that despite his being a Jew, "they charged me with being a German spy. Now, occasionally, this seems amusing to me, but at that time, believe me, I did not feel like laughing. I spent one year in prison, and it was clear to me that I couldn't last another six months. I was dying, simply dying."[15] Not long before his accident, Landau had the satisfaction of standing beside his teacher, Niels Bohr, when the great founder of the Copenhagen school—despite objections from the Marxist ideologists—was finally welcomed to Moscow University in 1961.[16]

In 1963 Landau discussed his preferences among films and books dealing with scientists. In his opinion, the book that best portrayed the true spirit of the scientific worker was Sinclair Lewis' *Arrowsmith*. Many will remember this novel for its portrayal of the Jewish scientist Max Gottlieb and his American student Martin Arrowsmith, its description of their single-minded devotion to pure science, their disregard for practical applications, politics, and ideology, their dislike for administrative personalities and institute directors, and also of the spontaneous friendship between Gottlieb and the self-made American capitalist, Ross McGurk, with whom the scientist felt a kinship of spirit. Arrowsmith emerges as the most individualistic of scientists, contemptuous of any notion of directive planning in science—in short, everything that a Leninist scientist should *not* be—while the directors who are perturbed by the planlessness of the scientific spirit are ridiculed.

Conversely, Landau assailed the exemplar of the Leninist scientist as portrayed in Soviet mythology. Specifically he ridiculed the famous Soviet film, *Baltic Deputy*—presumably based on the life of the botanist Klimenti Timiriazev—which for many years had been officially regarded as depicting the proper way for a Soviet scientist to behave. Landau said bluntly that the film's portrayal was something "not one of us scientists has seen or heard in his life" and gave "quite a wrong picture of the nature of the scientist's work." *Baltic Deputy* may have been a classic of socialist-realist film-making, but if it was socialist, it was certainly not realistic in Landau's estimation.[17]

Landau extended this same criticism to Soviet films generally, which he said were constantly showing individuals whose way of thinking was utterly unreal. He also regarded the long, drawn-out films of the Soviet "heroic era" as boring, with their "monotony of intonation" and "heavy style of acting," though he thought that Soviet historical films generally were better than those dealing with contemporary Soviet life, because artists dealing with the latter were subject to all sorts of pressures remote from art:

Let's be frank about it; reproaches about "the insufficient portrayal of the role of the trade unions" (or something similar) are often made, and they hinder the birth of real works of art.

[14] Albert Parry (Ed.), *Peter Kapitsa on Life and Science*, New York, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 197-201. See also Parry's *The New Class Divided: Science and Technology Versus Communism*, New York, 1966, pp. 42-43; and Leonid Vladimirov, *The Russians*, New York, 1968, p. 214.

[15] Interview in *Komsomolskaia pravda*, (Moscow), July 8, 1964, quoted in Albert Parry, "Lev Davidovich Landau," George W. Simmonds, Ed., *Soviet Leaders*, New York, Crowell, 1967, p. 242.

[16] S. Rozental, Ed., *Niels Bohr*, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1967, p. 129.

[17] Lev Landau, "A Scientist on Films", *Soviet Literature Monthly*, (Moscow), No. 3, 1963, p. 151. Reprinted from *Iskusstvo Kino* (Film Art).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the other hand, Landau considered American films to be among the finest. He especially admired the film *Twelve Angry Men,* an American courtroom drama in which a single juror holds out against the opinion of the collectivity and thus saves an innocent man from conviction. "The main thing in a film is action," said Landau. "For instance, in the American film *Twelve Angry Men*—one that you watch with intense attention—twelve men stay locked in one room for an hour and a half, but the film is nevertheless full of action." He also thought the American screen version of *War and Peace* "exceptionally successful" in capturing the spirit of the original novel.

The Sakharov Treatise

What Medvedev conveyed regarding the superiority of the Western social system from the standpoint of encouraging free, decentralized scientific research, Kapitsa regarding the retardation of Soviet science by dialectical ideology, and Landau regarding the more authentic human reality portrayed in American films—all these ideas have found new expression in the most complete document yet to come from the Scientific Opposition, Academician Andrei D. Sakharov's *Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom.*[18] Sakharov first came to public notice when the late Igor Kurchatov, the first Director of the Institute of Atomic Energy at Obninsk, paid tribute to him as a central figure in the Soviet achievement of a controlled thermonuclear reaction. Now Sakharov's document circulates extensively in typescript among the scientific community in the Soviet Union. It voices, we might say, the political aspirations of the ablest and most idealistic members of that community, which Kapitsa tells us numbers some 400,000 persons.[19] What, then, are Sakharov's principal tenets?

First of all, he rejects class struggle as a method for achieving social progress in this historical period and regards ideology as outmoded insofar as the solution of human problems is concerned. In the face of today's "perils," he writes, "any action increasing the division of mankind, any preaching of the incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is madness and a crime." Sakharov's starting point is recognition of a common planetary lot—that the world's problems are common to all. Even more than the imperatives of industrial organization or social structure, he argues, this common situation morally compels convergence between Soviet and Western societies. The present threat to civilization stems not only from the possibility of thermonuclear war, but also from over-population, mass myths, bureaucratized despotism, and a narcotic "mass culture."

Secondly, Sakharov sees a primary requisite for the solution of the problems facing Soviet society in the establishment of freedom of thought and discussion and an end to the "bureaucratic oligarchy" with its weapon of "ideological censorship." He bases himself here on a sociological understanding of the sources of Stalinism. Alluding to a 1,000-page unpublished manuscript on the subject by Roy Medvedev (Zhores Medvedev's brother and an eminent scholar in his own right), he expresses his agreement with what was clearly Medvedev's conclusion, namely that Stalinism was a sort of superstructure that developed over a pseudo-socialist economic base and led to the hegemony of a distinct class, a bureaucratic elite. Pointedly, Sakharov refers by name to the director of the Science Department of the CPSU Central Committee as a prime example of neo-Stalinism in Soviet society today, this man's leadership having been imposed despite the fact that he was rejected by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Thirdly, Sakharov takes the position that only a liberal-democratic reform of the Soviet system, including the institution of a multiparty political order, can safeguard freedom in the Soviet Union. Its establishment, he says, may come as the "inevitable consequence" when a "ruling Communist party refuses for one reason or another to rule by the scientific, democratic method required by history."

This enunciation of the historical inevitability of the overthrow of the "ruling Communist party" represents the last residue of Marxism in Sakharov's thought, while at the same time it bespeaks the intense hatred which the ablest members of the scientific community have for the party apparatus. Freedom of thought, writes Sakharov, is still menaced by "treacherous hypocrites and demagogues." When they demand that the intelligentsia subordinate themselves to the interests of the working class, what they really mean is that the intelligentsia should be subservient to the party's central

[18] Andrei D. Sakharov, "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," *The New York Times,* July 22, 1968, p. 15.

[19] Parry, *Peter Kapitsa . . .*, p. 217.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

apparatus; yet there is no assurance whatsoever that the latter's "caste interest" coincides with the interests of the working class and of progress.

The present-day Scientific Opposition has thus gone far beyond the critique of Stalinism put forward by the oppositionists of the 1930's. For its members regard the phenomenon of Stalinism as grounded in the Soviet social structure, and this was something the earlier Marxist oppositionists could never bring themselves to admit. To Trotsky, for instance, Stalinism was a deformation, an excrescence, but not a phenomenon immanent in a single-party, totally planned economy.

Objective Economists

Fourthly, Sakharov and his colleagues of today's Scientific Opposition have entirely discarded the Marxist theory of capitalism, rejecting the whole dialectical argument that the capitalist system is bound to decline because of the inevitable consequences of its profit-seeking. "There are no grounds for asserting, as is often done in the dogmatic vein," writes Sakharov, "that the capitalist mode of production leads the economy into a blind alley, or that it is obviously inferior to the socialist mode in labor productivity."

In this, Sakharov concurs with a whole new generation of Soviet mathematical economists and econometricians. Thirty years ago, Soviet economists were confidently predicting the inevitable demise of capitalism, but that confident belief has now largely vanished. One sees this especially in the fact that while many articles and books have been published in the Soviet Union attacking John Maynard Keynes, "a real point-by-point rebuttal" of Keynes' *General Theory*—according to a Western analyst—has not been offered, nor has there been "any attempt to assess Keynes' work in the objective analytical manner such as Western economists generally employ when criticizing each other." [20]

If Keynesian economic theory were sincerely considered false, Marxist economists would obviously still be undertaking to show that the equations for the basic disequilibrium of the capitalist system have remained invariant through all the Keynesian transformations, and that Keynes's proposed equilibrium solutions have been unavailing. Their failure to do so betokens that Soviet econometricians are in practice abandoning the Marxist theoretical edifice, voting with their intellectual feet, so to speak, by refusing to attack the contrary tenets of the chief economist of the bourgeois system. They still use Marxist phrases and metaphors, but primarily as a camouflage against the ideologues.[21]

The Scientific Opposition, moreover, exerts an influence extending beyond the ranks of academic scientists. Indeed, this influence reaches into the defense establishment itself, where the ideas of the Scientific Opposition have evidently won support among what might be termed the military technical elite. A significant indication of this is the fact that all the military and naval officers who have recently been punished as dissidents in the Soviet Union have been persons with highly scientific or technical responsibilities, ranging from Major-General Piotr Grigorenko, who once taught cybernetics at the Frunze Military Academy, to the three disaffected officers of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, who were in the nuclear submarine service.[22]

On the other hand, an immense gulf separates the Scientific Opposition from the people at large. Before the 1917 Revolution, the intellectuals in Russia were a revered group, the conscience of society, cast in the image of Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Chekhov. Not without reason could Lenin say that they had brought socialist consciousness to the workers. And Lenin himself, the great intellectual, fashioned the Revolution. But just because it was the intellectuals who guided the October Revolution, the disaffection that exists in the Soviet Union today has as one of its ingredients a popular distrust of the intelligentsia in general, because the people, one senses, feel they were once misled by the intellectuals.

There is thus a widespread revulsion against ideologists of all kinds, and Soviet public opinion

[20] Carl B. Turner, *An Analysis of Soviet Views on John Maynard Keynes*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1969, p. 159.

[21] The econometricians are now a vital part of the scientific elite, and a career in econometrics draws many talented students. Whereas a decade ago the Department of Physics and Mathematics at the University of Novosibirsk had far more applicants than it could accept and the Department of Economic Cybernetics had unfilled openings, in 1964 the latter had five applicants for every vacancy, and the entrance requirements were more severe for economists than for physicists. (See Ilya Fonyakov, *Young Scientists' Town*, Moscow, undated, p. 87).

[22] The three naval officers, arrested in May 1969, were charged with organizing a "Union of Fighters for Political Freedom" with the objective of realizing the "democratic rights and freedoms . . . guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." See "*Samizdat* Reveals Dissent Among Soviet Officers," in Radio Liberty *Research Bulletin*, May 20, 1970.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

polls indicate that the degree of esteem in which individual sciences are held varies proportionately with the extent to which they have been subordinated to ideology. Biology and the social sciences, for instance, are held in lower esteem than most of the physical and engineering sciences.[23] The same holds true for philology, where Stalin himself laid down the laws of linguistics, and most of all for traditional economics, long frozen into total rigidity by Marxian economic dogma.

Even though the physicists and mathematicians are not in the same discredited company, they nonetheless share to some extent in the low popular regard for the intellectual community in general. This is reinforced by the natural isolation that is imposed by the very nature of their work in abstruse scientific research. On top of this natural isolation, the Scientific Opposition of course lacks a free press and an open political forum in which to advocate and diffuse its ideas.

The Literary Opposition

Whereas the Scientific Opposition thus has little contact with the citizenry at large, the Literary Opposition is probably less isolated. At any rate, in the face of all obstacles, it is making the first real effort in many years—indeed since Trotsky's time—to reach the consciousness of the Soviet people. The two Oppositions, Scientific and Literary, stand in a sort of symbiotic relationship to each other. The new literature of protest draws its most avid readers from the ranks of the Scientific Opposition in its broadest sense. The poet Andrei Voznesensky said in 1962 that his readers were mainly members of the "technological intelligentsia," adding that "there are millions of them in Russia now. . . . They have no use for rhymed editorials." [24]

What are the comparative strengths of the two Oppositions in terms of active members? According to Andrei Amalrik in his recent essay, *Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?*, of the 738 persons who have signed protests of various sorts, 22 percent have been artists, 45 percent academics, 13 percent engineers and technicians, 9 percent publishing employees, teachers, doctors, and lawyers, and 5 percent students, with ordinary workers accounting for 6 percent.[25] Of the academic protesters alone, if one can judge by the available lists of signatures, somewhat more than half were scientists and engineers, as compared with a lesser proportion of humanists and social scientists.[26] Their total number admittedly remains extremely small in relation to total population, yet when, in the face of all the official powers of repression, even this limited number does speak up, it signifies an appreciable opposition among the very ablest members of the Soviet intelligentsia, the "great majority of whom"—according to Soviet novelist Anatoli Kuznetsov—are "today opposed to the Soviet regime." [27]

The publications of the Literary Opposition mostly take the form of so-called *samizdat* (literally, self-publishing)—that is to say, manuscripts which are written without hope of official publication, but which are typed and mimeographed by zealous supporters to be circulated primarily within the community of intellectual dissidents. The underground journals generally consist of relatively few pages and are issued in very small editions: a 1960 issue of *Sintaksis*, for instance, was reproduced and circulated in only 300 copies.[28] Most remarkable of all is the *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (Chronicle of Current Events), the first opposition newspaper to appear in the Soviet Union since the suppression of the Trotskyist bulletins. It has been coming out regularly since spring 1968 on the last day of every other month (February, April, June, August, October and December),[29] carrying news of the latest arrests by the secret police, interrogations, trials, and imprisonments; the texts of important documents and letters of protest; and messages of sympathy from foreign writers. Persecuted ethnic and religious minorities—Crimean Tatars and Ukranians, Jews and Baptists—also find an outlet for their feelings in its meager pages. The authorities keep on arresting distributors of *samizdat* and claim that they could shut down the entire operation within two days. Nevertheless, an underground

[23] Murray Yanowitch and Norton T. Dodge, "The Social Evaluation of Occupations in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* (Seattle), December 1969, p. 629.

[24] Quoted in Patricia Blake, "New Voices in Russian Writing," *Encounter* (London), April 1963, p. 28.

[25] Cf. Andrei Amalrik, *Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?* New York, Harper & Row, 1970.

[26] The petition of 121, for instance, had 59 scientists and technicians; the petition of 170 had 91 scientists and technicians. Cf. *Problems of Communism*, No. 4 (July-August) 1968, pp. 65 ff., pp. 70 ff.

[27] *Daily Telegraph* (London), July 31, 1969.

[28] Maurice Friedberg, "What Price Censorship?", *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (September-October) 1968, p. 20.

[29] Karel Van Het Reve, "Samizdat", *Observer Review* (London), March 29, 1970.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Freedom: The Categorical Imperative

An Artist's Voice

In 1948, there were lists of forbidden works. Now oral prohibitions are preferred, referring to the fact that "opinions exist" that the work is not recommended. It is impossible to establish where this opinion exists and whose it is. . . .

Who first had the "opinion" that it was necessary to expel Solzhenitsyn from the Writers' Union? I have not managed to clarify this question. . . .

Apparently "opinion" also prevented my fellow citizens from getting to know Tarkovsky's film "Andrei Rubliov," which we sold abroad and which I had the pleasure of seeing among enraptured Parisians. Obviously, it was "opinion" which also prevented publication of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* which was already set in type for *Novyi mir*. . . . .

Explain to me, please, why in our literature and art so often people absolutely incompetent in this field have the final word. Why are they given the right to discredit our art in the eyes of our people? . . .

Every man must have the right fearlessly to think independently and express his opinion about what he knows, what he has personally thought about, experienced, not merely to express with slightly different variations the opinion which has been inculcated in him.

We will definitely arrive at reconstruction without prompting and without being corrected.

I know that after my letter there will undoubtedly be an "*opinion*" about me, but I am not afraid of it. I openly say what I think. Talent, of which we are proud, must not be submitted to the assaults of the past. . . .

—From an Open Letter by world-renowned Soviet cellist Mstislav Rostropovich to Pravda, Izvestia, Literaturnaia gazeta, and Sovetskaia kultura (none of which published it) on behalf of his friend, the writer A. I. Solzhenitsyn, October 31, 1970. Translated in The New York Times, Nov. 16, 1970.

An Appeal from Scientists

It is in seeking exchange of information and ideas that we come up against the greatest stumbling block in our country. Truthful information about our shortcomings and negative phenomena is classified as secret. . . . Exchange of information with foreign countries is restricted. . . . Theoretical conclusions and practical proposals which strike some people as too bold are pared down to the bone without any discussion, for fear that they could "undermine the foundations." We have to face outright mistrust of all creatively-thinking, critical and active individuals. . . .

Freedom of information and creativity are necessary to the intelligentsia because of the very nature of its work, because of its social function. The urge of the intelligentsia to increase this freedom is both legal and natural. The State, however, counteracts this urge and brings to bear all kinds of restrictive measures, administrative pressure, dismissals from work and even court trials. This opens a gulf of mutual distrust and a profound lack of mutual understanding which stands in the way of fruitful cooperation between the Party-State sector and the most active sections of the intelligentsia, *i.e.*, those sections which are most valuable to society. In the present state of industrial society, when the role of the intelligentsia is growing unceasingly, this gulf must be seen as suicidal. . . .

Really, how can one justify detaining in prisons, camps and mental hospitals those people who are in opposition but whose opposition is legal, lying in the field of ideas and convictions? In a number of cases, moreover, it is not even a question of opposition at all, but simply of a desire for information, for a forthright and unprejudiced discussion of important social issues. . . .

—From the Appeal of scientists A. D. Sakharov, V. F. Turchin and R. A. Medvedev to Soviet party and government leaders, March 19, 1970. Translated in Survey (London), Summer 1970, pp. 160–70.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

literature of political protest has come into being and—according to Andrei Amalrik, one of the most outspoken members of the Literary Opposition—is now being circulated among thousands of readers inside the Soviet Union.[30]

But the diffusion of the information and ideas contained in the *samizdat* publications is not measured only by the relatively few thousands of people who actually see them. For their audience is multiplied several thousandfold through foreign radio broadcasts, especially those of Radio Liberty in Munich. There are about 86,500,000 radio sets in the Soviet Union according to government statistics, and of these an estimated 27,000,000 are believed capable of receiving short-wave broadcasts from abroad.[31] Even allowing for exaggeration and defective equipment, we may still estimate that millions of Russians have access to Western broadcasts. During the last year, Radio Liberty has been reading the contents of *samizdat* publications over the air to the Soviet people. The letters of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn denouncing literary censorship; the proceedings of the trials of Andrei Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel, Yuri Galanskov and Aleksandr Ginzburg, Pavel Litvinov, and many other dissidents; and the host of appeals and petitions demanding respect for the constitutional rights of Soviet citizens—all these and more have been made known to a much broader segment of the Soviet population through the Radio Liberty broadcasts (the announcers often speaking slowly enough to permit their words to be written down or taped).

Thus *samizdat* is now reinforced by what has come to be called *radizdat*. As one Western observer has written, the publications and documents of the Russian opposition which find their way abroad now "become known to Soviet radio listeners from Minsk to Vladivostok."[32] Indeed, when *Izvestia* alluded to the "well-known" trial of Galanskov and his circle, it was conceding that, despite the failure of the Soviet press to report it, the broadcasts from abroad about the trial had reached the Russian people.

Emergent Political Philosophy

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the writings of the Literary Opposition is that one can discern in them signs of the emergence of a common political philosophy. The Scientific Opposition, as we have seen, rejects dialectical materialism in favor of the logic of science. The Literary Opposition goes on to reject the Marxist-Leninist notion of class ethics and class morality. Marxist doctrine holds that there are no universal ethical principles and that ethical norms vary with political-dialectical requirements; the Literary Opposition, on the other hand, holds that there is a universal moral law, binding on every man and expressing the underlying human qualities in him. The philosophy of the Literary Opposition might properly be described as "eternalism": contrary to the dialectical viewpoint, it affirms that there are ethical truths which are eternally valid for all human beings.

This revival of eternalism is especially apparent in the names of the philosophical authorities whom the writers of *samizdat* essays most frequently invoke. Marx and Lenin are rarely cited; instead, we find references to Ecclesiastes, to Pascal, Bergson, and to Montesquieu's view that "justice is intrinsic in the nature of things; it exists independently of man, and it is always one and the same no matter who employs it." One opposition writer invokes the view of the nonmaterialist Austrian Social Democrat, Friedrich Adler—whom Lenin excoriated as an "idealist"—that there will be an "ethical rebirth of mankind . . . which all the best human minds have proclaimed."[33] In the first trial arising out of the demonstration of January 22, 1967, in Pushkin Square demanding freedom of expression, the defendant Viktor Khaustov said that he had learned from Kant that the Soviet repressive decrees were "contrary to the basic universal principles of law"; Kant's books, he said, "made me see a lot of things in a new light," and he had come to doubt the truth of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.[34] Vladimir Bukovsky, tried later for participating in the same demonstration, rejected the Leninist conception of freedom, asking in universalist terms: "What is the use of freedom to demonstrate 'for' if we can't demonstrate 'against'?"

[30] Andrei Amalrik, "An Open Letter to Kuznetsov," *Survey* (London), No. 74-75, Winter-Spring 1970, p. 99. Arrested last May, Amalrik was tried by a court at Sverdlovsk on November 11-12 and sentenced to three years in a labor camp (*The New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1970).

[31] *World Radio-TV Handbook, 1969*, Sundvej, Denmark, 1969, pp. 126, 246. The estimate of short-wave sets is made by Radio Liberty, *Guest in the Home* (brochure), Munich, 1969.

[32] Karel Van Het Reve, Ed., *Dear Comrade! Pavel Litvinov and the Voices of Soviet Citizens in Dissent*, New York, Pitman, 1969, p. XI.

[33] See selections from *Phoenix 1966*, *Russkoe slovo*, July 1966, *Tetrad*, November-December 1965, in *Problems of Communism*, September-October, 1968, pp. 71, 78, 81, 82.

[34] Pavel Litvinov, *The Demonstration in Pushkin Square*, Boston, Gambit, 1969, pp. 38, 79.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, recently awarded the 1970 Nobel Prize for literature, is of course the towering figure of the Literary Opposition. A man of immense moral authority as well as literary genius, he does not conceal his contempt for the hypocrisy embedded in the Soviet social system and is therefore hated by the Stalinist secretaries of the Writers' Union. Solzhenitsyn, too, rejects the Marxist viewpoint in favor of an "ethical socialism" based on eternal moral truths. Those whom he cites as his intellectual forebears (in a remarkable passage in *Cancer Ward* in which the old Bolshevik librarian, Shulubin, reviews his lifetime of experience with the degeneration of Soviet society) are Vladimir Solovev, Piotr Kropotkin, and Nikolai Mikhailovsky. This choice of heritage is significant. Solovev was a religious philosopher who argued for a social order founded on ethical premises; Kropotkin was the author of *Mutual Aid* and *Ethics;* and Mikhailovsky was the "subjective sociologist" and believer in free will against whom Lenin directed his first book.

An ethical socialist society, says Solzhenitsyn, cannot emerge from an order "that's always drumming on about hatred," nor is even "democratic socialism" sufficient; the needed reform must go beyond the alteration of political forms. Marxism, he asserts, stands refuted by Soviet experience:

. . . we thought it was enough to change the mode of production and people would immediately change with it. But did they? The hell they did! They didn't change a bit. Man is a biological type.

On the contrary:

We have to show the world a society in which all relationships, fundamental principles and laws flow directly from ethics, and from them alone. . . . Whenever the question of frontiers arises, we should think not of how much richer or stronger this or that course of action will make us, or of how it will raise our prestige. We should consider one criterion only: How far is it ethical? [35]

In Solzhenitsyn's work, too, one finds the philosophy of eternalism set forth in opposition to the dialectical point of view. Solzhenitsyn stresses not the variations in social systems, but rather the psychological invariables that underlie them all. His protagonist in *Cancer Ward* observes: "There were greedy people before the bourgeoisie, and there'll be greedy people after the bourgeoisie." And to the claim that certain character traits are necessarily correlated with "bourgeois social origin," he replies: "That's a lot of nonsense, all about social origin." For Solzhenitsyn, the meaning of existence is not to be found in every person's being superseded in the dialectical process. "The meaning of existence," he writes, is "to preserve unspoiled, undisturbed and undistorted the image of eternity with which each person is born."[36] In his view, "socialization" and the compulsions of the "herd instinct" are more to be feared than "alienation," and he sees "an entropy of the human spirit" in the official culture.

Solzhenitsyn is the one Soviet writer who has skirted dangerously close to laying hands on the iconic name of Lenin himself, albeit indirectly. He dares to ask why Krupskaia, Lenin's widow, did not raise her voice against Stalin, adding: "Who knows, we might have changed, might have dug our heels in and stopped it from going any further." While still holding to the moral concept of a socialist society, Solzhenitsyn is not prepared to make a shibboleth of "socialism." He wonders, for instance, whether the whole Soviet system of socialized medicine hasn't been a failure, and whether it wouldn't be better to have a less impersonal form of medical care, with the patient paying the doctor directly for treatment, and the doctor having to depend on the impression he makes on his patients. He regards it as tragic that "the most comforting figure in our lives," "the family doctor," has been "pulled up by the roots." He also has a kind word for an Armenian who wants to devote himself to private commerce, and tells how inmates in the camps used to discuss the greater flexibility of a free market system as compared to Stalin's command economy. Solzhenitsyn speaks for the moral consciousness in the tradition of the classical Russian writers: "A man dies from a tumor, so how can a country survive with malign growths like labor camps and places of exile?" [37]

Linking the Oppositions

Solzhenitsyn's work, moreover, provides a bridge between the Scientific and the Literary Oppositions. In his quest to recover a basis of sanity, he ex-

[35] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Cancer Ward*, tr. Nicholas Bethell and David Burg, Bantam Ed., New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1969, pp. 440-442.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 405, 428, 250, 435.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 520.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pounds Francis Bacon's classical theory of idols—those of the cave, the theater, and the market place—and he turns the power of empirical analysis on the standard Soviet clichés and "authoritative" opinions. The "idols of the cave" evoke in the mind of Solzhenitsyn's hero the image of a real cave, smoke-filled, with savages roasting meat, and in the depths a bluish idol—the whole image symbolizing the totemistic savagery of Soviet society. But in Bacon's scientific empiricism Solzhenitsyn sees the force of liberation from the irrational.

The symbiosis of the Scientific and Literary Oppositions raises the basic question: What social reconstruction is required to ensure that advancing technology and science will be used for moral ends? There is evidence that this and related issues are being discussed among large circles of people—not simply by way of the *samizdat* journals or even, as Solzhenitsyn told the Writers' Union, by way of the "hundreds of typewritten copies" of his novel *Cancer Ward* that were circulating in the Soviet Union. For instance, a new Russian edition of the works of H. G. Wells, in fifteen volumes, was published in 1964, and some 350,000 copies were sold. Its editor, J. Kagarlitsky, attributed Wells' attraction for Soviet readers to the fact that Wells raises the question as to what happens to a society when its science is separated from ethics and made subservient to moral backwardness.[38] It is known that Yevgeni Zamiatin, the author of *We*, the prototype of George Orwell's 1984, wrote a brochure on Wells. Neither *We* nor *1984* has been published in the Soviet Union, but as a substitute people can read such books as Wells' *The Holy Terror*, which narrates how a revolution led by an intellectual elite deteriorated into a Leninist-type dictatorship which then sought to organize a worldwide pogrom against the Jews. It is also noteworthy that two items of *samizdat* literature refer to the writings of the science-fiction novelist, Ray Bradbury.[39] The latter has been foremost in his craft for raising the specter of a dictatorial technocracy and its consequences in terms of the spiritual and cultural impoverishment of the people.[40]

It is the Literary Opposition which has to bear the brunt of official repression today. It is the intellectuals of small literary circles who have been most active in organizing demonstrations and who have been set upon and beaten by the police, arrested and sentenced to jail, hard labor at prison camps, or exile. They have the moral sympathy, but not the active political cooperation, of the Scientific Opposition. The demonstrations have been relatively few and have involved only small numbers of participants—starting with the student demonstration in Pushkin Square on December 5, 1965, protesting the arrest of Siniavsky and Daniel, and followed by a series of others, usually staged on behalf of successive groups of arrestees: first Galanskov, Ginzburg and Dobrovolsky; then Khaustov, Delaunay, and their friends; next Pavel Litvinov and Larisa Daniel; and finally, Anatoli Marchenko. At times, the Literary Opposition has merged with student protest and has put forward some unusual slogans demanding freedom of artistic expression. In April 1965, for instance, a group of young poets and students calling itself SMOG, an acronym for *Samoe molodoe obshchestvo geniev* (The Youngest Society of Geniuses), staged a demonstration in front of the Moscow Writers' Club. This group had organized itself after public readings of poetry were broken up by Komsomol operational squads, and its inspirers were the great literary figures who had withstood Stalinist pressures, such as Pasternak, Mandelshtam, and Tsvetaeva. As they paraded past the Writers' Club, they held aloft the slogan: "Socialist realism must lose its virginity."[41] Alas, socialist realism had done that long ago, bestowing its favors promiscuously, its practitioners being suitably rewarded by successive generations of party bureaucrats.

The Specter of the Masses

Let us turn now to a further question: To what extent do the Scientific and Literary Oppositions articulate a discontent felt by the masses? Andrei Amalrik states that "no one knows what kind of consciousness this mass has about itself," that "no one, including even the bureaucratic elite, really knows what attitudes prevail among the wider sections of the people."[42] Yet there is a fear, appar-

[38] J. Kagarlitsky, Ed., *The Life and Thought of H. G. Wells*, translated by Moira Budberg, London & New York, Barnes & Noble, 1966, pp. viii, 46, 82-85.

[39] See G. Pomerantz's "Address to the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow," translated in *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (September-October) 1968, p. 30; and A. Ginzburg's "A Letter to an Old Friend," in *ibid.*, No. 4 (July-August) 1968, p. 41.

[40] Sam Moskowitz, *Seekers of Tomorrow: Masters of Modern Science Fiction*, New York, Ballantine, 1967, pp. 356, 367.

[41] Pavel Litvinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 175.

[42] Amalrik, *Will the USSR Survive until 1984?*, p. 63.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ently widespread among Soviet intellectuals as well as in the ranks of officialdom, that the unknown, anonymous masses, if released from the regime's controls, would react in a bestial and savage way. It is a traditional fear in a Russia which remembers the frightful events of the uprising of Pugachev and Stenka Razin. The novelist Maxim Gorky feared the primitive animality of the Russian peasant, and Amalrik himself warns that if the Soviet government should collapse, "the horrors of the Russian revolutions of 1905-07 and 1917-20 will then seem simply like idyllic pictures." [43]

One might say that a mood of "socialist pessimism" grips both the intellectuals and the Soviet masses. They find it hard to be confident of any alternative, more than a half-century of Soviet rule having stifled the sense of an alternative, which is the essence of the experience of freedom. It is a feeling that history has reached its end: the socialist revolution has been made, a new world has been created, and lo! it is not good. Revolutionary idealism stands revealed as having played the fool, but history is irreversible, and what can one do but put up with the new order? One lowers one's level of historical aspiration and tolerates the official phrases, because evil is omnipresent and this is a Leviathan which cannot be brought to judgment.

If, like Job, one will not choose to curse God and die, one can at least forebear from having children. Thus, despite a huge propaganda of socialist optimism, the Soviet birthrate declines steadily. A recent sociological article in *Pravda* acknowledged the socio-psychological source of this phenomenon.[44] Data from "many parts of the country," the authors wrote, show that "the overwhelming majority of families want to have one child, or at the most two." Then they went on to suggest that the number of children desired "largely depends on the socio-psychological views held by the population and the psychological mood of the family." This mood, they say, is influenced by "material living conditions," but once formed it "becomes an important factor influencing the birthrate" and changes at a significantly slower pace than advances in living conditions. The article cites a report of the Moscow University Center for the Study of Population Problems which documented the reluctance of the general public to reproduce. People presumably do not anticipate singing tomorrows and have become, as we might say, narcissistic and pessimistic. Thus, although the authors aver that "the desire to transmit life to one's posterity is one of man's strongest natural drives," they intimate that Soviet reality has done something to discourage it, with the result that the will to maintain the present population no longer exists.[45]

Perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the prevailing mood of pessimism among Soviet citizens, especially among young intellectuals, comes from a young American student radical, Miss Kathy Boudin, now in hiding and sought by the police in connection with an explosion which destroyed a house in Greenwich Village last spring. Prior to these events, Miss Boudin had spent 15 months in the Soviet Union and in the spring of 1969 published a highly informative article on the feelings and opinions of Soviet students and intellectuals of the younger generation.[46] "Not only are they profoundly pessimistic," she wrote, "but they are suspicious of people who talk about doing this [participating in the protest movement in the United States] to make a better society." Whenever she had brought up such subjects as "collective decision-making," she reported, "a tense silence would fall on the conversation." To her Soviet friends, the "judgment of the collective" signified the pressures of "conformity or even repression." They submitted to these pressures in silence, for silence, at least, "separates them from those who lie." One remarked that he liked the atmosphere of horse races, because there at least people were honest about their hunger for money—"They don't have to lie and talk about the party or socialism."

To the young intellectuals Kathy met, socialism seemed humanity's blind alley. For them, she wrote, "planning was part of a disappointed dream. The word itself had a hostile set of associations . . ." They were especially "bitter" about the lack of freedom to live in the city of one's choice, for in the Soviet Union, anyone wishing to live in such cities as Moscow, Kiev, or Leningrad must first secure

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[44] D. Valentei and G. Kiseleva, "The Family, Children and Society," *Pravda*, Oct. 3, 1969; in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Oct. 29, 1969, pp. 10-11, 30.

[45] Symptomatic of the pessimism in Soviet society is the "constant rise in the consumption of alcoholic beverages and, in particular, strong alcoholic beverages" (*Izvestia*, May 27, 1969). Selective Soviet data reveal that "more than 40 percent of all divorces [in the USSR] are caused by the drunkenness of one of the spouses. In addition, there is an observable trend toward a certain increase in the percentage of divorces stemming from this cause" (*Pravda*, March 29, 1969).

[46] Kathy Boudin, "Mother Russia's Young," *Leviathan*, Vol. I, No. 1, March 1969. See especially pp. 39-42.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the approval of the police authorities, and young dissidents felt keenly that only in such cities could they form communities to overcome their isolation. They felt, furthermore, that this and other abuses of human freedom were inherent in the system of centralized economic decisions, and that doing away with central planning entirely was the only —but altogether unlikely—alternative. Even their literature, they believed, would remain dull unless a "free market economy" were established "in which money translates people's wishes"; otherwise, people would still remain under the thumb of the party's Ideological Commission.

Such was the dominant tone of Soviet pessimism, as experienced and described by a militant American "New Leftist." Plato envisaged a totalitarian society in which the guardians imposed a Noble Lie on the people. The Soviet pessimists think that their government rules by an Ignoble Lie.

The Mood of Pessimism

The mood of socialist pessimism is reflected again in a unique literary phenomenon in the Soviet Union—namely, the popularity of the *Book of Job*. Not only are there notable incidental references to Job's philosophy and plight, but in August 1967 an article in *Nauka i Religia*, the regime's journal of popular science and atheism, acknowledged specifically that the *Book of Job* has a rare appeal not only to believers but also to scientific historians. Job, said the article, was a man who reached the height of realistic thought concerning life and people. His viewpoint was that one cannot find a measure for morality in the flux of natural and historical events, and he raised the unanswered questions of being. Of course, the article concluded on the happy note that revolutionary energy would emerge triumphant, but Job's indictment of the laws of existence had made itself felt even in the hollow pages of the official organ of atheist optimism.[47] It is noteworthy in this connection that despite the immense anti-religious pressures brought to bear by the regime, the majority of all workers in Moscow (57.7 percent of them) are still married in church, and no less than 70.4 percent of them have their children baptized.[48] This behavioristic fact is far more significant than the same survey's claim that only 11.2 percent of them acknowledge being religious believers. As Friedrich Engels said, quoting Goethe's emendation of St. John, "In the beginning was the deed."

In one important respect, the present mood of pessimism in the Soviet Union differs from the previous similar currents in 1926 and 1937: there has been a relative absence of the suicides that used to spread among the intellectuals. In 1926-27, for instance, a virtual epidemic of suicides—the so-called *Yeseninshchina*—swept the Soviet intellectual community. Goethe's Werther may have killed himself out of *Weltschmerz*, but the 1926-27 Soviet suicidal urge was more a case of *Sozialismusschmerz*, for which the self-destruction of the poet Sergei Yesenin set the fashion. At the Higher Institute of Painting in Moscow, a whole series of suicides was inspired by Yesenin's example. The ablest Bolshevik ideologists—Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek—polemicized against "Yesenism," rebuking the dead poet for his lack of faith in the revolution. The poet Maiakovsky, who himself was to commit suicide a short time later, estimated in 1927 that something like 40 percent of his fellow artists were enthralled by Yesenin's act. The People's Commissar of Health pleaded for greater forebearance toward unstable personalities. The Commissar of Education, A. V. Lunacharsky, tried to draw a distinction between Yesenin and Yesenism and said that Yesenin's act was prompted by a desire to kill the hooligan in himself. Maiakovsky surmised that Yesenin's neurosis arose from his inability to fuse with the proletariat, while Ehrenburg said that Yesenin was alienated from his epoch.[49]

The suicides of 1926-27 and of the latter 1930's obviously belonged to a different category than the standard, established types of suicide, a category that might best be termed "ideological suicide." Yesenin and those who followed his example did not kill themselves because their own egoistic, com-

[47] M. Belenky, "'Orakh Olam' and the Book of Job," *Nauka i Religia*, No. 8 (August) 1967, p. 47. Cf. *Research Materials on Religion in Eastern Europe*, published by the Centre de Recherches et d'Etude des Institutions Religieuses, Geneva, Switzerland, Vol. I, No. 11, January 1968, p. 3.

[48] *Nauka i Religia*, No. 1. (January), 1967, p. 35. Also see *Research Materials on Religion in Eastern Europe*, Vol. I, No. 6, August 1967, p. 2.

[49] I owe my knowledge of these facts to a Ph.D. thesis by Constantin Vincent Ponomareff, *S.A. Yesenin in Soviet Criticism, 1917-1927*, University of Toronto, 1970. Also see Max Eastman, *Artists in Uniform*, New York, A.A. Knopf, 1934, p. 60. On the wave of suicides in the 1930's, see P. I. Yakir, "Stalin: A Plea for a Criminal Investigation," in *Survey*, No. 70-71, Winter-Spring 1969, p. 265; and Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Twenty Letters to a Friend*, translated by Priscilla Johnson, New York, Macmillan, 1967, p. 114.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

petitive goals had been frustrated, or because an altruistic concern for the community demanded such an act, or because they were confused and disoriented by the change from a system with one set of values to another. Rather, they took their own lives because they had come to realize that the ideology they had embraced entailed self-deception, fantasy, or hypocrisy, and that in defending it, they had become instruments for making the world a worse rather than a better place.[50]

Such "ideological suicides" have been singularly lacking in the modern-day ranks of either the Scientific or the Literary Opposition. No essays have been published on the theme and, as far as we know, few of those intellectual dissidents who have been arrested and sent to prison, labor camps, or insane asylums have killed themselves.[51] American students at Moscow State University report that each year six or seven of their Soviet fellow students kill themselves by jumping out of their dormitory windows, in addition to an unknown number who resort to more private means; but neither a Solzhenitsyn nor a Siniavsky has touched off a new *Yeseninshchina*. And the reason is not far to seek. They have not been involved with a bankrupt ideology; they have no commitment to Marxism, Leninism, or Stalinism; they bear no ideological guilt. As long as the new ethical opposition remains free from impulses of self-destruction, one can hope that it will become a strong counterforce for rational action and for liberation from Soviet pessimism.

The generational apathy and pessimism that is so pronounced among the youth has not, of course, escaped the attention of Soviet writers and social scientists. In discussing it, however, they are compelled to adopt the tone of what may be called "Soviet obliqueness." The facts are never simply and fully stated but are usually referred to in a kind of indirect way as if they are not to be taken as really real. A current epistemology holds that what data are taken as facts depends on one's theory, and Soviet analysts, as scientific revolutionists, have been following this rule for a long time.

Nevertheless, the gifted writer Viktor Nekrasov dared in 1965 to include in an essay some forthright reportage on the generational disaffection. He told of a young man who said to a group of older people:

We do not believe you. We do not believe a word. We twenty-year-olds do not believe anyone who is over thirty.

When the elders remonstrated, the young man replied:

I have seen my own father. He believes himself to be an honest man . . . but all his life he has lied. Lied to me, to my friends, to mama, to himself. He lied when he eulogized Stalin. . . . He lies now. . . .

There are, wrote Nekrasov, many such fathers, people who were "simply cowards," but he added that there are many such young, too, "who have in their pockets Komsomol and even party membership cards." When Nekrasov's essay was published, these passages were deleted by the censors.[52]

From the standpoint of intellectual development, the most remarkable and novel fact is that Soviet intellectuals, for the first time in many years, are discussing the questions: How will the instabilities of Soviet society evolve? Will that society break down, and if so, when and how? What has hitherto been treated as an "unproblem"—namely, the inherent "contradictions" in Soviet society, to borrow the Marxists' own terminology—has now become a real problem. Solzhenitsyn, for one, is confident that the system will eventually collapse, and that its minions will then hasten to try to erase and explain away their signatures to neo-Stalinist documents. Amalrik speculates on the catastrophic consequences that would follow a threatening war with Communist China.

There are already some hopeful signs that the Scientific and Literary Oppositions are making real headway. One is the fact that a curious fractionalization of the Soviet police and control machinery has evidently begun to take place. A similar phenomenon took place in the gestative years of the French Revolution. In 1751, Lamoignon de Malesherbes, a young nobleman sympathetic to the new political and philosophical ideas, became France's Director of Publications in charge of all censorship and licensing of books. But while his agents were raiding the quarters of the forward-

[50] The classical document of "ideological suicide" is *The Last Words of Adolf Joffe: A Letter to Leon Trotsky*, translated by Max Eastman, reprinted Colombo, Ceylon, 1950. For the story of Joffe's suicide, cf. Leon Trotsky, *My Life*, translated by Max Eastman, New York, Scribner's, 1930, pp. 535-537.

[51] However, a student who was penalized for condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia tried to commit suicide (Cf. "Documents: Soviet Union," *Survey*, No. 74-75, Winter-Spring 1970, p. 202). On instances of suicide among convicts in the labor camps, cf. Anatoli Marchenko, *My Testimony*, translated by Michael Scammell, New York, Dutton, 1969, pp. 87-88, 375.

[52] "Problems of the Younger Generation in the Soviet Union," Radio Liberty *Dispatch*, March 9, 1970, pp. 4-5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

looking French philosopher, Denis Diderot, Malesherbes was hiding Diderot's manuscripts in his own house, assuring the philosopher that they would be absolutely safe there. "Without Malesherbes," writes an American scholar, "the *Encyclopedia* might never have been completed."[53] Malesherbes also did his best to forewarn other *philosophes* of impending searches.

According to Amalrik and such outside observers as Max Hayward, an analogous phenomenon is now beginning to take place in the Soviet bureaucracy, and especially in the secret police. We might call it a process of "bureaucratic secession." Why, for instance, do the usually assiduous secret police fail to halt the circulation of *samizdat*? Not because of playfulness, says Amalrik, but because "the uncertainty in which the KGB and the regime as a whole find themselves."[54] Again, how does one explain the access which Zhores Medvedev obtained to the secret-police dossier on the Vavilov case? Or the numerous confidential items concerning the regime and the secret police that are constantly being published in the *samizdat* journals? The answer may be that some sections of the secret police and regime are starting to collaborate with the democratic Opposition; that we are seeing the beginnings of an intellectual secession of the bureaucracy.[55]

The Impetus of Competition

In trying to explain the intellectual and emotional changes currently taking place in the Soviet Union, there are many who would emphasize the growing functional requirements of a technological society. The society of "mobilization" has achieved its primary goals, they argue, and with industrialization an accomplished fact, the scientists and technicians can now safely demand the liberties they need in order to administer such a complex, economically advanced society—in other words, free thought has become a technological requirement. Actually, the facts we have reviewed are at variance with this functionalist-dialectical interpretation.

A closed technological system under Communist totalitarian rule, where there exists no competitive situation posed by the active presence of a liberal society, would still be capable of maintaining itself, while at the same time keeping its scientists and intellectuals subservient. Thus, while the Soviet Union, under Stalin's regime, was constructing its technological base, not only the country's literary talent but also its scientific talent were bullied, cajoled, and imprisoned: Kapitsa, for example, was placed under house arrest, and Landau was in prison. Scientific progress might flag, to be sure, but in the absence of a competitive alternative, this would be of little moment. The system might then take on the character of a stationary society.

In other words, there is no immanent dialectical necessity for the emergence of freedom in a technological society. The mainspring for the development of a certain degree of freedom in the USSR has been, above all, the intense competition in which the Soviet Union has been engaged with the United States. This is what keeps the marginal utility of scientists high in the estimate of the Soviet leaders. In the 1930's, the socialistic enclave of the United States' Tennessee Valley Authority was regarded as a yardstick by which to measure and prevent capitalist exploitation; today the status of scientists and intellectuals, as well as ordinary men, in capitalist society is the yardstick which exposes, and at the same time tends to mitigate, Soviet exploitation. Thus, the emergence of freedom in Soviet society is the outcome of an interaction between the two systems and not an immanent trend within the Soviet system alone. Soviet intellectuals are indeed beginning to grasp the truth that anti-intellectualism would flourish exceedingly in a universal Stalinist or Maoist system. But it is not so much the functional requirements of an industrial-technological society or some inner political dialectic of socialism as it is the competition with a free society that has helped to win for the Soviet intellectual community its still limited and partial freedoms.

The fear that above all haunts the Soviet leaders is that a kind of socialist exhaustion will come to pervade their people and that the economy itself will then begin to decline sharply, as it did in Czechoslovakia under comparable circumstances. Then, the combination of scientists and intellectuals might be reinforced by defecting bodies of bureaucrats, union members, collective farmers, and minority nationalities. Were this to happen, the Prague Spring might yet become the Moscow Summer.

[53] Lester G. Crocker, *The Embattled Philosopher: A Biography of Denis Diderot*, Lansing, Michigan State College Press, 1954, pp. 91, 237.

[54] Amalrik, "An Open Letter to Kuznetsov," *loc. cit.*, p. 99.

[55] Max Hayward, "Journey to Siberia," *Survey*, No. 74-75, Winter-Spring 1970, pp. 84-85. D. Pospielovsky, "Two Years of the Chronicle of Current Events," Radio Liberty *Research Paper*, No. 37, 1970, pp. 2-3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Plight of Soviet Jews

By Maurice Friedberg

Between January 15 and 22, 1970, tens of thousands of census takers visited Soviet homes throughout the USSR in the first population count that has been made in over a decade. Most of the findings have not yet become available, but preliminary calculations already made public indicate that Russians are gradually becoming outnumbered by non-Russians and, less surprisingly, that a greater percentage of the country's population now lives in the cities. At the date of writing, it seems possible to predict with certainty that when more data are released (probably in December 1970), they will reflect a significant increase in the Jewish population of the USSR; whereas the 1959 census recorded a total of 2,268,000 Jews, the corresponding figure in 1970 should be somewhere in the vicinity of 3,000,000, due both to actual growth and to the fact that more Soviet citizens have now avowed their Jewish origins. In recent months the three-million figure has come to be used with increasing frequency in Soviet periodicals, particularly in the publications of the Novosti Press Agency, which are destined for foreign consumption, and it has also been cited by Russia's lone Yiddish journal, *Sovietish heimland*. If the figure is correct—and there are no reasons to suspect the Soviet authorities of trying to inflate it—it would make the USSR the world's second largest center of Jewish population, larger than Israel itself and surpassed only by the United States.

Another finding of the 1970 census may well be even more surprising than the registered increase of Jews. Provided the statistics are not tampered with, the number of speakers of Yiddish should be significantly larger than the 400,000 reported in 1959. The reason is that in the latest census, respondents were asked to identify not only their native language (which in the past—according to a Soviet demographer, writing in a Yiddish periodical published in Warsaw[1]—was often interpreted as the language used at the factory or in the office) but also any other langugage of the peoples of the USSR which they knew. The Jews of the USSR include a very large number of bilingual persons, but under the terms of the 1959 census Russo-Yiddish bilingualism went unrecorded. Hopefully, the 1970 census should correct the record.

Director of the Russian and East European Institute at Indiana University (Bloomington), Mr. Friedberg is a frequent commentator on Soviet and Communist affairs.

[1] Yakov Kantor, writing in *Bleter far geshikhte* (Warsaw), Vol. XV, 1962-63; as referred to by William Korey in "Soviet Law and the Jews," *The Unredeemed: Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union*, Ronald I. Rubin, ed., Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1968, pp. 68-69.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet there are certain developments the new census will *not* record which are perhaps as important for an understanding of the changes in Russia's Jewry in the last decade as any of the statistical evidence. These are the twin phenomena of a new phase of government-inspired antisemitism and, in reaction, a strong resurgence of ethnic consciousness among Russia's Jews.

The nearly total absence of sociological information in the USSR makes it difficult to determine with any degree of precision the extent and intensity of Jewish ethnic awareness at different periods of Soviet history. That there was very significant Jewish assimilation prior to Word War II is beyond dispute. At the same time it is impossible to accept the validity of the official view long prevalent in the USSR that acculturation and even a complete disappearance of religious, linguistic and cultural distinctions are tantamount to a loss of ethnic identity. This simplistic view has been belied by recent trends in a number of Western countries, including Canada, Belgium and perhaps particularly the United States, where until quite recently, the idea of the "melting pot" was accepted as an article of democratic faith. Lately this view has even come to be challenged in the USSR itself.[2]

In any event, the process of assimilation— such as it was—came to an abrupt halt with the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet war. It suddenly became obvious that all Jews were considered equal by Hitler's armies—whether unassimilated or Russified, whether rabbis or Communists—and that even the children of mixed marriages were not exempt from the "final solution." The death warrant applied to Jewish civilians in occupied towns and to Soviet Jewish prisoners of war. It was equally clear that, harshly though the Nazis may have treated others, among all the ethnic groups of the USSR the Jews alone were to be physically exterminated by every possible means. This fact was not then—and still is not—admitted by the Soviet authorities. But by 1945 there was hardly a Jewish family in the European part of USSR that was not aware of the fact from firsthand experience.[3] The mass slaughter of Russia's Jews by the Nazis was greatly facilitated by the fact that the Jews were readily identifiable by their internal passports, which registered them as members of a distinct ethnic group, as they still do to this day.

Three years after the war, the accumulated reservoir of Jewish ethnic consciouness briefly surfaced in the mass demonstration of welcome extended by Moscow's Jews to Golda Meir, the present Prime Minister of Israel, upon her arrival in 1948 as her country's first ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Soon thereafter the so-called "anti-cosmopolitan" purges began. As the famous motion-picture director Mikhail Romm noted after Stalin's death, it was common knowledge at the time that the term "cosmopolitan" was simply a euphemistic synonym for "dirty yid."[4] The viciously antisemitic campaign of Stalin's last years resulted in the closing of all Jewish cultural institutions—schools, theaters, and publications—and in the incarceration of hundreds and later in the murder of scores of Jewish cultural figures. The arrest, early in 1953, of a group of eminent Jewish physicians on trumped-up charges of medical murder appeared an ominous sign of more persecutions to come. It is wholly probable that Stalin's death was the only thing that saved the doctors—and many others—from liquidation.

The remainder of the 1950's provided a respite for Soviet Jewry. In announcing the release of the Kremlin doctors a month after Stalin's demise, *Pravda* accused "those responsible" for the arrests of "attempting to fan the flames of ethnic hatred, which is profoundly alien to socialist ideology"—thus making it indirectly clear that the new leadership condemned antisemitism as an official

[2] Thus the Soviet sociologist I. Kon writes: "First of all, not every linguistic assimilation is voluntary. It happens that minorities are simply deprived of an opportunity to cultivate their languages, since they are not taught in schools and are not used in cultural life. . . . But even a complete linguistic assimilation, the loss of one's native language and its transformation into a dialect, is not tantamount to a disappearance of other ethnic differences. A person may speak the language of the majority and yet consider himself a member of a national minority. It is not accidental that our censuses separate the question about one's native language from that about one's ethnic affiliation." I. Kon, "Dialektika razvitiia natsii" (Dialectic of the Development of Nations), *Novyi mir* (Moscow), No. 3, 1970, p. 145.

[3] The painful rediscovery of one's half-forgotten (if not, indeed, renounced) Jewishness was poignantly recorded by a large number of Russian writers of Jewish origin, among them Ilia Ehrenburg, Margarita Aliger, Ilia Selvinsky and Vasili Grossman. Much of their writing inspired by wartime Jewish martyrdom was not published until the liberal "thaw" of the post-1956 period. Some was never allowed to appear in print.

[4] *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-64*, Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz (eds.), Cambridge, Mass., 1965, p. 97.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy.[5] For the rest of the decade, and particularly after Khrushchev's "secret" speech of 1956, official antisemitism remained in discredit as one of the more odious features of the Stalin regime. Interestingly, the same years seemed to reflect a letup in Jewish ethnic consciousness—or at least in its outward manifestation. It seems likely that Soviet Jews —so recently subjected to open persecution—were content simply to share quietly in the greater security and affluence enjoyed by all Soviet citizens in this period. Their sense of relief did not, however, dispel apprehensions about what the future might bring. There can be little doubt that a significant number of Jews took advantage of the fact that in the 1959 census, for the first time, respondents were not required to present documentary evidence for their answers, and thus chose to conceal their Jewishness, declaring themselves to be Russian, Ukrainian, *etc.*

While the post-Stalin era thus brought about a substantial amelioration in the lives of all Soviet citizens, including Jews, by no means did the regime's policy represent genuine liberalization or result in a significant redress of specifically Jewish grievances. The limits of regime tolerance allowed for the founding of the Yiddish journal *Sovietish heimland* (at first a bimonthly, later changed to a monthly) and for occasional concerts or shows by Yiddish artists, but schools, theaters and other forms of cultural activity were not permitted to resume operation. Perhaps the hardest thing the Jews had to swallow in this period was the Soviet authorities' systematic effort to obliterate the record of Jewish suffering as well as Jewish heroism in World War II (a sentiment eloquently expressed by the poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko—himself not a Jew—in his famous 1961 work which began with the words, "There are no monuments at Babi Yar," the site of the mass execution of Kiev's Jews by the Nazis[6]).

In the year 1961 the position of Soviet Jews once again began to deteriorate rapidly. A campaign of vilification against Judaism was launched, and a number of religious Jews were arrested and imprisoned on charges of espionage. At the same time synagogues in provincial towns began to be closed one by one, usually to the accompaniment of attacks in the press depicting them as centers of black marketeering, drunkenness and espionage—charges echoed in "spontaneous" letters from local Jews pleading that the temples be shut.

The height of the campaign was reached in 1963 with the publication of Trofim Kichko's *Judaism Without Embellishment*, a crudely antisemitic tract which combined absurd fabrications about the teachings of Judaism (claiming, for instance, that Judaism permitted stealing from non-Jews) with cartoons that were so blatantly racist that they were denounced even by a number of Communist parties in the West. In response to such protests the Ideological Commission of the CPSU Central Committee issued a statement condemning the cartoons in Kichko's work as crude and offensive—without, however, disavowing the text proper.[7]

The anti-religious campaign aimed against Judaism appeared to be purposefully synchronized with a wave of well-publicized trials in a number of Soviet cities for a variety of economic offenses. These trials had a virulently antisemitic character: no opportunity was missed to inform the public that a particular culprit or his accomplices were Jewish or, failing this, had Jewish relatives and friends. Not infrequently, the "satirical" portrayals of the accused were reminiscent of the extremes of Nazi propaganda. But the antisemitic thrust of the campaign had some very concrete and sinister results as well. Of the 250 persons executed on charges of economic crimes (an unprecedented punishment for the commission of such crimes during peacetime), more than half were unmistakably Jewish. Considering the fact that the Jews comprise slightly over one percent of the country's total population, the implications were all too clear.[8]

It is against this background of a quarter of a century of persecution—beginning with the slaughters of World War II, continuing through Stalin's purges of 1948-52, and taking into account the anti-

[5] *Pravda*, April 6, 1953.

[6] For a discussion of the controversy stirred up by the publication of the poem, see William Korey, "The Forgotten Martyrs of Babi Yar," *The Unredeemed, op. cit.*, pp. 127-34.

[7] Trofim Korneievich Kichko, *Iudaizm bez prikras*, Kiev, Ukrainian Republic Academy of Sciences, 1963. Something of Kichko's background is worth reporting. According to an article by L. Oziabkina and N. Zarudny, published in *Literaturnaia gazeta* of Feb. 10, 1953, Kichko was a collaborator with the Nazis during World War II in the occupied Ukraine. After the war he tried to deceive the authorities with a fictitious account of having participated in a resistance group; the ruse failed, and he was expelled from the Communist Party. It is not clear whether he later regained party membership. The statement of the CC Ideological Commission appeared in *Pravda*, April 4, 1964.

[8] For an evaluation of these trials by the International Commission of Jurists, see "Soviet Jews as Economic Criminals" in Ronald J. Rubin, ed., *The Unredeemed, op. cit.*, pp. 115-26.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

semitic campaigns of his successors in the early 1960's—that we must view the flare-up of Soviet antisemitism and the unprecedented demonstrations of Jewish nationalist defiance that began three years ago.

The USSR's unconditional support for the Arab cause, which has been one of the pillars of Soviet foreign policy since the six-day war of June 1967, could not fail to have repercussions on the position of the country's Jews. The situation has revived memories of World War II, when Soviet propaganda, having discovered the ineffectiveness of appeals for loyalty to Marxist proletarian internationalism and to the Soviet system, switched to the old-fashioned, xenophobic approach of whipping up hatred of everything German and glorifying all things Russian. That such tactics did not suit a country professing to be opposed to any form of nationalism, indeed one whose pantheon of saints was headed by two Germans, Marx and Engels, mattered little. Ideological consistency clearly had to bow before pragmatic exigencies, and the allegedly anti-nationalistic Soviet Russia made use of every rusty weapon from the arsenal of anti-German bias.

ЗВЕНО ОДНОЙ ЦЕПИ—ПРЕСТУПНОЙ

Художник Ю. Кершин

Caption below: **"A link in a single, criminal chain."** ***Text above:*** **"Imperialists of the USA and FRG assist one of the most shameless detachments of Zionism—the rulers of Israel—in expanding aggression in the Middle East (from newspapers)."**

—From *Agitator* (Moscow), No. 10, May 1970.

The parallel is obvious. The accumulation of layers of antisemitism was such as to make a new upsurge of antisemitism an inevitable byproduct of the hard-hitting anti-Israeli campaign that was waged in the Soviet press, on radio and on television. Perhaps the antisemitic overtones of the anti-Israeli campaign could have been softened had a concerted effort been made to dissociate "good" and "patriotic" Soviet Jews from "bloodthirsty Israeli aggressors" and "imperialistic Zionists." This might have been accomplished through public pronouncements by the country's leaders, but no such attempt was made.[9] On the contrary, as the campaign of vituperation against Israel progressed, its antisemitic flavor became ever more pronounced. Cartoons featured stereotypes identified by a Star of David, the symbol that had also been used by the Nazis to identify all Jews; abundant use was made in anti-Israeli articles of venerable antisemitic clichés, questionable jokes and Yiddishisms familiar from ancient Jew-baiting lore; and no effort was spared to revive the specter of an international Jewish menace, with the obvious implication that *all* Jews were actually or potentially involved. Finally, a new propaganda *motif* was sounded to the effect that Israeli "aggression" and Zionist "plots" were aimed not only at the Arabs but at the Soviet bloc itself, and that both of these deadly daggers were poisoned with the venom of Judaism —*i.e.*, of a religious faith professed by the believers among Soviet Russia's own Jews.

As time went on, other uses were found for the newly generated reservoir of antisemitism. Its applicability was no longer limited to producing support for the government's pro-Arab stance. With increasing frequency it began to be used as a weapon in the struggle against liberal forces in the

[9] The only development that could be remotely related to such an effort occurred in March and April of 1970, when a barrage of statements by Soviet Jews suddenly appeared in the press, shrilly protesting loyalty to the USSR and declaring hatred for Israel (see further in the text). Note, however, that these statements were made by Jews themselves and *not* by authoritative figures in the party and the government.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

satellite countries, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as in the war against the Soviet Union's own dissidents.

Symptomatic of the Soviet authorities' decision to exploit antisemitism in their propaganda against Israel was the reappearance in print of Trofim Kichko, the aforementioned author of the antisemitic tract, *Judaism Without Embellishment*. On October 4, 1967, just four months after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, an article of his appeared in *Komsomolskoe znamia*, a provincial newspaper published in the Ukraine; and on January 20, 1968, *Pravda Ukrainy*, the republic's central newspaper, reported that Kichko's "services to atheist propaganda" (*i.e.*, his previously-mentioned antisemitic opus) were being rewarded with a scroll of honor. Soon thereafter a new book of Kichko's made its appearance. Its title was *Judaism and Zionism*, thus linking directly the practices and beliefs of Judaism to a hostile political ideology.[10] Indeed, Judaism in Kichko's book is only the first link in a sinister chain leading—of all things—to Nazism:

Judaism and Zionism educate the Jews in a spirit of contempt and even of hatred for other people. . . . What was there that had so much attraction for the Zionists in the Torah and the Talmud—tendentiously compiled by the prophets—and in the ideology of Judaism? First and foremost—the chauvinist idea of "God-chosenness of the Jewish people," the idea of Messianism and of ruling over the peoples of the world. . . . While the West German neo-Nazis talk about the superiority of the Aryan race, the Israeli Zionists relentlessly preach the "God-chosenness" of the Jewish people.

Kichko then struck the theme that no one should be surprised at these aspects of Judaism. After all, "The Talmud does not even consider someone of another faith a man, but merely a creature created in the image of man." And further, according to Kichko, Judaism proclaims that "the entire world belongs to the Jews."[11]

Kichko's book was soon followed by another monograph, Yuri Ivanov's *Beware, Zionism!*[12] Though similar to Kichko's in many respects, Ivanov's work concentrated on alerting the Soviet public to the menace of an international Jewish conspiracy: "The Zionists are using the false and reactionary concept of a 'world Jewish nation' in order to establish control over citizens of diverse countries, as long as they are of Jewish origin."[13] More dangerously, it intimated that Soviet Jews might not be immune to the blandishments of Zionism by pointing out that its slogans (and, by extension, those of American imperialism) "have evoked a response among some circles of the working Jewish intelligentsia."[14] Furthermore, Ivanov asserted that "Judaism is characterized by hatred of man, by preachment (in various ways and forms) of genocide, by cultivation of love of power, and by praise of criminal methods for the achievement of power." All this moved a team of Soviet reviewers, writing in April 1969, to observe that "unlike some other varieties of contemporary nationalism, Zionism, as Yuri Ivanov convincingly demonstrates, is completely devoid of any . . . progressive democratic features."[15] The equation was thus made complete: the world's most inhuman religion spawned the world's most vicious nationalism, one without any redeeming features.

[10] T. K. Kichko, *Iudaizm i sionizm*, Kiev, "Znania," 1968. The book was published in 60,000 copies in an inexpensive edition.

[11] Kichko's views were not isolated—similar pronouncements may be found both before and after the appearance of his *Judaism and Zionism*. *E.g.*, an article in *Pravda Ukrainy* of of Sept. 6, 1967, stated that Zionism ". . . promises the Jews that they will rule the entire world or, at the very least, enjoy a privileged position among the peoples of the entire world." A year and a half later, on March 9, 1969, *Sovetskaia Belorossiia* charged General Moshe Dayan with ordering 14 Arabs buried alive and commented: "He is a religious believer. He professes Judaism. In accordance with the tenets of his religion he considers himself 'God-chosen.'"

[12] Yuri Ivanov, *Ostorozhno, sionism!*, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1969. Printed in 75,000 copies.

[13] Soviet diatribes against the Zionist concept of a "world nation" as "false and reactionary" suffer from what may be described, to put it very charitably, a certain degree of inconsistency. Thus, for some years now, the USSR has been waging a campaign of "ingathering exiles" of its own. The object of this Soviet "Zionism" is the Armenian Diaspora, and those to be "repatriated" to Soviet Armenia are Armenians who have been residing abroad for generations. An interesting passage defining this Soviet "Zionism" is found in a introduction to an anthology of émigré Armenian prose entitled *Under Alien Skies*, brought out in Russia in 1967: "Normally an individual's place of birth, fatherland [*rodina*] and place of residence coincide. For many Armenians, however, these are altogether different concepts. They may have been born in Western Armenia [*i.e.*, Turkey—M.F.], but their fatherland is Soviet Armenia, even though they may be residing, say, in New York or in Beirut." (*Pod chuzhim nebom*, Moscow, "Progress," 1967, p. 5).

[14] The same idea had been expressed earlier in *Krasnaia zvezda*, the newspaper of the Soviet armed forces, on Aug. 17, 1968: "The Zionists stubbornly strive to make all Jews, regardless of their citizenship and of their party loyalties, partners in the Israeli aggression and in the dirty actions of the Jewish big bourgeoisie and of international imperialism, which are aimed at the camp of peace and socialism. . . . Similar strategems were once resorted to by the Nazis in order to form their 'fifth columns' . . . ." The article also stated that Israeli intelligence was attempting to recruit "persons of Jewish origin residing in socialist countries." Similar ideas were expressed in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, Jan. 24, 1969.

[15] F. Zakharov, G. Krombet, V. Yushchenko "Sionistskaia shirma imperialisticheskoi reaktsii" (Zionist Screen for Imperialist Reaction), *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, No. 4, 1969, p. 133.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What is Moral?

The morality of Judaism is not connected with the real needs and interests of the people. Moreover, it is contrary to their interests; it is a certain manifestation of individualism and of egoism which are characteristic of antagonistic society. Judaism cannot be a model of morality because on one side it threatens people with "divine punishment" for sins, and on the other hand it itself sanctifies sins if they are in the interests of religion and of the exploiting classes.

Isn't the anti-humanism of Judaism best illustrated by the morality of the prophet Moses himself? About this "most meek and holy man" it is said in the Torah that by his deeds he brought about the loss of thousands of Egyptians. . . .

Judaism calls on man to reconcile himself with difficult conditions of life, because "God's ways are inscrutable." It accustoms man to the idea that on earth there is not, and there cannot be, justice; that misfortunes, evil, wars and the killing of millions of people occur at the will of Yahve himself. There is a direct connection between this morality of Judaism and what the Israeli Zionists are doing in practice. Wasn't it according to the Torah that the Israeli extremists acted during the latest aggression against the Arab countries? Aren't they directed by religious teaching when they commit new provocations in the Near East?

—From T. K. Kichko, *Judaism and Zionism*, Kiev; Society Znannia of the Ukrainian SSR, 1969.

Ivanov's book was obviously deemed a success, for an enlarged version of it was brought out early in 1970. Excerpts published in *Turkmenskaia iskra* on May 20, 1970, divulged at least one noteworthy addition: not only were the sinister Zionist forces linked with the French Rothschilds and with recent Czechoslovak émigrés (both claims had by now become routine), but *the Jews* (not just "Zionists") were even said to have infiltrated the Vatican. Soviet readers were confidentially informed, so to speak, that Augostino Cardinal Bea was a Jew who had converted to Roman Catholicism in order to promote Jewish interests. This particular kind of attack is eloquent testimony to the virulence of the present Soviet antisemitic campaign.

Soviet press reaction to the purges of Poland's remaining Jews early in 1968 consisted of a rather modest amount of reportage.[16] While one can only speculate about the reasons behind the Soviets' "hands-off" attitude, at least two considerations suggest themselves. First, Warsaw's attempt to remove the last, small vestige of Polish Jewry from all positions of influence in party and state by fanning popular antisemitic sentiments had provoked international outrage, and the Soviet authorities probably were not eager to associate themselves with the campaign any more than was necessary. Second, and more important, Moscow was aware that the antisemitic excesses in Poland had developed as a result of popular demonstrations of anti-Soviet feeling; thus open identification with Poland's campaign against the Jews could have been counterproductive.

The situation was very different in Czechoslovakia, where opposition to antisemitism had become one of the slogans of Dubcek's reformist forces. In its efforts to topple the liberals in Prague, Moscow was willing to exploit any issue at hand, and antisemitic propaganda became one of the major weapons it used against Dubcek, both before and after the invasion. For example, an anonymous pamphlet of the kind distributed by clandestine Soviet sources in Czechoslovakia prior to the invasion intoned:

The Federal German Republic is an agent of the United States, and Israel is an agent of the Federal Republic. . . . Our working class understands that financial power is controlled by international monopolistic capital and that the Jews are an international race. It is against these twin enemies that the international proletariat is rallying under the slogan, "Let us unite." The words of the party's present leader [Alexander Dubcek—M.F.] bear no relation to socialism. They employ, people say, the tactics of international capitalism, which is represented in our country by the Jews and their agents. Those Jews shrink from no kind of crime.[17]

A few days after the occupation of Prague, on August 26, 1968, the still defiant Czechoslovak radio commented:

We have learned at long last who is responsible for the

[16] For a documentary account of the 1968 antisemitic purge in Poland, see *The Anti-Jewish Campaign in Present-Day Poland*, London, Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1968.

[17] Cited in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 20, 1968. A similar line was pursued in East German propaganda: On August 25, 1968, a few days after the invasion, *Neues Deutschland*, the official newspaper of the East German Communist Party, charged that "Zionist forces have taken over the leadership of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party." Six days later, on Sept. 1, the same newspaper printed an article entitled "Prague is Ruled by Zionists."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

non-existent Czechoslovak counterrevolution. We have been told this by the official press of the occupiers, and they have done so in their usual refined and euphemistic way. They did not say outright "the Jews"; they said "international Zionism." Apparently our East German friends have been experts on this subject ever since World War II. . . . Allegedly, 2,000,000 people are involved, and after their liquidation the soldiers are apparently to leave the country. . . . Why cannot these 2,000,000 Zionists be found if the Soviet army command or perhaps *Neues Deutschland* wishes to find them? Anyhow, the Germans today are the only real experts able to distinguish with absolute accuracy between Aryans and inferior races.

Within days Czechoslovakia's Soviet "friends" were to abandon any pretense of refinement and to forego the use of euphemisms. On September 4, 1968, *Izvestia*, the official newspaper of the Soviet government, sought to discredit liberal Czechoslovakia's cause by unmasking her foreign minister, Jiri Hajek, as a dishonest, greedy Jew and a Nazi collaborator. Wrote *Izvestia*:

A question suggests itself: Who is that J. Hajek? Who was the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's Minister of Foreign Affairs? . . . People say that during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia J. Hajek, in order to save his life, wrote flattering articles for the Gestapo. And that it was the Gestapo that saved J. Hajek's life, but that Hajek had to "earn" it by doing quite a bit of work for the Nazis. It was perhaps for that reason that he eventually changed his name from Karpeles to Hajek. During the last two weeks Hajek-Karpeles has been running all over the world, from city to city and from village to village. He has been to Belgrade and to Vienna, to New York and to London, to Zurich and to Geneva. . . . Some people intimate that he is getting ready to go overseas once again, to the United States. One of his "friends" there promised him a "big job" with an advertising agency.

Although *Izvestia* published a "correction" sometime later (only to the extent, however, of admitting mistaken identity), there can be little doubt that the slur was premeditated: it is difficult to believe that the Soviet authorities had no reliable biographical information on a cabinet member of a Warsaw Pact nation. Besides, there was no mistaking the flavor of the article with its tone of conspiratorial whisper of a widespread rumor, and the use of a reasonably common Jewish name of Karpeles. Jiri Hajek's answer appeared in the Prague magazine *Reporter* on October 19, 1968, one of the journal's last issues before its suppression by the Soviet authorities. Hajek pointed out that attacks on him had appeared in the press of "certain" socialist countries:

Some of these attacks had a distinctly racist character and were devoid of any foundation. It is not true that I am of Jewish origin. But I must add here that I would not be ashamed of it if I were, because I think that a man should be judged on the basis of what he does and how he behaves and because I think that in this country racism was disowned long ago.

Since the summer of 1968 a number of items in the Soviet and East European press have blamed "Zionism" not only for the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia but also, retroactively, for a number of other calamities.[18] Much of this propaganda, particularly that originating in Arab countries (for cross-reporting from Arab countries is now quite common), has been overtly antisemitic.[19]

Extensive use of antisemitism has also been much in evidence in the Soviet authorities' struggle against political dissidents inside the USSR ever since the early 1960's. Thus, a good deal of Jew-

[18] *E.g.*, N. Gasarov, writing in the January 1969 issue of *Sovetskie profsoiuzy*, the trade union journal, held "the Zionists" responsible for the Czechoslovak "counterrevolution" of 1968 and for analogous events in Poland in 1956.

[19] *E.g.*, on March 8, 1969, *Izvestia* quoted *Al Dunia*, a pro-Communist Lebanese newspaper which claimed that Israel had access to all of Czechoslovakia's state secrets, including the details of Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations, "because many Jews residing in Czechoslovakia occupy important political, scientific and cultural positions and favor the abolition of socialism in Czechoslovakia and the restoration there of a capitalist regime which would favor Israel's interests."

"Outside" Agitators

In the period of the Poznan incidents in Poland in 1956 . . . Zionist groups that existed in the University of Warsaw, in the Polytechnic Institute, and in other institutes of learning, were engaged in constant incitement of the students. It was also not without the participation of the Zionist centers that the incidents of March 1968 took place in the Polish People's Republic. The Zionists had exerted their disintegrating influence on the youth of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as well.

—From *Sovetskie profsoiuzy* (Moscow), No. 2, January 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bating accompanied the trial, in February 1964, of Iosif Brodsky, the young Leningrad poet accused of "parisitism"; and an insidiously antisemitic atmosphere surrounded the trial, early in 1966, of Andrei Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel, the latter a Jew and both of them noted writers of the literary underground.[20]

[20] For details see *On Trial: The Soviet State versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak,"* Max Hayward, ed. and trans., New York, 1966. General background material may be found in my essay "Jewish Themes in Soviet Russian Literature," *The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917*, Lionel Kochan (ed.), London, 1970, pp. 188-207.

"Objectively" Speaking

They (Zionists) have always pursued only two basic objectives: reestablishment of control over Jewry and profiteering. (p. 61)

Zionist ideas reflected nothing more than the desire of the Jewish bourgeoisie to regain control over the distintegrated Jewish communities. These ideas did not rest on the objective laws of development of class society of which the Jewish communities formed an intrinsic part, but on the subjective intention of the reactionary forces to retard the fusion of the Jewish working masses with the working people of other nationalities. (p. 63)

The main targets of the subversive activity of the international Zionist concern . . . have been and continue to be the Soviet Union, all socialist countries, the international communist working class, and the national liberation movement. . . . The campaign against the socialist community, and against the Soviet Union in particular, is being conducted under the ragged banner of "protection of the Jews." . . . What conclusion could be drawn from the fact that the neo-Nazis in Bonn organize a "week of solidarity and defense" of the Israeli Zionists, while the latter organize a "week of solidarity and defense" of Soviet Jews? (pp. 153-54)

—From Yuri Ivanov, *Ostorozhno: Sionizm!* (Beware: Zionism!), Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970.

The intensification of official antisemitism in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war has already been described. A recent example of the continuing virulence of the campaign was the publication early this year of two novels by Ivan Shevtsov, *In The Name of the Father and the Son* and *Love and Hate*, both of which combine scathing attacks on the Soviet liberal intelligentsia in general with openly antisemitic references and portrayals.[21] For example, in the first novel—which features distasteful caricatures of such cultural heroes of the Soviet liberals as the young poets, Bela Akhmadulina and Andrei Voznesensky—numerous references are made to Trotsky with emphases on his Jewish antecedents. The second work, brought out significantly enough in an initial printing of 200,000 copies by the publishing house of the Ministry of Defense, again contains some malicious cartoons of a number of non-Jewish Soviet liberal intellectuals, but its main thrust is blatantly antisemitic: even the non-Jewish villains and weaklings are charged with glorifying "Einsteins and Eisensteins" while denigrating Russia's cultural achievements. Of the novel's two central Jewish villains, one, named Dubavin (who shamefully conceals his Jewish first name and patronymic) is not only a repulsive corrupter of innocent Russian maidens, but, as we learn later in the novel, also a foreign spy. In his spying activities, his alias is "Henry Schwartz"; his accomplices and friends also have non-Russian names. The other Jewish villain, Naum Goltser, is sinister to the point of grotesqueness. He is linked to a foreign journalist named Jack Sidney Davie, who is expelled from the USSR for smuggling "narcotics and Zionist propaganda" into the country. Like the other Jew in the novel, Goltser is a lecher who forces a Russian girl into unnatural sex acts. He is also a purveyor of narcotics, although he himself would not touch the stuff. To top it off, Goltser commits two murders, both related in gruesome detail; one of the victims is his girl friend, a narcotics addict, and the other his own mother.

As in the past, the Soviet regime's reversion to a course of open and active antisemitism has been accompanied by direct efforts to force the Jews

[21] Ivan Shevtsov, *Vo imia otsa i syna*, Moscow, Moskovski rabochi, 1970 (65,000 copies); *Lyubov i nenavist*, Moscow, Voennoe Izdatelstvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1970 (200,000 copies).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

themselves not only to declare their support for regime policies but to deny that there could be such a phenomenon as ethnic discrimination in the Soviet state. Following up the publication of a few anti-Israeli statements by individual Soviet Jews that in and by themselves might have passed as authentic, the Soviet propaganda machine unleashed a campaign so patently engineered from above that even without supporting evidence (some of which has leaked to the West) it was obvious that pressure had been brought to bear on the Jewish population. It started early in March with an unprecedented press conference, clearly arranged by the Soviet authorities, at which a number of prominent, if ill-assorted, Soviet Jews—including an aged rabbi, a prima ballerina, several scientists and even some army generals—denounced Israel and Zionism for the benefit of foreign newsmen and the television cameras. In the same week, the Soviet press began to print literally hundreds of reports of protest meetings as well as statements by Soviet Jews, young and old, famous and obscure, religious and Communist—all of them suddenly moved to speak up in unison and, from one end of the country to the other, to proclaim their hatred of the Israeli "aggressors" and their unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Union. A few typical samples of these statements, all published on the same day (March 12), are provided by the following three declarations made respectively by a Jewish factory director in Kishinev, Moldavia, an ordinary Jewish worker in Riga, Latvia, and a Jewish artist in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan:

They [the Israelis] have established a regime of unrestrained terror, they expel the Arab population from their homes, they destroy houses and lock up in prisons and concentration camps all those who resist these inhuman acts. . . . And after all this, Tel Aviv chieftains hope to find support among the Jews of our country. No, gentlemen, we shall never betray our fatherland, which has . . . raised us up in a spirit of patriotism and devotion to the Communist cause.—*(Sovetskaia Moldaviia)*

The Zionists . . . are trampling on the memory of Jews who were brutally murdered by the Nazis. They spit on the past, and now they embrace the murderers of the Jewish people. . . . Moreover, the government of Israel and its Prime Minister Golda Meir are "concerned" about having us, Soviet Jews, "return to Israel." Does Mrs. Meir understand that her words sound like delirium? We are home here, in our Fatherland, which we love fervently!—*(Sovetskaia Latviia)*

Golda Meir and her entourage insolently appeal to persons of Jewish nationality to leave the USSR for Israel. This will never be. I am a citizen of the Soviet Union and will never betray my beloved fatherland. . . . We [Soviet Jews] brand with shame the aggressor who launched the war against the freedom-loving Arab people.—*(Sovetskaia Estoniia)*

Reports have reached the West through a number of channels that statements such as these were elicited by various means and degrees of pressure and intimidation—ranging from "requests" or suggestions of party personnel at places of work or in other local organizations, to threats that jobs might be lost and other penalties ensue. While it is impossible to document such reports, the evidence of a well-organized propaganda effort directed from the center is overwhelming. The avalanche of protest meetings and letters to editors continued for precisely a month and a half, and then came to a sudden stop on April 14, presumably to avoid interference with the observances of the centennial of Lenin's birth a week later. It was resumed, though with much less intensity, in mid-May.

Doubtless these hundreds of pledges of Soviet patriotism were intended in part to serve as a response to intensified protests in the West against Soviet antisemitic practices—protests which have called upon the USSR to desist from anti-Jewish discrimination and to allow those Jews who so desire to emigrate to Israel, as Poland's Jews were recently permitted to do.[22] It seems fair to surmise that the campaign also reflected—and attempted to neutralize—the growing pressure of such protests from within the Soviet Jewish community.

The trend of recent developments makes it important to identify the aims of state-sponsored Soviet antisemitism. In terms of foreign policy considerations, there can be little doubt that the desire to please the Soviet Union's Arab clients has been a major determinant of official attitudes, as evidenced by the abundance of "anti-Zionist" and "anti-Judaic" fare in Radio Moscow's Arabic broadcasts. On the domestic front, the injection of antisemitism into the campaign against liberal dissenters has been aimed at presenting dissent as an "alien" phenomenon, whose carriers are themselves "aliens"—just as antisemitism was used earlier to provide scapegoats for Soviet economic deficiencies,

[22] One of the reasons why Communist Poland permitted her Jews to leave in 1968-69, while the USSR refused to do so, seems obvious: in Poland only a small number of people could take advantage of the opportunity. Before the purges of 1968, the country's Jewish population was estimated at slightly over 20,000. Approximately 15,000 are presumed to have emigrated.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

particularly the failure to provide the country with adequate supplies of consumers' goods. Finally, state-sponsored antisemitism has been meant to instill fear and submissiveness among the Soviet Jews themselves.

Whatever the degree of success in all the other respects, the effort to intimidate Soviet Jews shows signs of having backfired. While the suppression of Jewish culture and religion has inevitably taken its toll over the years, government-inspired Soviet antisemitism seems to have arrested and even reversed the process of assimilation among Russia's Jews. The few Yiddish concerts and theatrical performances that are now held are demonstratively attended by crowds of young Soviet Jews, even though they are ignorant of the language. Similarly, thousands of young Jews, atheists by default, have for some years been gathering around Russia's few remaining synagogues during Judaism's most sacred holidays in a gesture of ethnic solidarity and defiance of the Soviet authorities. There is hunger for information about Jews abroad, particularly those in Israel, and listening to foreign radio broadcasts is probably more widespread among Russia's Jews than among any other group in the population.

Going beyond such manifestations of solidarity, a number of Soviet Jews have dared to protest openly against the authorities' anti-Israeli propaganda since the six-day war of 1967, pointing out that such propaganda fans the flames of antisemitism within the USSR. An early and dramatic example was a letter of February 15, 1968, signed by 26 Jewish intellectuals residing in Soviet Lithuania and sent to the Secretary General of the republic's Communist Party. After pointing to dozens of examples of virulent state-sponsored antisemitism, the authors of the letter declared:

We realize that the anti-Israel propaganda conducted by the Soviet press is not intended for internal consumption and is not directed at Jews who live in the Soviet Union. However, we should not ignore the fact that, despite all the stylistic nuances, the anti-Israel propaganda, and especially the cartoons in the central press, have revived antisemitic passions. . . . We cannot be silent when the press prints material that nourishes Judeophobia. . . .

It is known that if the borders were opened for emigration today, some 80 percent of the entire Jewish populace of Soviet Lithuania [25,000—M.F.] would leave for Israel. . . . We are not wanted here, we are being completely oppressed, forcibly denationalized, and even publicly insulted in the press—while at the same time we are forcibly kept here.[23]

To date more than 150 such letters and petitions have reached the West. Many of them carry the signatures of scores of persons of every age and from every walk of life, all indicating their exact addresses. The contents are strikingly similar—resentment and suffering over Soviet antisemitism, along with pleas and demands that the signers be allowed to leave for Israel. Some of the petitioners have taken the desperate step of publicly renouncing their Soviet citizenship and declaring themselves to be citizens of the Israeli state.

Ominously, a number of these protesters have been arrested since they dared to make their feelings known. One of the first and most publicized cases was that of a young engineer named Boris Kochubievsky, who was put on trial in May 1969 for having issued public statements defending Israel and requesting permission to emigrate; for this "crime" he was sentenced to three years in prison. (By a macabre coincidence, his trial was held in the same old courthouse in Kiev which over 50 years ago witnessed the notorious antisemitic trial of Mendel Beiliss, a Jew accused of ritual murder.) At least 31 other Soviet Jews are known to have been arrested, but as of this writing none has been brought to trial.

What lies ahead is impossible to tell. But the implications of the recent past are fairly obvious. For some years Soviet propaganda has tended increasingly to portray Zionism as a variety of racism, indeed as equivalent to Nazism. While this assertion is as absurd as it is malicious, it suggests in a remote and distorted way the real issue confronting the Soviet authorities. Namely, there is no denying the fact that there exists a degree of interdependence and interaction between antisemitism and Zionism—a relationship that has existed between every type of ethnic, racial or religious oppression and the movements for emancipation that have sprung up among the groups so persecuted. Years of systematic oppression of Soviet Russia's Jews—in cultural, spiritual, psychological and other respects—have, with supreme irony, revitalized Zionist sentiments in that country to a degree that has not been evident for half a century.

---

[23] *Redemption! Jewish Freedom Letters from Russia,* ed. by Moshe Decter, New York, 1970, pp. 10-11, 13-14. A similar open letter was addressed two years later to one of the prominent Soviet Jews who denounced Israel during the campaign of March-April 1970. The author of the letter, V. Polsky, underscored that the campaign against Israel results in an intensification of hatred of the Jews within the USSR: "I have already witnessed how one of the readers, after studying your article, exclaimed: 'They murder children! Hitler didn't kill enough Jews!' Don't you understand that the hatred of the Jews of Israel that you incite . . . will turn into a sinister boomerang against the Jews of the USSR?" See *Jews in Eastern Europe* (London), August 1970, p. 89.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ballads from the Underground

Selected and Translated by Misha Allen

NOTE: A new genre of social commentary and dissent—magnitizdat—*has developed in the Soviet Union. It involves the use of private recording equipment to reproduce, circulate, and perform folk and protest ballads at private gatherings.* Magnitizdat—*which draws its name from the Russian words* magnitofon *(tape recorder) and* izdat *(to publish)—is an underground phenomenon, unsanctioned and deprived of public facilities through which it might be heard, although it is apparently not illegal. Among the most popular performers of the underground ballads are Mikhail Nozhkin and Vladimir Vysotsky, both established Soviet film actors. In the first of the selections presented here, Nozhkin sings of a quest for social justice and a less materialistic way of life. The next five ballads, all by Vysotsky, tell in true folk fashion of hypocrisy, of alienation, of prisoners and prison camps, and even of the meddlesome Chinese Communists ("A Letter from Workers in Tambov"). The final selection, the anonymous "A Ditty about Bedbugs," satirizes the very distressing problems of life in crowded Soviet apartments.*

These ballads from the underground are part of a voluminous collection of Soviet songs on record and tape belonging to Misha Allen. Mr. Allen is a Canadian specialist in Russian culture and folklore, as well as a translator and teacher.

Mikhail Nozhkin

AT THE LENIN MUSEUM

Year by year our life gets better.
Every shop has customers galore.
We grab up food and clothing—
What we need and often something more.
In our apartments crystal stands in rows;
In our homes, ceramics by the pound.
We snobbishly crave imported clothes,
And with junk our wardrobes all abound.

While in the Lenin Museum
There are two overcoats with bullet holes,
Two worn-out suits, a pair of shoes,
A cap, some books, and nothing else.

We should live more austere and simple lives.
Yet we worship fashion, luxury;
Put on airs of greedy merchant wives;
Fill our bankbooks with deposits;
Spend thousands on our pleasure cars,
And tend them as our precious dears;
Drape ourselves in sealskin and in mink,
And diamond jewels wear upon our ears.

While in the Lenin Museum . . . (*refrain*)

We live much better now, that's clear.
One might even say that life is great,
The life we labored for from year to year
And justly did anticipate.
Only, we should take great care
Lest we soar too high (and fall).
To save our human soul, let us
Once in half a century recall . . .

That in the Lenin Museum . . . (*refrain*)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vladimir Vysotsky

THE LENINGRAD BLOCKADE

I grew up during the Leningrad Blockade.
Then neither wine nor women turned my head.
I saw the Badayev Warehouses in ashes laid
And queued up for my meager dole of bread.

Brave citizens, what were you doing then,
When our city couldn't even count its dead?
You were eating caviar and bread, while I
Scrounged for cigarette butts instead.

Birds were grounded by the bitter cold.
For a thief there wasn't anything to bum.
That winter angels took away my folks,
And I feared that I, too, might succumb.

We were deluged with hunger, malnutrition.
All starved—even the public procurator.
We read news about evacuation
And listened to the radio commentator.

It seemed the blockade never would be over,
But our nation in the end won victory.
And now we could really live in clover,
If the volunteer militia'd only let us be.

I beg you kindly, citizens in armbands,
Don't lay upon my soul your grubby hands!
The AUCCTU, I'd suppose,
Our unpatriotic deeds already knows.[1]

SERIOZHKA FOMIN

Like any other gang a-roamin',
We sang all night and many a vodka drained.
We never liked Seriozhka Fomin,
Because he always seemed so self-contained.

Once at Seriozhka's, as we sat about
(It is true we always had reunions there),
We learned that war had broken out
As Molotov's famed words came o'er the air.

At the recruiting office I was told:
"Your plant will defer you—you're too old."
But I enlisted. Seriozhka Fomin didn't bother,
Thanks to the professor, his father.

While I shed my blood for country and for home,
Something always burned me up inside:
I was bleeding for Seriozhka Fomin,
While he sat back and didn't risk his hide.

At last the war was over.
The heavy burden from our shoulders passed.
I met Seriozhka Fomin. Lo!
"Hero of the Soviet Union" on his breast.

[1] The volunteer militia is an unpaid auxiliary police force which wears red armbands and patrols the streets of Soviet cities to combat hooliganism, *i.e.*, thievery, drunkenness, and brawling. Workers are recruited for these assignments through local organs of the AUCCTU (The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions), which also maintain work records of all citizens (including arrests and sentences). The thief in this ballad seems not to mind adding a new arrest to his record.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MY FRIEND HAS LEFT FOR MAGADAN

My friend has left for Magadan;
My friend has left for Magadan.
Take off your hats; wish him the best!
He went himself—
Without police, without arrest.[2]
Not because he wasn't doing well,
Or 'cause he's an oddball, as some tell.
He simply went.

I know that some will ask, "What for?
Why give up everything you have?
What's out there but labor camps galore
Full of murderers, full of murderers?"
He answers them, "The rumors are untrue.
Moscow has as many murderers, too."
Then he packed a suitcase—only one—
And left for Magadan, for Magadan.

It's not that I'm too old, you know.
(The other night I jumped off a moving tram.)
But Magadan's no place for me to go,
Closing chapters, forgetting who I am.
Instead, I'll sing to the sounds of my guitar
Of what he'll see out there so far,
Of what he's never seen before,
Of Magadan, of Magadan.

No guards will beat him on this trip.
He went of his own free will.
He volunteered to work up North,
Having had of us his fill!
And what has God in store for me?
Perhaps to Magadan I'll flee,
And see what my old friend's about,
Myself drop out!

GOD WILLING

You have gone for a short time.
God forbid we should meet again.
I am headed East by cattle car,
Sentenced, God willing, to the mines.

You won't cry and you won't grieve,
Nor see the family, young or old.
I don't give a damn, I'll be out here
Digging the fatherland's gold.

All has stopped; the wheels stand still.
The rails and ties have reached an end.
Had I the tears, the air I'd rend,
But tears no longer flow on earth.

Never mind, don't wait, Godspeed!
Don't let my hardship cause you pain.
But remember this, God willing,
Our paths shall one day cross again.

My term will end; I shall survive
And be a free man yet!
But here in exile I sleep on planks
And try my best to forget.

If windswept forests, endless blue I find,
How can I hold my tears?
Kilometers seven thousand lie behind.
Ahead? Seven blue years.[3]

[2] The fact that the subject of this ballad *chose* to work in distant Magadan (the normal route there is prosecution and exile) is a particularly bitter commentary on Soviet life.

[3] The Russian word for "blue" used here (*sineva*) also means "blue rot," a fungus disease of timber, implying the psychic and physical rot of imprisonment.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A LETTER FROM WORKERS IN TAMBOV

The skies are gloomy over Peking.
Here in Tambov we take a coffee break,
And from our Tambov factory we write
To you who risks so willingly would take.

Because you didn't sign the treaty,
The world must suffer—nations one and all.[4]
Distorting facts, you proved quite clearly
You've cast your lot with General de Gaulle.

We fully treasure every passing day.
But if antiquity one must recall,
It was you who gave the world gunpowder
And also built the ancient Chinese Wall.

We understand you have the people now
To survive three hundred million lost in strife;[5]
But we are sure that even Comrade Mao,
By God, would surely rather cling to life!

In the days when you on rice and water fed,
You manifested internationalism.

We doubt that while you munched on Russian bread
You uttered words about revisionism!

Do you fear the revanchists there in Bonn?
That Washington threatens to overwhelm?
But didn't someone state at the UN
That we are always set to give them hell?

You have no need for missiles or for bombs.
Don't fan the flames of war. We'll have you know
That, if the need arises, we are poised
To inflict on them a thermonuclear blow.

If it's for fruitful action that you itch,
There is plenty right at home for you to do.
Kill your flies; exterminate your sparrows;
And do something about your birthrate too!

As for our way of life, we here know better.
May we suggest you let such matters be,
As stated in the CC's special letter,[6]
With the line of which we all here quite agree.

Anonymous

A DITTY ABOUT BEDBUGS

There lives in my apartment
A clan of bedbugs red,
Each one from childhood known to me.
And all that friendly family—
By their smell, the color of their eyes—
From afar I'd recognize.

With the bedbugs I concluded
A separate little pact.
By steering clear of turpentine,
Kept our friendship quite intact.

But one night at seven thirty
When to snoozing I did fall,
Alas, I squashed a bedbug
'Twixt my finger and the wall.

Since then they have been raging
In a vengeful, bloody mood.
I've even captured black ones
From a tropic latitude.

Now a million bedbugs roam my flat
Set to chomp me up on sight,
And only in the bath or toilet
Can I find some peace at night.

[4] Presumably the reference is to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, from which the Chinese People's Republic and France both abstained.

[5] This alludes to Mao's boast that the CPR could lose 300 million persons and still be a great power.

[6] It is not clear what Central Committee document is meant here, but it obviously was a Soviet rebuttal to Chinese criticism.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Czechoslovakia: The Return to "Normalcy"

By Edward Taborsky

"The real tragedy of Czechoslovakia would begin if compromises swallowed up the true sense of our struggle and if nothing but the name of the democratization process were left," warned the Czech section of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union on October 31, 1968—some two months after the Soviet Union and four Warsaw Pact allies had invaded the CSSR.[1] The tragedy has since been consummated, and precious little now remains of Czechoslovakia's bold attempt to create "socialism with a human face," the term popularly applied to the dramatic liberalization of Czechoslovak society in the months following the January 1968 ouster of Antonin Novotny from leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS). Abetted by relentless pressure from the Soviet overlords for "normalization" (*i.e.*, reestablishment of rigid, centralized control over Czechoslovak society by a disciplined, pro-Soviet party), a collaborationist, hard-line clique of party veterans, under the somewhat moderating supervision of the present First Secretary, Gustav Husak, has captured control of the CPCS and compromised, distorted, or mutilated most of the achievements and promises of the liberal "Prague Spring" of 1968.

Every facet of Czechoslovak life has been deeply affected by these changes. Major purges have swept liberals and reformers from leadership positions in party, government, and mass organizations. The police now forcefully repress anti-Soviet and anti-regime demonstrations and prosecute demonstrators under stringent new statutes. Liberal influences which dominated the informational and cultural media and educational establishments in early 1968 have been removed or stifled. Decentralization of economic management—the crux of the New Economic Model (NEM) introduced in 1967 by Ota Sik and others—has been replaced by increasingly centralized management. The widespread experiment in Yugoslav-style workers' self-management has also been cast aside. Finally, the Husak regime has felt constrained to abjectly "legitimize" the Warsaw Pact intervention of August 1968, to prom-

[1] *East Europe* (New York), December 1968, pp. 31-32.

Mr. Taborsky is Professor of Government at the University of Texas (Austin) and author of Communism in Czechoslovakia: 1948–1960 *(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961). His articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ise unswerving allegiance to Moscow, and to renounce any immediate hopes for more fruitful economic or political ties with the West.

The implementation of this program was not achieved overnight. The Soviets had planned to install a new pro-Soviet, orthodox Communist regime in Czechoslovakia immediately after the August 1968 invasion. In the first hours of the invasion they abducted party First Secretary Dubcek as well as Oldrich Cernik, Frantisek Kriegel, Josef Smrkovsky, and other liberal leaders to Moscow. With the key liberals in custody, Moscow intended to name a new regime, apparently counting on public endorsement of this measure by CSSR President Ludvik Svoboda—commander of the Czechoslovak Brigade in the USSR during World War II and recipient of the Soviet "Hero of Socialist Labor" order. However, the aging general, backed by the entire Czechoslovak nation, staunchly refused and thereby forced the Kremlin to accept, for a time, a regime still dominated by reformers and headed by Dubcek, the leader of the Czechoslovak democratization movement earlier that year.

This initial setback did not prevent the Soviet occupation forces from continuing to promote the political fortunes of "healthy" (*i.e.*, pro-Soviet) CPCS veterans. The first step in the conservatives' campaign to capture control of the party came at the CPCS Central Committee Plenum in November 1968 when the hard-liner Lubomir Strougal was elected to the Presidium and that body's Executive Committee, and became as well the CPCS Central Committee's secretary in charge of the new Czech Lands Bureau (organized at the Plenum to exercise tight control over party work in Bohemia and Moravia—the so-called "Czech Lands"). Nevertheless, progressive and moderate leaders still dominated party and government posts, appreciably impeding "normalization."

Conservative Breakthrough

This situation, clearly unpalatable to the Soviets, ended at the April 1969 Central Committee Plenum —nearly eight months after the invasion—when conservative forces decisively gained the upper hand within the party. Using as a pretext the anti-Soviet demonstrations in Czechoslovakia in late March (on the occasion of victories by the Czechoslovak team over the USSR team in world hockey matches), the Soviet Union engineered the promotion of Husak to CPCS First Secretary. Liberals Smrkovsky, Bohumil Simon, Joseph Slavik, and Josef Spacek were dropped from the Presidium, although Dubcek clung to membership in that top policy-making body.

Emboldened by this success, the party hardliners relentlessly purged the remaining liberals from party posts at successive Central Committee meetings. In June 1969, Sik, Kriegel, and the prominent Marxist philosopher Karel Kosik were among those ousted from the Central Committee. In September 1969, conservatives were named to replace 29 liberals on the Central Committee, and Dubcek was removed from the party Presidium. Simultaneously, dogmatic party veterans such as Oldrich Svestka, Drahomir Kolder, Antonin Kapek, and Josef Kempny moved into responsible party posts.

In January 1970 Cernik was dropped from the party Presidium and replaced by Strougal as CSSR Premier. Karel Polacek, too, left the Presidium and was removed as Chairman of the Central Council of Czechoslovak Trade Unions. Stefan Sadovsky was ousted from the Presidium and the CPCS Central Committee's Secretariat and also relinquished his post as First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party to Josef Lenart (who had served as CSSR Premier under Antonin Novotny). Similar purges swept the regional and lower levels of party, government, and public organizations during 1969 and early 1970.

These purges differed from the *chistkas* of the 1950's in two significant respects: they exhibited none of the repugnant rituals of self-criticism and confession typical of the show trials of the Stalinist era, and the consequences for those currently being purged have been much milder. In the 1950's, purged leaders were forced to confess publicly to patent falsehoods and trumped-up charges and then were sentenced to long prison terms or even execution (as in the 1952 case of the onetime party General Secretary, Rudolf Slansky).

In the current purge very few liberals have presented abject apologies; to the contrary, most have defended their actions and statements during 1968 fearlessly and eloquently,[2] choosing to resign or be dismissed rather than confess to having acted against the true interests of the party. This unrepentant attitude has infuriated the hard-line leaders of the CPCS. Thus, Strougal complained that

[2] For an outstanding example, see the courageous speech delivered by Kriegel at the CPCS Central Committee Plenum in May 1969 (see translation in *East Europe*, July 1969, pp. 25–27).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dubcek's address to the September 1969 Central Committee session, while admitting to some errors of judgment during 1968, was "very unself-critical."[3]

In their indignation, some ultraconservatives have attempted to pin the label of treason on the actions of the liberal leadership during 1968, actions which allegedly constituted "a stab in the back of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp."[4] This attitude seemed to point to criminal prosecution of Dubcek and other major party leaders. However, Husak (himself the victim of a political trial in 1954), and even dogmatists such as Svestka and Indra, have consistently opposed such measures.[5] The party weekly *Zivot strany*, on October 8, 1969, cautioned: "There can be no question of a return to the 1950's, of any kind of revenge." The comparatively gentle treatment accorded Dubcek bears witness to the resolve of the Husak regime in this matter. Dubcek was appointed Ambassador to Turkey in December 1969, and, although he was subsequently recalled and stripped of his party membership, there has been no trial. The regime has initiated criminal prosecution for political activity only in the case of several lesser liberal figures, such as chessmaster Ludek Pachman, writer Ota Filip, and Federal Assembly deputies Vaclav Prchlik and Rudolf Battek.

The measures taken against Prchlik and Battek were, however, symptomatic of the rapid downgrading of the Federal Assembly under the Husak regime.[6] The Assembly meekly cleared the way for government prosecution by depriving the two deputies of their legislative immunity. In another step, the Assembly cleared the way for a purge of its membership when, on October 15, 1969, it adopted a law permitting removal of deputies from legislative bodies at all levels for any violation of the "policy of the National Front" (the umbrella front organization through which the CPCS has traditionally controlled all major mass organizations and several puppet-like minority parties).[7] In December 1969 this law was used to unseat 62 liberal deputies to the Federal Assembly and to replace them with conservatives.

Cleansing the Ranks

With the purge of party and government leaders well under way, the CPCS turned at the beginning of 1970 to a "purification" of its own rank and file. By means of an exchange of party membership documents, the CPCS leaders hope to screen out all persons deemed disloyal to the current regime and its orthodox, pro-Soviet line. Persons found guilty of advocating liberal causes in 1968 would only qualify for a new membership card if they confessed their faults publicly, "renounced their false political past," and promised to support the party without reservation in the future.[8]

This grass-roots purge has clearly run into local opposition. Committees established in basic party organizations to interview members and issue new cards have themselves been accused of liberalism and leniency. Some basic organizations have been adjudged too liberal to conduct the purge in good faith and have been dissolved on orders from higher party organs. Although *Rude pravo* of September 23, 1970, reported a 20-percent reduction in CPCS membership as a result of the screening, the number of members expelled is clearly smaller than party leaders expected.[9]

The general populace, too, has resisted the increasingly restrictive policies of the CPCS and its hard-line leadership. For example, on the first anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the public observed spontaneously a "Day of Shame" by boycotting the shops and public transport facilities and by stopping traffic and work for five minutes in many cities. The response of the Husak regime has been to resurrect the civil and secret-police establishments as instruments of control and repression.

[3] Associated Press Report from Prague, September 29, 1969.
[4] Czechoslovak Situation Report, Radio Free Europe Research, No. 80, Sept. 19, 1969.
[5] See Svestka's articles in *Tribuna* (Prague), Sept. 17, 1969 and May 27, 1970; Indra's speech published in *Svoboda* (Prague), Oct. 1, 1969; and Husak's reports to the party's Central Committee sessions of September 1969 and January and June 1970: *Rude pravo* (Prague) Oct. 11, 1969, and Jan. 31, 1970, and *Pravda* (Bratislava), July 28, 1970.
[6] The Federal Assembly became the national legislature of the CSSR when that state became a federation on January 1, 1969. The Federal Assembly inherited its membership and a spirit of independence and integrity from the former National Assembly, a body which had responded to the "Prague Spring" by blossoming into a genuine forum for public debate and heated interpellation of government ministers.
[7] See *Sbirka zakonu Ceskoslovenske Socialisticke Republiky* (Collection of Laws of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—Prague), No. 39, Oct. 15, 1969.
[8] The membership purge was explained in an open letter from the CPCS Central Committee to all Communists, published in *Rude pravo*, Feb. 3, 1970.
[9] Press interviews with M. Jakes, Chairman of the CPCS's Central Control and Auditing Commission (the body directing the membership purge), indicate the problems being encountered (see *Rude pravo*, April 14, 1970, and *Tribuna*, June 3, 1970).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, in the case of the "Day of Shame" demonstrations, the police reacted with a display of force clearly designed to intimidate the public, as well as to impress the Kremlin with the stability and orthodoxy of the CPCS. Five demonstrators were killed, hundreds were injured, and several thousand persons were arrested.

Management of the law-enforcement agencies of the CSSR is once again in the hands of pre-1968 Stalinists. Personally implicated in many of the injustices perpetrated in the past, they have fiercely repudiated the policy initiated in 1968 to introduce impartiality in the administration of justice.[10] Typical of their reaction was the "emergency" decree "For Strengthening and Defending Public Order," adopted by the Federal Assembly immediately after the August 1969 clashes. The decree permitted arrest of suspects without a court warrant and investigative detention for up to three weeks. Cases would be heard by a single judge, without the customary lay assessors (ordinary citizens elected to participate in judging criminal cases alongside professional judges). Penalties included Soviet-style banishment from one's place of residence for up to five years.[11] Most elements of this repressive measure were incorporated into CSSR criminal and labor codes before the decree expired on December 31, 1969.

Another sign of the return to arbitrary administration of justice was the July 8, 1970, amendment to the 1968 Law on Rehabilitation.[12] The 1968 law was designed to facilitate exoneration and public rehabilitation of persons wrongfully convicted during the 1950's. The new amendment stipulated that any conviction for acts actually committed and considered illegal under post-1948 laws would remain standing, regardless of the means used to obtain the conviction. This was a clear rejection of the leniency shown in the invalidation of many such convictions during the "Prague Spring."

Among the strongest advocates of judicial impartiality, freedom of speech, and other liberalizing aspects of the events of 1968 were the representatives of the communications and cultural media—journalists, radio and television broadcasters, writers, artists, and actors. It is, therefore, not surprising that reimposition of censorship (abolished in June 1968) became a prime objective of the Soviet occupation force and its local collaborators. This objective, however, was not easily attained. Inspired by the brief few months of virtually complete freedom to express a wide range of views, the Czechoslovak intelligentsia—journalists, writers, students, and scientists—stubbornly resisted attempts to muzzle the media. For months even *Rude pravo*, the Central Committee's daily, rejected the antiliberal diatribes published in *Zpravy* (a Czech-language paper distributed by the Soviet forces) and in *Tribuna* (the organ of Strougal's Czech Lands Bureau). The labor force strongly backed the intelligentsia in rejecting reactionary policy (*e.g.*, printers delayed the scheduled appear-

[10] See, for example, articles by the head of the State Administrative Department of the Czech Lands Bureau (*Zivot strany* [Prague], Nov. 26, 1969) and by the Chief Prosecutor of the Czech Socialist Republic (*Tribuna*, May 27, 1970).

[11] Published in *Rude pravo*, Aug. 23, 1969.

[12] Czechoslovak Situation Report, Radio Free Europe Research, No. 29, July 17, 1970.

Don't get excited, Citizens! This is only a temporary measure!

—From *Rohac* (Bratislava), Feb. 5, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ance of the first issue of *Tribuna* in January 1969).

This stubborn resistance was crushed after the advent of the Husak regime in April 1969. Appointments of politically reliable cadres to editorial posts sealed the fate of the liberal media. "A general offensive has been launched against the mass communications media," protested the Coordinating Committee of Czech Creative Associations on May 21, 1969.[13] This offensive had generally achieved its objectives by the start of 1970, with hardliners entrenched in all responsible posts. Nonconforming periodicals—such as *Listy, Reporter, Tvar, Literarny zivot, My 69, Doba, Studentske listy, Zitrek, Politika,* and *Plamen*—had meantime been banned.

Recalcitrant Intellectuals

Yet this victory of "normalization" was achieved at a high price—the heavy drain of talent from the communications media. Few progressives in this field—and certainly none of the prominent figures—have shown any inclination to cooperate with the regime. Most have accepted demotion, firing, and being cut off from the public rather than compromise their principles, and their professional unions have likewise resisted regime pressures to conform. The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union called off its Fifth Writers' Congress (scheduled for April 22, 1969) on the ground that it could not fulfill its mission under the existing political circumstances—a sign of continuing ferment in this important organ of cultural control. The Constituent Congress of the Czech Writers' Union (the new Czech Lands branch of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union) on June 10, 1969, elected outstanding liberals to its leadership organs, denounced censorship (terming the work of the new censorship organ—the Czech Office of Press and Information—"harmful and undistinguished"), and pointedly called for more contacts with Czech émigré authors.[14] In September 1969 the Presidium of the Czech Journalists' Union resigned rather than bow to the regime's directives.

The alienation of Czechoslovakia's intelligentsia from the current regime is almost total. The government succeeded in enlisting a mere 130 of the country's thousands of journalists to sign a sycophantic pro-regime manifesto, published in *Rude pravo* on May 17, 1969. A similar campaign in November 1969 drew pledges of support for the regime from several hundred performing artists, administrators of cultural establishments, translators, workers in factory clubs, and "meritorious teachers."[15] In both instances the campaign enlisted either nonentities or die-hard dogmatists, such as Svestka, Ladislav Stall (onetime Chairman of the Committee of Socialist Culture under Novotny), and Jiri Hajek (editor of the resurrected conservative cultural weekly *Tvorba*—not to be confused with the liberal of the same name who served as Dubcek's foreign minister in 1968). The pro-regime artists were held in such contempt by the vast majority of their colleagues that they began to "fear to defend their own ideas," as the Czech Minister of Culture candidly admitted in *Rude pravo* on November 20, 1969.

The stolid refusal of the creative intelligentsia, and particularly its cultural associations and unions, to recognize the "directive function of the state in the field of culture"[16] drove the regime to harsh measures. The Czech Ministry of Culture assumed direct control of the financial resources of the cultural associations in November 1969. The ministry also took charge of all foreign cultural contacts, and the minister warned of "sharp intervention" in publishing activities.[17] So-called "artistic councils" were established to advise the minister on ways to control various aspects of Czech cultural life.[18] The councils will, presumably, serve as the nucleus for new conservative front organizations designed to replace the present cultural associations.

Pressure on cultural expression was further intensified in 1970. In January, editors of periodicals were notified that paper supplies for the year would be allocated "on the basis of the system for the year 1967," which meant a sharp reduction of allocations for those periodicals which had become popular in 1968, but which had not yet been closed by the authorities. The following month, in a step reminiscent of the darkest days of Stalinism, the regime compelled Prague theaters to cease performance of three plays, including "Ode to the King" by Molière, because of "improper" audience reaction

[13] Excerpts from this protest were published in English in *East Europe*, July 1969, pp. 23-25.

[14] Reported in *Tvar* (Prague), June 1969.

[15] Lists were published successively in *Rude pravo* of Nov. 14, 15, 20, 22, 26, and 28, and Dec. 5, 1969.

[16] *Rude pravo*, Nov. 8, 1969.

[17] See Miloslav Bruzek's interview in *Vecerni Praha* (Prague), Dec. 2, 1969, and his speech, published in *Svobodne slovo* (Prague), March 20, 1970.

[18] An interview on the "Artists' Councils" with the Czech Deputy Minister of Culture appeared in *Rude pravo*, Feb. 28, 1970.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—*i.e.*, the audiences applauded scenes which lent themselves to anti-Soviet or anti-regime interpretations. A month later the Czech Writers' Union was forced to surrender its publishing house to a "Literary Fund" administered by the Ministry of Culture.

Despite these measures, the regime is faced with continued opposition and resistance to its cultural policies. The public virtually ignored a series of art exhibits sent to Prague from the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries; only an exhibition of the paintings of Henri Matisse drew crowds.[19] *Rude pravo* of April 6, 1970, complained that publication programs of many publishers for 1970 still included works by such "undesirable" authors as former Czechoslovak Presidents Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, the Catholic writers Jan Cep, Jakub Deml, and Jaroslav Durych, and even by authors recently expelled from the party—*e.g.*, Ludvik Vaculik, Karel Kosik, Jan Benes, and Josef Skvorecky.

Repression in the Classrooms

The party has also applied repressive measures in the educational sector—with a similar lack of success in winning the allegiance of teachers, professors, and students. Liberated in the "Prague Spring" from the degrading role of teaching dogma, distortions, and half-truths, most Czechoslovak educators are loath to return to such discredited modes of instruction. As a result there have been, from the viewpoint of hard-liners, "crude violations of the principles of socialist pedagogy . . . overt and covert manifestations of anti-Sovietism and anti-socialism, excessive nationalism, and false superpatriotism."[20]

While such attitudes were apparently tolerated in the 1968-69 academic year, the regime stepped up efforts to eliminate them at the outset of the 1969-70 school year. The August 1969 decree on public order (discussed above) authorized the summary dismissal of all teachers educating youth "against the principles of socialist society and its construction." This sword of educational repression was wielded enthusiastically by Jaromir Hrbek, who was appointed Czech Minister of Education on August 27, 1969. In a September 1 television harangue, Hrbek called for the merciless firing of all teachers unwilling to follow ministry directives. He immediately circulated throughout the ministry an odious 30-point questionnaire requiring each employee to give an accounting of his personal participation in the 1968 liberalization and to name colleagues who had shown liberal tendencies and who should therefore be dismissed.

This energetic campaign was stubbornly resisted. According to complaints published in the official *Ucitelske noviny* (Teachers' Gazette) of October 9, 1969, liberal-minded teachers were engaging in a "political whispering campaign" against the regime's educational policies, while school principals allegedly felt constrained to ignore teachers loyal to the regime when awarding bonuses due to pressure from "antisocialist demagogues."

The situation in the universities proved equally painful to the regime. University faculties and students had been deeply involved in the democratization movement, and they bravely continued to publish, speak, and demonstrate against the political reaction ordered by the Soviet Union after August 1968. At the beginning of the 1969-70 academic year the Husak regime began to tighten its controls over the universities. In September, Education Minister Hrbek ordered all faculty members who had signed the liberal "2000 Words" manifesto in 1968 to publicly repudiate their signatures by January 1, 1970, or lose their jobs. Armed with the 1969 amendment to the law on universities,[21] Hrbek abolished numerous chairs and departments of universities and dismissed or pensioned hundreds of professors, lecturers, and academic assistants deemed politically unreliable. The concept of university autonomy, which had blossomed in 1968, was consigned to oblivion.

In the autumn of 1969 the CPCS also moved to eradicate liberal influences in the university party organizations. University party committees in Prague and Brno were abolished, with control of party life in the universities turned over to other local party organs in an attempt to bypass university party cadres who had helped "formulate and work out the strategy and tactics" of liberalization.[22] The December 3, 1969, *Vecerni Praha* complained of

[19] *Tribuna*, March 11, 1970.

[20] This complaint of the Slovak Minister of Education was printed in the Slovak CP daily, *Pravda* (Bratislava), Sept. 1, 1969.

[21] *Sbirka zakonu*, Dec. 23, 1969. The intent of the amendment was clearly revealed in an interview with the new President of Charles University, Bedrich Svestka, in *Tvorba* (Prague), Jan. 28, 1970, and in a major speech by the Czech Minister of Education published as a supplement to *Ucitelske noviny* (Prague), March 5, 1970.

[22] *Tribuna*, Nov. 22 and 29, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continued liberalism and inept party work in the capital's higher educational establishments.

Czechoslovak university students proved equally intractable in the face of regime pressures. It was the demonstration of students against poor dormitory conditions in autumn 1967 which triggered Novotny's downfall, and during 1968 students rallied massively behind the liberal cause. After the Soviet invasion, students were in the forefront of demonstrations against the occupation and the increasingly reactionary policies of the CPCS.[23] Until banned, *Studentske listy* was one of the most articulate liberal journals. The Union of Czech University Students chose to dissolve itself rather than become a puppet of the National Front, and the substitute front organization set up by the regime—the Union of University Students of the Czech Socialist Republic—was only able to recruit 4,500 students by May 1970.[24]

In 1970 the regime established special disciplinary commissions at all universities to evaluate the political activities of students. Loyalty to a dogmatic version of Marxism-Leninism once again became the decisive criterion for university admission.[25] University officials were also ordered to give preference to applicants from worker or collective farmer families, regardless of academic qualifications. Revival of this Stalinist "class principle" was aimed at winnowing potentially liberal offspring of the intelligentia out of future entering classes.

The Plight of the Economy

In addition to the serious consequences of the Soviet invasion and the policies of "normalization" for CSSR political and intellectual life, these events also dealt major blows to Czechoslovak economic performance and to the fledgling economic reform then about 18 months underway. The Dubcek government had scarcely begun to grapple with the very real problems arising from the reform when the Soviet invasion totally disrupted the economy. The resulting dislocations and inflation, in turn, provided the pretext for conservative forces to challenge and eliminate many important decentralizing features of the reform and to reestablish tight central control over the economy.

The NEM (New Economic Model) was introduced in 1967 on the urging of Sik, Eugene Loebl, and other liberal economists in an attempt to remove the dead weight of the Stalinist command system and to make the Czechoslovak economy once again an efficient mechanism, capable of competing in world markets. The new system relied on "economic instruments" (prices, profits, and financial incentives) to motivate economic actions instead of the use of administrative fiat, which had characterized the former "directive management."[26] Central planners were limited to preparation of long-term economic projections, providing general guidelines, and publication of a small number of (nonbinding) annual economic indicators, while operational decisions were left to managers of individual enterprises or groups of enterprises (so-called economic production units). The enterprises were left to earn their own way (often without state subsidies), to draw up production plans in response to market conditions, and to prove their economic viability in largely free competition. The government began a gradual withdrawal from price-setting functions, and prices on many goods were allowed to fluctuate with demand. Great emphasis was placed on increased trade with advanced Western economies, and on its beneficial effects on production efficiency and quality.

However, the NEM was experiencing severe start-up problems even before the Soviet invasion of August 1968. Imperfections in the pricing mechanism and enthusiastic profit-seeking by enterprise managers combined to encourage production of high-profit, low-utility goods at the same time that workers—enjoying bonuses which grew faster than productivity—found nowhere to spend their increased pay. Large profits accumulated in the hands of some enterprise managers, but the capital goods market was clearly inadequate to cope with the resulting demand. Large sums became mired in delayed construction projects, further fueling inflationary pressures.

The Soviet invasion only accentuated these dislocations and prevented the Czechoslovak government from grappling with the inevitable problems arising in the momentous transition from a centralized bureaucratic command economy to a more

[23] The self-immolation of student Jan Palach in January 1969 was a most electrifying example of the ardor of the liberal student movement.

[24] See Jan Prochazka's article in *Tribuna*, June 3, 1970.

[25] See the article by the Slovak Deputy Minister of Education in *Pravda* (Bratislava), March 27, 1970.

[26] For a discussion of the main features of the NEM see Edward Taborsky, "Czechslovakia's Economic Reform: Balance Sheet of the First Year," *East Europe*, April 1968, pp. 19-32.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decentralized and liberal economic system. Economic performance faltered at the end of 1968 and fell short of the performance targets for 1969. Overall industrial output grew 5.2 percent in 1969 against a planned 7 percent (with consumer goods output up only 3.8 percent). Food production grew 1.3 percent, with meat output actually 24,000 tons below the 1968 total. Agricultural production, which had risen 5.6 percent in 1968, increased only 0.9 percent during 1969. Housing construction in 1969 was 83,400 units out of a targeted 105,000. Wages grew by 7.3 percent, and overall money income rose 11.4 percent against a modest 4-percent increase in labor productivity, fueling an inflation which was augmented by spells of panic buying in response to political uncertainty. A reported 4-percent rise in the retail price level admittedly understated the burden on the average consumer, who was forced to buy high-priced substitutes for low-priced items in short supply.[27]

Contributing to the CSSR's economic plight was a massive work slowdown—a last-ditch protest against the 1968 invasion and abandonment of the "Prague Spring." Railway troops had to be called in to expedite handling of shipments of relief supplies from the USSR at the Cierna and Tisou yards. In a May 3, 1969, national radio address, Premier Cernik reported that a visiting trade union delegation from Italy had mistaken the inactivity at a Czech plant on a normal workday for a workers' strike! The regime responded to such behavior by tightening the labor code, and in March 1970 it ordered the labor force to work an extra three Saturday shifts and one Sunday shift (without pay) during the remainder of 1970 to make up for time lost in absenteeism and slowdowns.

Exorcising the NEMisis

For a while it appeared that the NEM would survive these major economic problems—especially since Czechoslovak regimes continued to subscribe publicly to the principles of the reform. In January 1969 Premier Cernik still listed implementation of the economic reform as one of the five "pillars" of party policy,[28] and as late as April of that year First Secretary Husak gave top priority to the reform in a nationwide radio address.[29] However, the mounting economic crisis and the pressure of the hard-liners soon brought decisions sharply retreating from NEM principles back to centralization. By the end of July the government had frozen wholesale prices, and all major economic production units had been forced to conclude binding "agreements" with central authorities to fulfill production targets, particularly for goods scheduled for export to other socialist countries. In effect, the center had once again assumed command of the economy, and the "indicative" economic plan for 1969 had become a binding document.[30]

The Soviet occupation also put an abrupt end to the hopes of reform economists that Czechoslovakia might increase its trade with the West and obtain Western credits for the import of advanced technology. The Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak Declaration signed in Moscow on October 27, 1969, prescribed "development of the process of economic integration between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia," coordination of economic plans of the two countries for 1970 and for 1971-75, and a substantial increase in Soviet-CSSR trade.[31] Instead of the Western hard-currency loan hoped for in 1968, Czechoslovakia now has only vague Soviet promises of "cooperation in purchases on the external market of certain goods in which the CSSR is deficient at the present time." Soviet-CSSR trade for 1970 is scheduled to grow 6.4 percent compared to a planned increase of only 1.7 percent in trade with capitalist countries.[32]

These concrete measures undermining the principles of the NEM were accompanied by increasingly sharp attacks on Sik, Loebl, and other sponsors of the reform. They were accused of denying the decisive role of the state in the economy and of causing inflation and shortages of consumer goods and fuel supplies through their economic mismanagement. Husak himself accused the reformers of introducing "methods of bourgeois society into our socialist society, encompassing an explicit destruction of the scheme of economic management."[33]

---

[27] Report by the Federal Statistical Office on the performance of the Czechoslovak national economy in 1969, published as a supplement to *Hospodarske noviny* (Prague), Feb. 6, 1970. Matters improved somewhat in 1970 as industrial production rose by 9.8 percent in the first seven months of 1970 in comparison with the same period in 1969.

[28] *Prace* (Prague), Jan. 22, 1969.

[29] *Rude pravo*, April 18, 1969.

[30] See *Nova mysl* (Prague), Oct. 19, 1969; *Zivot strany*, Sept. 10, 1969, and Jan. 20, 1970; and an interview with the Federal Planning Minister, *Hospodarske noviny*, Nov. 28, 1969.

[31] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 29, 1969.

[32] *Rude pravo*, Nov. 4, 1969.

[33] See *Rude pravo*, Oct. 15, 1969, and Jan. 5, Feb. 2, 1970.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As the Federal Planning Minister, Frantisek Vlasak, stated in *Doba* of September 4, 1969, Czechoslovakia's position as "an integral part of the entire socialist community" precludes any marked deviation of her management model from the principles applied in other countries (*i.e.*, the USSR).

Thus, "directive management" appears to have been restored in the Czechoslovak economy. Even those economists who have refrained from denouncing the NEM (*e.g.*, Andrej Lantay, Director of the Slovak Institute of Economics) have conceded the necessity for stricter central controls and a return to some "directive methods."[34] It appears Lantay and others are hopeful that the major principles of the NEM may be resurrected after a period of economic consolidation lasting two or three years.

The decisions to pull back from many of the principles of the NEM and to recentralize economic management were accompanied by growing official opposition to the ambitious experiment in enterprise (workers') councils that had blossomed in 1968. Inspired by and patterned somewhat after the Yugoslav prototype, the councils were designed to give workers a substantial role in economic decision-making at the enterprise level, including the right to elect their own managers. Modest and cautious experiments with enterprise councils were initiated under Novotny, but during the "Prague Spring" of 1968 the concept was adopted by the liberals as a dramatic symbol of democratization of Czechoslovak society. Hundreds of enterprise councils were formed during 1968, both before and after the August invasion. In December 1968 the enterprise council of the famed Skoda Works at Plzen elected a new manager for the plant.

Despite evident Soviet distaste for the scheme, new councils were being formed well into 1969, and the institution was firmly endorsed by the March 1969 Trade Union Congress. As late as July 1969 the Czech Government stated that it was considering adoption of a statute legalizing and regulating enterprise councils. But the "normalization" took its toll: the statute was never adopted, and by autumn 1969 the manager of the Skoda Works had been replaced by an appointee of the Czech Ministry of Industry. The councils lost any real decision-making prerogatives they might have enjoyed in 1968 and part of 1969. By 1970 "so-called democratic forms of management, such as enterprise councils," were being denounced as vicious attempts to create economic anarchy and to undermine the authority of management organs.[35]

In tightening central controls over the economy, the Czechoslovak government has so far avoided one rather obvious step—unification of the separate Czech and Slovak ministries of industry into a single central agency. This significant omission suggests that the federal structure of the CSSR, instituted in January 1969, continues to be something more than an empty façade and that the gains registered by Slovakia under the new arrangement have not been completely negated.

Long treated as an inferior part of the Czechoslovak state, Slovakia made significant political and economic advances during the "Prague Spring." Its party leader, Dubcek, who had advocated greater central investment allocations to Slovakia while Novotny was in power, became CPCS First Secretary. The Slovaks saw in the democratic mood of early 1968 a real opportunity to achieve their coveted goal of converting Czechoslovakia into a genuinely binational federal union from its former status of a centralized state in which the more numerous Czechs were dominant.

Indeed, a number of government commissions were laying the groundwork for federalization when the invasion of August 1968 occurred. That the commissions were permitted to finish their work and that the terms of the future federation were, in fact, rather hastily finalized on October 28, 1968, suggests that this aspect of the Prague Spring had Soviet approval. Possibly, Kremlin acquiescence to federation was part of a divide-and-rule strategy which, by strengthening the Slovaks at the expense of the Czechs, was designed to facilitate control of the CSSR in the early months of the occupation. In any case, the CSSR in January 1969 formally became a federation comprising two equal member states—the Czech Socialist Republic (CSR) and the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR). Significant administrative authority was devolved to the respective republic agencies.

Futile Federalism

However, as the example of the USSR shows, true federalism cannot exist where all power is vested in a strong central oligarchy. The reestablishment

[34] See articles by Lantay in *Nove slovo* (Bratislava), Sept. 11, 1969, and Jan. 15, 1970.

[35] See Jan Pavlik's article, *Pravda* (Bratislava), Jan. 3, 1970.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of such an oligarchy in Czechoslovakia during the last two years has deprived federalism of much of its meaning. The need to "strengthen the federal directive center," to increase its share of total federal and republic budget revenues, and to expand the authority of central economic planners was a prominent theme in articles evaluating the CSSR federation on its first anniversary.[36] Federation is increasingly discussed in the context of the notorious Leninist principle of "democratic centralism" (which favors concentration of all major decision-making at the center despite a democratic façade).

Central encroachment in republic administrative matters is likely to increase. The fact that Husak, who served nine years in prison on a charge of Slovak bourgeois nationalism, is officiating over this process may keep Slovak resentment from assuming its customary anti-Prague, anti-Czech overtones. Indeed, the current difficulties—clearly traceable to the Soviet intervention—may serve to establish a close *modus vivendi* between Czech and Slovak nationalities based on a common hatred of the Soviet Union.

This shared antipathy for the USSR is based, in the final analysis, not so much on any single Soviet action or any single Soviet policy, such as interference with the country's economy or its cultural freedom (much resented though this is), as on the deepening national sense that the country has been returned to the status of a satellite. After the August invasion both the Czechs and the Slovaks for many months resisted pressures to return to the pre-1968 pattern of subservience to Moscow. Well-known pro-Soviet leaders like Vasil Bilak, Miloslav Jakes and Alois Indra were booed and heckled whenever they appeared in public, and their followers were kept from positions of authority in government and party and banned from the communications media.

However, relentless Soviet political and economic pressure began to tell, and the resatellization of Czechoslovakia proceeded inexorably. Perhaps the most graphic illustration of Czechoslovakia's gradual loss of autonomy is furnished by the leadership's changing official reaction to the August invasion. On August 21, 1968, the CPCS Presidium officially denounced the invasion as an act "contrary to the fundamental principles of relations between socialist states and a denial of the basic norms of international law."[37] Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek delivered a formal complaint to the UN Security Council on August 22.

Yet one week later, the Dubcek regime felt compelled to oblige the Soviets by withdrawing the "Czechoslovak question" from the agenda of the UN Security Council and agreeing to the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, though it persisted in calling the invasion wrong, harmful, and unnecessary. Husak went a step further by publicly endorsing the Soviet view that "rightwing, antisocialist" elements had actually posed a threat to party control of Czechoslovakia, but as late as the June 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, he still maintained that there had been sufficient "internal forces" in Czechoslovakia to preserve Communist control without Soviet intervention.[38]

Finally, in August 1969, Husak was compelled by the Soviet Union to relinquish the last shreds of Czechoslovak autonomy and pride when he officially denied that the invasion was "a hostile act"; instead, he proclaimed, its purpose was to "assist the Czechoslovak people."[39] Less than a month later the CPCS Central Committee formally rescinded the 1968 resolution of its Presidium, terming it "non-class, un-Marxist, and fundamentally incorrect."[40]

This capitulation was followed by the signing of a joint Soviet-Czechoslovak Declaration on October 27, 1969, which characterized the intervention as an "act of international solidarity which helped to stop the antisocialist counterrevolutionary forces." The declaration also endorsed the Brezhnev Doctrine, which maintains that every Communist party must answer for its actions to the socialist community and that defense of socialist achievements is "the common international obligation of all fraternal countries." Not only did it condone the Soviet intervention, but it also committeed the CSSR to help the USSR in similar interventions elsewhere in the "socialist world system."[41]

The satellite status of the CSSR was solemnized in the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded on May 6, 1970, which replaced the Czechoslovak-

[36] See, for instance, the interview with the Federal Deputy Premier, K. Lac, in *Mlada fronta* (Prague), Feb. 28, 1970.

[37] *Prace* (Prague), Aug. 21, 1968. English text in Robert Littell, Ed., *The Czech Black Book*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

[38] Czechoslovak Situation Report, Radio Free Europe Research, No. 49, June 12, 1969.

[39] *Pravda* (Bratislava), Aug. 30, 1969.

[40] *Rude pravo*, Sept. 29, 1969.

[41] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 29, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Cooperation concluded on December 12, 1943. The new document clearly embodied the Brezhnev Doctrine and implicitly made all Czechoslovak international actions subject to Soviet veto.[42]

The Soviet Union and its Czechoslovak collaborators have reimposed on the CSSR a regime cast in the Stalinist mold and obedient to Moscow. Everywhere the so-called "healthy" forces have replaced the liberal party members who led the democratization of 1968. The Husak coalition of realists and dogmatists continually assures itself and all who would listen about the success of "normalization."

Sitting on Pandora's Box

Yet the real situation in Czechoslovakia is hardly as satisfactory to the party leaders as they would have the world believe. In fact, the policies of the current regime have, if anything, aggravated the fundamental problems which brought about the "Prague Spring" in the first place. Alienation of the people from the regime has never been so ubiquitous, perhaps reaching its extreme after the savage repression of the August 1969 demonstrations and the almost simultaneous official expression of gratitude to the USSR for the 1968 invasion.

This alienation now extends to the working class, once the firm supporter of the CPCS. A majority of the workers had supported, or at least tolerated, the party's seizure of power in 1948. Workers also experienced a certain upgrading of their social status under successive Communist regimes. Thus, even though the party failed to fulfill many of its promises, disaffection among the workers prior to 1968 was milder than among other segments of society. During the "Prague Spring" the workers rallied wholeheartedly behind Dubcek and revived a genuine trade union movement. The August 1968 invasion intensified the support of the working class for the liberal cause, and trade unions followed the lead of students in demonstrating against the revival of censorship and other repressive measures forced by the Soviet Union. Termination of the enterprise-council experiment, the purge of trade union functionaries supporting Dubcek's policies (*e.g.*, Polacek), and reversion of the trade unions to the status of a transmission belt of party policy opened a wide gulf between the workers and the CPCS—a gulf which was further widened by repressive labor legislation.

The regime's retreat from the NEM to the discredited "administrative-directive" system also did not add to its popularity. No criticism of Sik and other reform economists could absolve the Husak regime from public blame for economic and technological backwardness, for shortages of apartments, consumer goods, and even fuel. "Normalization" also negated the advances registered in relationships between the party and Czechoslovak youth during 1968. Policies such as the new disciplinary measures in the schools and universities, stifling of free speech and press, and subversion and infiltration of student organizations have totally discredited the party among Czechoslovak young people.

The disaffection is also widespread within the party itself, where the majority of the rank and file had rallied to Dubcek's "socialism with a human face" as a rare chance to redeem the party in the eyes of the public and to make it possible for the party to govern with the genuine consent of the governed. Realization that this unique opportunity has been lost caused profound disillusionment.

As a result, many of the party's ablest members have resigned or been expelled. Those who remain have "dug themselves in" (as the hard-liners phrase it), attempting to survive while engaging in a bare minimum of collaboration with the present leadership. The 1970 purge has doubtless left a CPCS consisting of an unimpressive combination of inveterate hard-liners, a far larger number of hacks and opportunists, and a small group of lesser reformers who have expiated their liberal sins through self-criticism.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party's leaders have consequently fallen into as complete a dependence on Moscow as in the darkest days of Stalinism. Lacking a significant domestic power base, the regime must rely on harsh, repressive measures to maintain itself in power, measures which would be impossible without the backing of Soviet might. The issues which surfaced in the "Prague Spring" remain unresolved, and they will resurface—with greater force and urgency—should the Soviet props be removed from under the Husak regime. Since this day of reckoning depends on developments within the Soviet Union, it may be slow in arriving. But come it will.

[42] An English-language text of the treaty is printed in *New Times* (Moscow) May 19, 1970, pp. 30-31.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Poverty of Marxism-Leninism

ERVIN LASZLO, ED.: *Philosophy in the Soviet Union: A Survey of the Mid-Sixties.*
Dordrecht, D. Reidel Co.; New York, F. A. Praeger, 1967.
GUY PLANTY-BONJOUR: *The Categories of Dialectical Materialism: Contemporary Soviet Ontology.*
(Translated from the French by T. J. Blakeley.)
Dordrecht, D. Reidel Co.; New York, F. A. Praeger, 1967.
DAVID CAUTE, ED.: *Essential Writings of Karl Marx.*
Selected writings with an introduction and notes.
London, MacGibbon & Kee, Ltd., 1967.
Harold J. Laski on the Communist Manifesto.
New edition of a 1947 essay by Mr. Laski; with original text and prefaces of the Manifesto.
Foreword by T. B. Bottomore.
New York, Pantheon Books, 1967.

Reviewed by George L. Kline

IN A CONVERSATION some time ago, a Soviet logician remarked to the reviewer that, in his opinion, the appropriate way for a philosopher to honor Lenin's memory in the centennial year would be to do the best work he could and simply label it "dedicated to the memory of Lenin." He had suggested such a procedure when preparations were made, in the mid-1950's, for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (1908). His earlier proposal had fallen on deaf ears. Judging by the content and quality of recent Soviet philosophical writing, it seems clear that if he repeated the suggestion in connection with the centennial celebration, he was similarly rebuffed.

The April issue of *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 4, 1970), published at the peak of the anniversary observances, contains 16 articles—12 by philosophers, one by a historian, three by scientists. The contributors represent the top brass of Soviet *academia*: all three scientists are academicians, as are two of the philosophers; a third philosopher is a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The historian is a "doctor of historical sciences," and the nine remaining philosophers are all "doctors of philosophical sciences." Sadly, what this galaxy has produced is dreary and dogmatic fare, characterized by both "Leninolatry" and "quotology." The only exceptions are the essays of the two distinguished physicists, Academicians V. A. Fok and M. A. Markov,[1] and the noted geneticist, Academician N. P. Dubinin—but what they have to say, though scientifically interesting, does not have much to do with Marxist-Leninist philosophy. And Fok's article was reprinted from another publication. Other recent issues of *Voprosy filosofii* have exhibited almost as much Lenin worship, and sev-

[1] Of incidental interest, both Fok and Markov are misidentified as "philosophers" by Guy Planty-Bonjour (see pp. 15 and 155 of his work under review).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eral articles on "Lenin and . . ." have been promised for future issues.

These latest products of Soviet philosophy throw an odd light on some of the statements and claims made a few years back by contributors to Ervin Laszlo's survey of Soviet philosophy in the mid-1960's. For example, in an introductory essay originally published in 1963, the noted philosopher and logician J. M. Bochenski, founder of the so-called "Fribourg School of Sovietology," with which Laszlo has been associated, identifies Soviet dialectical materialism as the third "major type" of philosophy in the world today, after (Western) phenomenology and analytic philosophy (p. 7). He insists that "there is every chance that Soviet philosophy will rapidly improve. The number of younger workers and their ardor is such that only a major catastrophe could stop this progress" (p. 4). Later in the volume, in a commentary that originally appeared in 1966, he deplores the "sore fact" that "Sovietologists who try to persuade their non-Communist colleagues that there is something valuable in Communist philosophy have had very little success" (p. 189).

In his foreword Laszlo goes even further, maintaining that Soviet philosophy is the work of academic thinkers who, "on the whole, are neither more nor less competent than their [non-Soviet] colleagues" (p. v). Both Bochenski and Laszlo make the curious claim that in the "classification of ontological categories" the "Soviets are ahead of the United States" (p. 195; *cf.* p. 3)—though this hardly seems to be the kind of activity in which the philosophers of one country could be "ahead of" or "behind" those of another.

GUY PLANTY-BONJOUR'S view on these matters strikes the reviewer as far more judicious. In his competent study (written *circa* 1965) he notes that the current level of Soviet philosophy is "superior to that of the Stalinist period but definitely inferior to that of the years 1920-30. It is still mediocre; it is no longer lamentable" (p. 168). One might add that the professional level of *Voprosy filosofii*, not just in the "Leninist" year 1970, but also in 1960 and 1965, was perceptibly inferior to that of *Pod znamenem marksizma* during the 1920's, and stunningly inferior to that of *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii* in 1890 or 1910. Planty-Bonjour is essentially right in concluding that "there is no originality left in contemporary Soviet thought" and that dialectical materialism, as a "school within the Marxist trend of thought," is "degenerating into a scholasticism which is a stereotyped series of affirmations and negations." Soviet philosophy, he adds, is "the least critical of philosophies. It is never surprised; it never questions; it never reads the sources. . . ." (pp. 166-67).

How could competent and conscientious critics like Bochenski, Laszlo, and other members of the "Fribourg School of Sovietology" have been so misled? Perhaps the "catastrophe" to which Bochenski referred has in fact taken place, to the detriment of

Reviewers in This Issue

GEORGE L. KLINE—Professor of Philosophy at Bryn Mawr College (Pennsylvania); author of *Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969).

CARL J. FRIEDRICH—Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard University; author of numerous works, he is currently writing a volume on political pathology (Harper and Row, forthcoming).

EDMUND DEMAITRE—Author of books on political philosophy and international affairs, including *La Crisi del Marxismo* (Milan, 1964).

NANCY NIMITZ—Staff member of the Economics Department of the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

NICHOLAS DEWITT—Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Applied Manpower and Occupational Studies at Indiana University.

ALLEN HETMANEK—Senior Research Analyst at the US Library of Congress.

MAURICE FRIEDBERG—Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Indiana University (Bloomington).

R. V. BURKS—Professor of History at Wayne State University; editor of *The Future of Communism in Europe* (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1968).

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN—Professor of Political Science and chairman of the graduate program in international relations at the University of Pennsylvania; author of *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet philosophy. One might be tempted to interpret the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as such a "catastrophe," the repercussions of which are still being felt. In a recent issue of *Studies in Soviet Thought*, a publication which Bochenski edits, Thomas J. Blakeley, who himself spent several years at Fribourg, notes that "some contemporary Soviet philosophers [he lists 31 of them in all] have joined in the most recent version of the big lie"—an *apologia* for the Soviet Union's "brutal and cynical invasion of Czechoslovakia."[2] The philosophers include Academician F. V. Konstantinov, a long-time member of the editorial board of *Voprosy filosofii*, and Dr. T. I. Oizerman, now a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Blakely quotes a long excerpt from the *apologia*, containing such gems as "democracy comes to full bloom only in socialism under the direction of the Communist Party," and "by means of its scientifically established political line [the party] provides [other mass organizations] with a correct orientation, and unifies and directs their forces toward a single goal, the construction of communism." He then comments: "Such a text . . . is a typically Stalinist account of the Communist view of the role and importance of their own party." He adds that if this "exercise in neodogmatism" is genuine, "one can reasonably conclude that the 'détente,' 'thaw,' 'liberalization,' etc.—if it ever did exist outside the minds of inveterate optimists—is over."[3] In the reviewer's opinion, the "thaw" in philosophy was in fact "over" well before 1968, perhaps as early as 1958, when the first sharp attacks on Marxist revisionism were launched.

I would suggest two partial explanations of the Fribourgian "optimism"—aside from sheer wishful thinking, of which there has been a certain amount:

(1) There has been a real gain in professionalism in two fields on the periphery of Soviet philosophy: (a) logic, philosophy of science, and scientific methodology, and (b) the history of philosophy. The "optimists" have tended to generalize from improvement in these areas to improvement in philosophy generally. (Recent work in logic and related fields is competently discussed by two of Laszlo's contributors, David D. Comey and W. Boeselager; Planty-Bonjour covers the subject more briefly.) To appreciate the fragility of such generalization one need only compare the dramatically different treatment of subject fields in the *Filosofskaia entsiklopedia*, Vols. 1-4 (Moscow 1960-67), ranging from the solid and conscientious articles on ancient Greek philosophy (by Professor A. F. Losev[4]) or the technically sophisticated articles on mathematical logic, information theory, *etc.*, (by a variety of authors) to the dismally rehashed articles on historical materialism (by Academician Konstantinov) and dialectical materialism (by Professor A. G. Spirkin).[5]

(2) There has been a tendency to extrapolate Soviet philosophical "progress"—extending the upcurve of 1952-1958 to the years 1959-1966 and beyond. But a move from "deplorable" to "mediocre" does not necessarily entail a further move to "good" or "distinguished." Even after the spasm of the present "Lenin year" has passed, the bulk of Soviet philosophical writing may remain, for an indefinite period, at a mediocre level, while specialized studies in logic and in the history of philosophy continue to improve.

Does this mean that the further study of Soviet dialectical materialism is not worthwhile? No—but perhaps the subject could be dropped to a lower key, and more attention paid to logic and the history of philosophy. Something like this seems to have happened over the past two or three years in *Studies in Soviet Thought*, which has focussed increasingly on two areas not previously stressed: Marx's own thought, and the history of (non-Marxist) philosophy in Russia.

Laszlo's collective volume is predictably uneven; it contains, in addition to the articles already mentioned, good critical articles by Karl G. Ballestrem ("The Soviet Concept of Truth"), Richard T. De George ("The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Ethics"), and Gustav A. Wetter ("Freedom of Thought and Ideological Coexistence"). Aside from the question of subject matter, the book is marred by an excessive number of misprints, by inconsistent transliteration, and by occasional stylistic awkwardness (especially in the translation of Helmut Fleischer's sporadically insightful essay on "The Acting Subject in Historical Materialism").

[2] T. J. Blakeley, "On Lies; Big, Little and Soviet," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, No. 3, September 1969, p. 210. The Soviet publication is *Marksizm-Leninizm—yedinoe internatsionalnoe uchenie* (Marxism-Leninism—A Unified International Doctrine), 3 vols., Moscow, 1968.

[3] Blakeley, *op. cit.*, pp. 216, 217, 219 f.

[4] Losev is also the editor, and introducer, of the superb first volume of a projected three-volume Russian edition of Plato, (Moscow, 1968).

[5] The only article on Marx (in Vol. 3, 1964) was written by Lenin himself in 1913 and draws its main philosophical inspiration from Engels.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

M. PLANTY-BONJOUR offers a crisp critical study of the two components of dialectical materialism—materialist ontology and the dialectic. He concludes that a "materialist dialectic"—a "dialectic without Logos"—is unintelligible, adding that "Western thought is stunned to see Soviet orthodoxy ask Hegel and the dialectic to serve as the basis of materialism" (pp. 169, 170). He feels that a "denatured" Marxist-Leninist dialectic cannot explain the "essential rationality of the world" (p. 171). Planty-Bonjour knows his Aristotle and his Hegel; his critical shafts almost always find their mark.

Unfortunately, the English translation by T. J. Blakeley leaves a good deal to be desired. It is often unidiomatic and sometimes wrong—*e.g.*, in rendering the French *finalité*, repeatedly, as "finality" (it should be "final cause" or "purpose" or "teleology," depending on the context). "Finalized action" should be "purposive action" (p. 159). In footnote 78 on page 96, "For not taking it seriously in 1924, Lukács was condemned" should read "For not taking it seriously, Lukács was condemned in 1924." Many footnotes contain extended quotations in German, which should have been put into English. And, annoyingly, Planty-Bonjour's references to French translations of Aristotle, Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have been retained in the translation, which makes them useless for English readers. There are a number of minor omissions and many misprints; one silly mistake in the French original has been repeated—the use of the term "ancient physiocrats" on p. 43, where the author clearly means the Greek nature philosophers (*physiologoi*).

NEITHER THE Laszlo nor the Planty-Bonjour volume has much to say about Marx, since the main inspiration for dialectical materialism comes from Engels and Lenin. But Planty-Bonjour makes a reference to Marx's "naturalistic humanism" (p. 98), which may serve as a bridge to some brief comments on the Caute and Laski volumes.

David Caute includes the passage on "humanism" from *The Holy Family* (pp. 25 f.), and in one of his notes refers to Marx's "humanist ideal" (p. 50). However, he does not make the important distinction between a future-oriented "humanism of ideals" (which Marx accepted) and a present-oriented "humanism of principles" (which Marx rejected). Like Marx, contemporary Soviet philosophy is "humanistic" only in the first, and weaker, sense; like him, it commits the "fallacy of deferred value," displacing the locus of human value to a "world historical" future, and assigning only historically instrumental value to presently existing individuals—a positive value if they facilitate, a negative value if they obstruct, the building of communism.

Caute's anthology is useful and representative (although the more objectionable traits of Marx the polemicist are pruned away—*e.g.*, his stridently antisemitic remarks in "On the Jewish Question," 1843). It shows Marx's power as a historian and social critic. Caute's own brief notes often raise trenchant critical points, bringing out contradictory tendencies in Marx's thought. What Caute says of Marx on religion could be generalized to apply to all of Marx's work: he "penetrated the problem with more power than refinement" (p. 86).

Harold J. Laski's "Introduction" to the *Communist Manifesto*, written in 1947, is of monographic length. It is, on the whole, informative and sensible, although it includes such controversial claims as: (1) "few documents in the history of mankind have stood up so remarkably to the test of verification by the future"; and (2) there is "little likelihood" of the "effective mitigation" of the "misery of the masses" within a "capitalist framework" (p. 102). I assume that ignorance, not malice, prompted Laski to call Alexander Bogdanov an "idealist of the Kantian school" and to refer to Bogdanov's philosophy as "metaphysics" (pp. 81 f.).

Generally, Laski wants to draw too sharp a line between Marx and Lenin, blaming Lenin but not Marx for "the vitriolic character of Communist polemic since 1917" (p. 83). What he has to say about (Stalinist) communism deserves to be quoted at length:

> **The passion for conspiracy, the need for deception, the ruthlessness, the centralized and autocratic commands, the contempt for fair play, the willingness to use lying and treachery to discredit an opponent or to secure some desired end, complete dishonesty in the presentation of facts, the habit of regarding temporary success as justifying any measure, the hysterical invective by which they wrought [sought?] to destroy the character of anyone who disagreed with them; these, in the context of an idolization of leaders who might, the day after, be mercilessly attacked as the incarnation of evil, have been the normal behavior of Communists all over the world (pp. 88 f.).**

In 1947 it took a certain amount of courage for a "liberal" Marxist to say such things—but, of course, not nearly so much courage as it would take for a contemporary Soviet Marxist to raise even the mildest of objections to his country's invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Uses of Terror

ALEXANDER DALLIN AND GEORGE W. BRESLAUER: *Political Terror in Communist Systems.* Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970.

Reviewed by Carl J. Friedrich

THIS SLENDER VOLUME, agreeably compact and very readable, is a welcome addition to the long and protracted discussion concerning the role of terror in totalitarian regimes. While its subject matter is confined to the use of terror in Communist states, it invites comparison with other policies—especially since the authors posit that "terror has been a hallmark of all societies." Skillfully written, the book essays a comparative analysis of the role and function of terror in societies located at various points in time and space; the general conclusion reached seems to be that the uses of terror have varied greatly depending on the circumstances under which it was employed.

The general theoretical framework of the book is suggested by the authors' definition of political terror as signifying "the arbitrary use, by organs of political authority, of severe coercion against individuals and groups, the credible threat of such use, or the arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups." Such terror, in the "functional" approach adopted by the authors, may be functional or disfunctional,[1] depending upon the purpose to be served or even the time span considered; for what may appear functional in the short run may turn out to be disfunctional in the long run. (This functional approach can, of course, be applied to numerous pejorative terms and the phenomena corresponding to them, such as corruption, betrayal, treason, and especially violence, of which terror appears to be an extreme form.) But if terror is so defined, the authors' proposition that it is the hallmark of all societies seems rather questionable. For surely Great Britain and Switzerland, to name two modern regimes, were not characterized by the arbitrary use of severe coercion—though in Great Britain's case one must exclude the treatment of the colonial possessions and Ireland.

However, if the authors' assertion concerning the universal applicability of terror is open to dispute, they are certainly correct in stressing the essentiality and centrality of terror to totalitarian systems. (It should be noted, though, that the authors are not sufficiently discriminating on this point: while their original definition of political terror calls the phenomenon "the linchpin of totalitarianism"—which points to the essentiality of terror in the system—the footnote to this passage speaks of the centrality of terror.) Where I differ from the authors is that whereas they define terror as an objective "given" of governmental behavior (or misbehavior), I would be inclined to stress more the psychological aspects of terror; for to be terrorized seems to me a psychic state of extreme frustration that may be induced by imaginary (as well as by real) dangers. Thus the state of mind of some minorities in the United States is that of terror, though the objective situation may well not justify it.

Taking as their point of departure the concept of terror as a governmental instrumentality, Dallin and Breslauer proceed to analyze in broad comparative terms its use in the various developmental stages of Communist systems: the take-over stage (ch. 2), the mobilizational stage (chs. 3, 4, 5) and the post-mobilizational stage. Clearly, the concept of mobilization—used here in the sense now familiar

[1] The authors follow the current unfortunate custom of spelling this word as "dysfunctional," wrongly combining a Greek prefix with an adjective of Latin derivation.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the study and analysis of underdeveloped countries (*i.e.*, as the activation of latent popular energy for collective action)—is very important to the analysis. Complementing the sequential scheme of terror used in the take-over, mobilization and post-mobilization stages are chapters on the dynamics, dialectics and disfunction of terror (ch. 7) and a final balance sheet of the costs and benefits of terror to governments using it.

That balance sheet is, the authors find, very difficult if not impossible to draw up. They cite Robert K. Merton to the effect that there is always "the difficult problem of developing an *organon* for assessing the net balance of consequences" in judging the functionality of actions. Not only, to cite Merton again, may "some items be functional for some individuals and subgroups and disfunctional for others," but an item may have both functional and disfunctional consequences. A major difficulty, they feel, "stems from the fact that whether or not a given effect is considered a plus or minus ultimately depends on the values that the observer attaches to the variables and goals."

This conclusion appears to me excessively relativistic. For the efficiency with which a particular system functions is a datum which may be evaluated with reasonable objectivity irrespective of whether the observer likes the system or not. It is of course true that, in the authors' words, "to Communist policy-makers themselves what was judged desirable at one stage may have seemed counterproductive later, when the full consequences could be seen." But this judgment involves a broader kind of concept than that of functionality; and the fact that policy-makers may err in their assessment of functionality does not prove that "ultimately" such subjective assessment is decisive. Quite to the contrary, it proves that such assessment can best be treated as hypothetical in nature—as is the case with judgments about other pathological phenomena in politics, such as corruption and betrayal.

The authors conclude that "terror proves to be ambiguous in its effects." And they add that "if then we ask whether terror is necessary or essential for a Communist regime, we can point back to our earlier conclusion that totalitarianism does indeed imply arbitrary and severe coercion." This seems to imply that the use of terror is part of totalitarianism by definition—as this writer would argue. Indeed, at one point, Dallin and Breslauer state explicitly that "at the mobilization stage of its development a Communist policy committed to the exercise of total control and the prompt implementation of sweeping change does require purposive terror"—which would seem to be in agreement with my thesis. However, the authors go on to say that "*commitment to these goals is neither necessary nor inevitable*, but once it is made, terror follows with iron logic" (italics added).

But how are we to imagine a Communist regime which is not committed to the twin goals of total control and sweeping change? If it does not call for sweeping change, what kind of Communist system could it be—a partially capitalist one? This writer has argued that a Communist system can afford to permit freedom of expression as long as the regime's taboos are respected and there is no organized dissent—as the authors candidly recall. But such limited permissiveness in one sphere of political life is a far different matter from a policy which would abandon the call for "sweeping" changes; for the abandonment of what seems to me the "necessary"goal of sweeping change could not be carried out unless communism were to abandon the core of its ideology.

On the same assumption that communism can afford to be permissive on issues not pertaining to its ideological core, one can readily agree with the statement that "it is undeniable that the escalation of coercion into both situational terror and purposive liquidation of the kulaks was not essential to the realization of Soviet goals." One can further agree with the authors' dictum that Stalin's "Great Purge cannot be justified by the priority goal of economic development: it came after the critical breakthrough." Still, if the Great Purge cannot be rationalized in this fashion, it may well have been functional on other grounds up to the time when Stalin called a halt to it.

Finally, the authors explore, if ever so briefly, certain variables which influence the application of terror in Communist systems. These variables include the historical sequence in which terror appears, the mode of take-over by the Communists, the level of socio-economic development in the country affected, political stability, organizational level, traditional political culture, national experience, the values of the elite and of the dictator personally, as well as certain external influences. It all adds up to the conclusion that it is well-nigh impossible to state any generalizations concerning the functionality of terror beyond saying that sometimes and under certain conditions terror is functional, and at other times and under different conditions it is not functional. The authors also express the wish that their path-finding comparative study be followed by others which hopefully will provide more specific conclusions about the when and the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

how of terror's functionality—a sentiment with which this reviewer fully concurs.

From the discussion of the functionality of terror in the mobilization stage of Communist systems, the authors turn to its application—or the lack of it—in the post-mobilization stage. We are told, "the trend away from political terror at the post-mobilization stage is unmistakable, but it is not consistent." While the authors feel that "as social scientists we cannot predict that a given [Communist] leader will choose to ignore the enormous cost of a return to mass terror," they believe that "it is likely that there is no rational alternative to the abandonment of terror." The inordinately high social, economic and political costs of terror outweigh any conceivable benefits its use might yield in an increasingly modernized society," or so Dallin and Breslauer opine. I wish I could be as sure. Czechoslovakia is admittedly a special case, but it shows that when ideological and power-political issues are at stake, the requirements of a modernized system may be disregarded and terror may be reinstituted.

This particular example also shows why the term "terror," as used in this book, is unfortunate in one way: despite the broad definition favored by the authors (and this reviewer), it tends to evoke in the mind of the average reader the extremes of Stalin's Great Purge and Mao's Cultural Revolution, in which blood, much of it innocent, flowed in torrents. Actually, the record shows that much of the most effective kind of political terror manifests itself in an atmosphere of widespread fear of arbitrary punishment and arrest, and the consequent suspicion of all by all. This kind of terror is not likely to disappear, and there is little evidence to support the authors' view that the elites of Communist regimes "are bound to conclude that the costs of terror far exceed its gains." Indeed, there are many indications that these elites conclude just the opposite, and who is to say they are wrong? Wherever in Communist countries the attempt was made to discontinue arbitrary violence, the situation very soon got out of hand—*e.g.*, in East Germany, Poland, China, and others. The ensuing backlash has resulted in the reestablishment of terror and a growing conviction on the part of the ruling Communist parties that their system does not work without terror. Therefore this reviewer must disagree with Dallin's and Breslauer's conclusion that "the dynamics of the system [Communist totalitarianism] points in the opposite direction"—*i.e.*, toward a Communist system without terror.

If terror will not disappear from Communist societies, it may however assume a more sophisticated form than it took in the past; indeed, Dallin's and Breslauer's incisive presentation of the relevant facts suggests that terror in the form of intimidation becomes part of the life-style in these societies. Though the life-style of intimidation "by no means assures the adoption of the rule of law, let alone a transition to political democracy," it does set "definite limits to the application of coercion." This insight in turn raises the question of the limits of terror in a Communist system. What are these limits? When does coercion become excessive? The answer is that coercion becomes excessive when it becomes disfunctional (*i.e.*, pathological), when it does not make people do what the regime wants them to do. When terror exceeds what can reasonably be borne by human beings, they will adopt passive resistance. (It is the old situation of the mule driver who learns that an excess of violence will only serve to make his animal "mulish.") Also, terror will lose its bite when all or most people are threatened by it. To be effective, it must be selective or differentiated—this is one lesson which Communist rulers have learned from their own past excesses.

Finally, the question of the limits of power in a Communist system—whose urgency has been highlighted most usefully by the book under review—points to a universal issue, namely the question of the limits to be placed on power and coercion in all societies. It is an old problem, but no less pressing for that. The only viable answer to the abuse of power and coercion—as this writer has undertaken to point out in numerous books—is the division of political power under a constitution. It is because totalitarianism rejects the concept of the limitation of power, demanding instead that total power be placed in the hands of the class-conscious elite of the proletariat, that the abuse of power and coercion have become integral features of the Communist system. Hence terror, in its sophisticated form of intimidation, will remain operational despite its costs, and the possibility of its sudden expansion will continue to loom as an everpresent threat on the horizon of such regimes.

For no matter how noxious those costs have proven themselves to be, they are still regarded as well worth it by those who, as an old German saying goes, "have eaten wisdom with big spoons"—that is to say, by those who claim to know what is good for everybody else. Terror that forces people to see the error of their ways—whether in behavior (Stalin) or in thought (Mao)—thus remains highly functional in the Communist world as long as it accomplishes these purposes.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Man and God in Marx

HENRY J. KOREN: *Marx and the Authentic Man.*
Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1967.
ADAM SCHAFF: *Le Marxisme et L'Individu* (Marxism and the Individual).
Paris, Librairie Armand Collin, 1968.
HERBERT APTHEKER, ED.: *Marxism and Christianity, A Symposium.*
New York, Humanities Press, 1968.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE: *Marxism and Christianity.*
New York, Schocken Books, 1968.

Reviewed by Edmund Demaitre

WHEN KARL MARX DRAFTED his Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach (proclaiming that "the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual; in reality it is the ensemble of social relations"), he could hardly have foreseen that the thesis—which, along with *The German Ideology*, he was to leave "to the gnawing criticism of the mice" —would become one of the central issues around which mid-20th-century debates on Marxism would revolve. For, in contrast to earlier controversies on the meaning and validity of the Marxian message, the current disputes involve mainly ontological or anthropological questions rather than the deterministic political and economic concepts on which the Marxian critique of capitalist society was built.

The sudden interest in the ontological and anthropological aspects of Marxism is hardly surprising, considering the overall context in which recent debates on Marxism have developed. Whether viewed as a prophecy, a science, or a blueprint for action, Marxism can now be subjected to an objective analysis in the light of factual observations and historical experience. Thus the critique of classical Marxism is no longer a strictly intellectual and speculative exercise, as it was in the time of Bakunin or Bernstein. For the development of a once unrestrained capitalism into a technocratic-industrial system, regulated—at least in part—by state intervention, and the emergence of socialist states, founded—at least in part—on Marxist principles, have provided entirely new dimensions for discussing Marxism in non-speculative terms. Theoretical discussions of Marx's apodictical pronouncements on the falling rate of profit, increasing unemployment, reckless exploitation of the workers, and proletarization of the lower middle classes have become utterly meaningless; experience has shown quite convincingly that on all these points Marx was wrong. No less futile have become the once agitated discussions on the possibility of building a collective system based on the communal ownership of the means of production, changed modes of production and production relations; experience has also shown that as far as the possibility of setting up such a system is concerned, Marx was right.

The question remains: How does the collective system perform its political, economic, social, and cultural functions in relation to the individual, viewed both as an autonomous entity and as an "atom" in a vaster community? In other words, do changed modes of production and production relations guarantee, as Marx expected, the attainment of that freedom which he defined as "the individual's ability to develop his faculties in every direction"? To this all-important question the half-century of *praxis* of communism provides a negative rather than a positive answer. It also highlights a number of epistemological and structural ambiguities inherent in the Marxian theory as well as in its post-Marxian accretions.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The raising of the question was unavoidable, not because the Bolshevist attempt to set up a Communist society failed (it did not), but precisely because it was successful as far as initial organizational aspects were concerned. First one, then several, Communist states were founded and proved to be viable—regardless of the means used to assure their survival and their effective functioning. But once the basic objective—namely, the changing of the modes of production and production relations—had been attained, the individual's position in a collectivized society was bound to come up for reexamination in the light of the Marxian projection forecasting man's passage from the realm of necessity to that of freedom.

At the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, which began the liquidation of the Stalinist heritage, even orthodox Marxists admitted that the task of freeing man from the cruel whims of necessity had not been accomplished. It was in that phase of the post-Stalin era that the problems of freedom and alienation moved to the foreground of the debates on "pure Marxism" and the future orientation of the world Communist movement. The political implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence added further urgency to these issues, since in the Western world—once hopes for an imminent Communist take-over were abandoned—the Communist position toward individual freedom had to be clarified, if only for tactical reasons. Another perhaps less important but far from negligible factor influencing the course of debate was the Communist concern over the inroads that existentialism, with its preoccupation with freedom and disalienation, had made in Western thought. The threat of Sartre's materialist existentialism, Mounier's Christian existentialism and Merleau-Ponty's ethical existentialism could be belittled by Marxists but could not be ignored.

THESE, THEN, WERE THE principal reasons why the debates on the individual and his freedom in collectivized societies acquired increasing urgency. The issues involved in the controversies are clearly delineated by Henry Koren in "*Marx and the Authentic Man.*" They range from the definition of the essence of man and the nature of his existence to the difficulties inherent in the Marxian attempt to reconcile the process of man's gradual self-realization with a strictly deterministic concept of history. In the author's opinion, there can be no doubt that the problem of freedom occupied a central position in Marx's thought, notwithstanding the mature Marx's apparent unconcern with alienation and man's striving toward freedom through self-creation.

It is through the prism of these central issues that Professor Koren analyzes Marxian philosophy both as an explanation of the world and as a guideline for changing it. The Marxian concepts of the self-realizing man, of social consciousness, of the substructure and superstructure as well as their organic interrelations, are outlined with critical insight and precision in a language entirely free of the repulsive jargon which in recent years has so deeply invaded sociopolitical scholarship. Professor Koren's critique of the Marxian critique of society, a sort of negation of the negation, is soberly objective, underscoring the ambiguities and contradictions in Marxian thought without trying to debunk or reject everything Marx taught or stood for.

On one point, however, it is difficult to agree with Professor Koren—namely, his suggestion that dialectical materialism constitutes a very marginal aspect of Marx's thought. True, it was Engels, not Marx, who sought to apply Hegelian dialectics in a systematic manner, but he did so with Marx's approval. In the preface to *Anti-Dühring*, a work which provided the basis for what Plekhanov was to call "dialectical materialism," Engels noted that "the mode of outlook expounded in this book was founded and developed in far greater measure by Marx, and only in an insignificant degree by myself." In fact, the tenth chapter of Part III, entitled "From the *Critical History*," was written entirely by Marx.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE question whether dialectical materialism is a marginal or essential element of Marxian thought emerges with unmistakable clarity in Adam Schaff's analysis of Marx's, and of Marxist, conceptions of the individual. Before he became one of the victims of the neo-Stalinist purge of 1968, Professor Schaff, a member of the Polish Communist Party's Central Committee, was considered the leading Marxist theoretician in Poland, even though his often unorthodox interpretation of Marxism did not always meet with the approval of the official party ideologist, Zenon Kliszko. In the mid-1950's, when another prominent Polish Marxist, Leszek Kolakowski, set out to restore "pure Marxism" by concentrating on its humanistic content, it was Professor Schaff who took Kolakowski to task for introducing idealistic elements into Marxism. However, what Schaff objected to was not Kolakowski's insistence on the humanistic essence of Marxism but what he consid-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ered a deviation from dialectical materialism. Following a protracted debate with Kolakowski, Schaff published *The Philosophy of Man,* in which he sought to reconcile dialectical materialism with Marxist humanism. In his second book on the same subject, translated into French under the title *Le Marxisme et L'Individu,* Schaff developed his arguments in favor of a Marxist anthropology and ethics that would introduce a new, dynamic element into Marxism without changing its strictly materialistic and dialectical nature.

Marx defined communism as "practical humanism"; Schaff declares that "communism is the cause of man," and he seeks to identify the essence of Marxism along these lines. However, in contrast to many neo-Marxists, Schaff does not recognize a "break" in Marx's thought; that is to say, he does not discern a significant contradiction between the still Hegelian views of the young Marx and the theories advanced by the mature author of *Das Kapital.* The Marxian theory, as Schaff sees it, constitutes an organic whole, with *Das Kapital* and other works of Marx's mature period providing the scientific justification for Marx's basic idea—the struggle of alienated man for the free development of his personality.

In assessing the significance of this struggle, Schaff displays considerable courage and intellectual probity. For, in contrast to many Marxists—and particularly Soviet Marxist philosophers—Schaff does not shrink from admitting that Marxist-Leninist practice, like capitalist social engineering, has failed to solve the problem of alienation. He is highly critical of the savage excesses of the Stalin era as well as of the dry terror exerted by an impassible and implacable party bureaucracy. His critique of socialist and capitalist societies, as well as his program of disalienation through the development of an authentic "philosophy of man," is far more realistic than that of chiliastic visionaries seeking a perfect society formed by perfect, and perfectly happy, men. For, again in contrast to most Marxists, and also to utilitarian hedonists, Schaff doubts whether perfect happiness can be attained or even defined in other than negative terms. In his view, the main efforts of socialist construction should be directed towards creating the *possibilities* for a happy life by eliminating the social causes of unhappiness. Thus, what he advocates is the development of a new social and individual ethos based on Marxist humanism, which, once integrated into a collective system, would help men to confront bravely the inevitable problems of their existence, including inner loneliness and fear of death.

Up to this point it is easy to follow Professor Schaff's reasoning. It is more difficult to reconcile his advocacy of a humanistically-inspired Marxist ethics with his commitment to dialectical materialism—a reconciliation which Sartre, for instance, found impossible to achieve. Since dialectical materialism claims to be a science, it deals with the universal. Ethics is not a science and deals mainly with the individual. It is difficult to see how a new ethics centered on the individual's autonomy can be developed within the framework of dialectical materialism, which determines *a priori* man's relations with nature and society. Moreover, as Karl Popper remarked in another context, science can describe general types of men, but it cannot define a single, individual man. The unique individual and his unique actions, relations and experiences can never be fully rationalized.

Yet Professor Schaff tries to do just that in his effort to strike a balance between a kind of moral radicalism with voluntaristic overtones and an attenuated but still rigid determinism. The contrast between his often pragmatic examination of the human condition and his analysis of man's societal relations results in a number of disconcerting conclusions, which often contradict the very premises on which they were built.

Considering the conditions under which the book was written, such conclusions may have been inevitable. The contradictions are most apparent in the chapter dealing with the individual and history. Like Gyorgy Lukács, Schaff does not believe that the development of the superstructure is unconditionally dependent on the base. In his opinion, the movement of history is not determined by general laws but rather depends on consciousness expressing itself in action. However, individual action should result from free choice; to prevent the individual from choosing between alternatives amounts to depriving him of the very freedom which is the *sine qua non* of his disalienation. From this it should follow that current totalitarian *praxis,* which tends to make compulsory anything that is not prohibited, should be rejected.

This, however, is not Professor Schaff's conclusion. For, after denouncing arbitrariness and restrictive interference with scientific, literary, artistic and philosophical matters, he stresses the indispensability of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship is explained away, if not excused, with more or less the same arguments—capitalist encirclement and the survival of bourgeois residues—that were used to justify the excesses of the Stalin regime.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In spite of these and other inconsistencies, *Le Marxisme et L'Individu* is not only an exciting and brilliantly argued book but also an important work. It is indeed one of the best examples of the way Marxism can be developed and its original message clarified by using the same critical methods which Marx himself used in his critique of bourgeois society. Whether or not one approves of the methodology, it undoubtedly produces at least a partial demythologization of Marxism. Thus, Schaff not only denies the absolute validity of the all-decisive influence of the base on the superstructure but also dismisses as "utopistic" Marx's vision of the "total man." He places the same sacrilegious label on Marx's concept that "free activity" will replace "labor" once the Communist millenium has materialized. In contrast to Engels' prophecy, Schaff does not believe that the state will wither away once the means of production have passed into common ownership and classes have disappeared. Neither does he admit that changed production relations and the concomitant disappearance of classes will put an end to individual alienation. It is in this context that he proposes the development of an autonomous, and anthropocentric, anthropology which, in promoting disalienation, will fill the "empty areas" in Marxism. In short, what Schaff proposes is the placing of man as a biological individual, and also as a component of society, in the very center of the Marxian structure.

IF PROFESSOR SCHAFF'S two basic assumptions, the anthropocentric character of Marxism and the significance of the freedom of choice as the indispensable condition of disalienation, are correct (as many Western Marxists now believe them to be), this would imply the existence of at least two humanisms—a Marxist and a non-Marxist humanism. The question is how two—or several—humanisms can be reconciled in seeking to promote the gradual, even if limited, convergence of diametrically opposed conceptions of the world.

One of the most complex aspects of this particular problem, the possibility of a rapprochement between a theocentric and an anthropocentric humanism, is discussed by the contributors to *Marxism and Christianity*, a symposium edited by Herbert Aptheker. The contributions are based on lectures delivered at a series of meetings sponsored by the American Institute of Marxist Studies. Mr. Aptheker, who is one of America's leading Communist theoreticians, is to be congratulated for the critical insight and objectivity he has demonstrated in selecting the essays dealing with various aspects of the Christian-Marxist dialogue. Unfortunately, Mr. Aptheker's own contribution to the debates is neither profound nor original.

Professor Harvey Cox's introduction provides a proper setting for the symposium. He rightly points out that while it was only recently that the Christian-Marxist dialogue attracted worldwide attention, in fact the dialogue goes back to the very beginning of the Marxist tradition. Thus current discussion represents a revival rather than a beginning. Although Professor Cox is not satisfied with the progress made so far, he believes that the element of hope, implying the notion of change which is present in both world views, provides the basis for a rapprochement. The question is whether the parties engaged in the dialogue will succeed in losing their ideological rigidity—the Christians by recognizing man's cosmic role as an agent of historical change, and the Marxists by consenting to re-examine the sources of Marxism with candor and precision.

A very similar point is made by Professor Quentin Lauer, S.J., in his interesting analysis of Marx's atheism. Father Lauer's assessment of the effectiveness of the Christian-Marxist dialogue is highly realistic. If Marxism is viewed in traditional terms —that is, in the light of Marx's atheistic postulates —then the prospects of a rapprochement are practically nil. This is due not so much to the antagonistic content of the two conflicting world views but rather to the fact that Marxist atheism is integrated in a system which, in contrast to Hegelian dialectics, does not leave any room for a "third position"—that is, a synthesis, or reconciliation, which would negate what is false in the first two positions but retain them, at least partially, by affirming what is true in them. Thus, the solution would require not a repudiation of Marxist atheism, which would be illusory, but its freeing from the fetters of Marxist dialectics. Father Lauer's propositions are somewhat similar to those of Lukács, Roger Garaudy, Ernst Fischer and other neo-Marxists who also seek to redirect Marxism to its Hegelian sources. However, neither Marxists nor neo-Marxists would agree with Father Lauer's contention that Marx's anti-religious position is either irrelevant or, if relevant, inconsistent with the anti-metaphysical stand of Marxism. In Father Lauer's view, it is on the basis of a mutual realization of "what man is or what he is to be" that a reconciliation between religious and Marxist thinking might be achieved.

Among the various essays included in *Marxism and Christianity*, Howard Parson's assessment of Marx as a prophet, George Hampsch's discussion

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the practice of freedom, and Patrick Hill's analysis of Mounier's integral realism deserve particular attention. Richard Lichtman's contribution, a detailed examination of the Marxian critique of Christianity, is the longest and the most controversial. Professor Lichtman makes many valid observations and, thanks to his thorough knowledge of the Marxist classics, succeeds in establishing an organic unity between Marx's anthropology and the Marxian critique of bourgeois-capitalist society. Since Professor Lichtman admits that his self-imposed task is to present the Marxist position "in the most favorable light" without taking into consideration the many criticisms which may be directed against it, his methodology would be unobjectionable had he limited himself to letting Marx and Engels speak for themselves. Unfortunately, this is not the case. In analyzing or supporting the Marxian position, Professor Lichtman often resorts to generalizations of his own, the validity of which is, to say the least, highly questionable. He says, for instance, that "Christianity did not merely fail to protest against slavery, its effect was to condone and legitimate the relationship." What does "Christianity" mean in this particular context? Is the reference, to use the Engelsian distinction, to "apocalyptic" or "Constantinian" Christianity? In any case, one should recall that Bartolomé de Las Casas, Catholic bishop of Chiapas, William Wilberforce, one of the founders of the Clapham sect, the Quakers John Woolman and Anthony Benezet, and the French statesman Montalambert, to mention only a few, were devoted Christians who played a leading role in the antislavery movement.

Alas, historical precision does not seem to be one of Professor Lichtman's fortes. He refers to Monsignor Kaas and Chancellor Brüning, leaders of the German Catholic Center Party in the Weimar Republic, as "monarchist reactionaries." This oversimplification ignores sincere efforts by both to preserve the Weimar regime by trying to save its shaky democratic institutions from the combined assaults of the closely cooperating Nazis and Communists. Professor Lichtman also states that in Italy "the Catholic Church, under Pacelli, Pius XII . . . dissolved the Catholic Populari [*sic*] party under the liberal Don Sturzo, thereby paving the way for Mussolini." The fact is that Mussolini was already well in the saddle when, at a congress in Torino in 1923, the Popolaris split three ways—with the right and the center, led by Don Sturzo, opting for a conditional collaboration with Mussolini. And what can be said about scholarly reliability when Rolf Hochhuth's otherwise interesting play, *The Deputy*, is cited as one of the authoritative sources in support of Lichtman's absurd statement that "hardly a Catholic or Protestant took a stand against Hitler until he . . . began to meddle in Church affairs." These and similar lapses cannot be glossed over even if one were charitable enough to attribute them to nothing more than excessive zeal in the author's effort to bolster, with recent historical examples, a typically 19th-century critique of Christianity.

In seeking to clarify the relations between *present-day* Christianity and *present-day* Marxism, such an approach seems hardly effective. While Marxism should not be viewed exclusively in the light of the "organizational crudities" of the Stalin era, neither should post-conciliar Christianity be judged, as Professor Lichtman is inclined to do, in the light of St. Ambrose's or St. Jerome's pronouncements. For the question is no longer whether Marx was the first to bring the metaphysical themes of alienation down to earth. It is rather whether—and how—the Christian and Marxist projects of disalienation can be brought, at least partially, to a common denominator, even if this should involve the radical demythologization of the theological and secular-theological content of both world views.

This is the point made by Alasdair MacIntyre in his provocative study, *Marxism and Christianity*. In Professor MacIntyre's opinion, the dialogue cannot yield positive results unless a consistent and rigorous critique prevents Marxism from breeding degenerate forms and, at the same time, the demythologization of Christianity extends to a more radical criticism of the secular present. While some of Professor MacIntyre's propositions are highly controversial (few Marxist or non-Marxists would agree, for example, that "it is precisely what Marxism has in common with Christianity that has rendered it so particularly vulnerable"), he supports his central theme—the uniqueness of Marxism as the only secular doctrine which retains the scope of traditional religion—with original and seductive arguments.

The author's urbane skepticism may not be fully in tune with the more hopeful expectations of other students of Christian-Marxist relations. However, it is the very divergence of views and their respective logic which underscores once again the only possible conclusion which one can draw from the current debates—namely that neither prophecy nor science can provide reliable means of charting with absolute precision the unpredictable flow of human history. Tyche, the Greek Goddess of Chance, is still very much alive.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews in Brief

Soviet Agriculture

ROBERT CONQUEST, ED.: *Agricultural Workers in the USSR*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

FEW WOULD QUARREL with the editor of this small volume when he states in his preface: "Except for the Secret Police itself, no single one of the institutions of the Soviet Union has brought the regime less credit than the collective farm." Part of the evidence underlying this judgment is presented in the reviewed book, but only a small part, inasmuch as Mr. Conquest is concerned not with agriculture as a whole, but with the fate of peasants as citizens, workers, and consumers, and his treatment is cast in broadly descriptive rather than precise quantitative terms.

The first three chapters of *Agricultural Workers in the USSR* describe what one might call the "human interest" aspect of agricultural policy in the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev-Kosygin periods (through 1967); the last describes the way in which Soviet agricultural workers are organized, equipped, paid, housed, and educated. Even experienced students of Soviet agriculture will find new insights in the terse text and numerous source notes. On the other hand, a reader approaching the subject for the first time may be seriously misled by the cavalier treatment accorded some very central issues and by statements which are simply inaccurate.

An example of these pitfalls is the assertion that although the average prices for deliveries of agricultural products to the state almost trebled between 1952 and 1957, they remained so far below production costs that they "still failed to stimulate production" (p. 55). The novice might conclude (quite incorrectly) that output increased only insignificantly during this period and that prices for all products in all regions were still very unfavorable to the producers. Even more misleading, the author's formulation seems to imply that adequate prices by themselves can evoke satisfactory output, regardless of the adequacy of industrial inputs to agriculture or the degree of autonomy of farm managers.

Likewise, to say that private plots, with only three percent of the total sown area, account for one-third of total USSR agricultural output (p. 114) conveys a false impression of the relative productivity of the private and the socialized sectors. The reader should be reminded that much of the feed for private livestock originates on collective and state farms, that plots specialize in more labor-intensive and higher-priced products, and that a higher proportion of private plot marketings are at high free-market prices than is the case for collective farms. Despite these qualifications, one would conclude—rightly—that the performance of the private sector has been remarkable. Nevertheless, it is not self-evident that the conditions for this success—a reasonable connection between effort and reward, the freedom to specialize and to use techniques which are fitted to local conditions, and a continuity of management—can never be approached in socialized agriculture.

In any case, to suggest that the USSR should today follow Poland and Yugoslavia and revert to private agriculture (p. 9) is idle rhetoric as well as dubious advice (the examples marshaled in support of this suggestion are not compelling). The real question is whether an institution with such a tainted past as the collective farm can be adapted to function creditably. That Mr. Conquest foresees nothing more than minor improvements perhaps reflects his underestimation of the progress recorded in the recent past: "From 1958 agricultural output has been virtually stagnant" (p. 10). While it is true that the able and persistent Soviet critics of the command agricultural economy have yet to register a decisive triumph, the claim that the post-Khrushchev agricultural reforms had no effect by the end of 1967, when the reviewed study was completed, is totally incorrect. The 1965-67 average figures for total agricultural output and earnings of collective farmers per man-day showed increases from 1958 levels of 23 and 94 percent respectively!

These significant gains prove that real progress on the collective farms is *not* impossible. Agricultural policy has proven a thorny matter in many parts of the world, and we should try to be objective in dealing with the Soviet version.

Nancy Nimitz

Educational Payoff

HAROLD J. NOAH, ED. and Translator: *The Economics of Education in the USSR*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

DURING THE LAST DECADE, economic research has focused increasing attention on the relationship between education and economic growth, and numerous studies have appeared which examine the contribution of different types of education to economic development in particular countries. It has been demonstrated that expenditures on the health, education and nutrition of workers, on the creation of skills, on the dissemination of information, and on other carefully directed social programs can considerably raise output

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and productivity. In particular, it has been found that what is crucial for the achievement of rapid economic development is not merely an increase in the quantity of labor, but also an improvement of its quality—the latter aspect being susceptible to measurement in terms of the amount and types of a society's educational investments affecting labor productivity. Investment in education can have a much higher total yield (or "return") than other forms of capital expenditure, such as investment in visible structures and physical assets. Scholars in the Soviet Union have also come to this realization, as the reviewed volume indicates.

Breaking the chains of Marxist dogma, which asserts that investment in the socio-cultural superstructure is, by definition, unproductive, Soviet research of the past decade has produced useful studies on the economics of education, of skill training, and of research and development. One locus of such economic research has been the Center for Socio-Economic Research in Education at the Moscow Pedagogical Institute. The *Economics of Education in the USSR*, now edited and translated by Harold J. Noah, a professor at Columbia University's Teachers College, is a compilation of papers presented at a 1964 USSR-wide conference convened by the Moscow Pedagogical Institute. Edited by V. A. Zhamin, then rector of the Institute and director of the above-mentioned Center, the book originally appeared in Russian in 1966 under the title *Aktualnye Voprosy Ekonomiki Narodnovo Obrazovaniia* (Urgent Problems of the Economics of Public Education).

Despite the fact that Prof. Noah's English version is considerably dated, due to the publication of numerous other Soviet studies on the economics of education since 1964, the volume does provide useful insights into the Soviet approach to research in this area. As in all such undertakings, the Soviet work combines relatively limited "scholarly" empirical findings with a heavy admixture of domestic and international propaganda about the achievements of the Communist system of education, including invidious comparisons of Soviet developments with those in the West—as, for example, on pp. 126-27, where the "liberating" effect of specialized education in Soviet society is contrasted to the "deprivation effects" of such education in capitalist countries.

Although interest in the economic effects of education in Russia can be traced to the original writings of I. I. Yanzhul in the 1890's and the studies of S. G. Strumilin in the 1920's, there was a subsequent lacuna in research on this topic which lasted nearly four decades. The gigantic expansion of Soviet education was planned and executed without recourse to calculations of either its aggregate economic effectiveness or the alternative economic advantages of different types of education and training. The current upsurge of interest in surveying the costs and benefits of education was triggered, not by a scarcity of educational resources and facilities, but by an overabundance and by Khrushvhev's demand in 1958 that the mushrooming educational establishment be restructured so that the numbers and skills of graduates would fit the anticipated manpower needs of the USSR.

Despite the dogmatic disclaimer that "education plays no direct role in the formation of the national income" (p. 5), the book clearly accepts the need to "optimize" the "contribution" of education to raising labor productivity in the age of science and technology (entire Part II, pp. 101-66). The authors suggest that the goal of greater economic effectiveness of education requires efforts to (1) reduce the costs of education, for example, through greater stress on part-time evening study or extension correspondence courses); (2) achieve a more rational blend of formal and on-the-job training; (3) increase the precision of local and regional manpower forecasts; and (4) improve the locating of schools and training institutions.

In their presentations, the contributors to the symposium have leaned either toward broad clichés (based on official data of the Central Statistical Agency) or toward the elaboration of dry mathematical formulas (involving, *e.g.*, conversion coefficients for different types of labor or transitional ratios between different levels of schooling). With few exceptions, the articles are notable for their dearth of useful survey data and their lack of a genuine analytical approach. The agenda for future research (pp. 219-27) bogs down in discussing the details of implementing specific projects rather than daring to address itself to the more charged question of assigning priorities to various sectors of education.

The value of the book to analysts of Soviet affairs would have been considerably enhanced if the editor had undertaken some systematic and critical evaluation of the findings of the Soviet authors. As it stands, without proper evaluation and comment, the volume is of only limited use to either the general reader or the professional observer of Soviet life who may not be well versed in such a specialized area of economic analysis.

Nicholas DeWitt

Minority Report

TERESA RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE: *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*. Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

PUBLICATION OF A STUDY on Tadzhikistan—one of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia—is most timely at this juncture. Soviet Central Asia, located in the strategic border zone of Russia and China and providing a cultural bridge between the USSR and the countries of the Middle East and South Asia, has never been more important in USSR foreign policy. At the same time, the burgeoning population of the Central Asian republics, the transition of their societies from clan, local and tribal atomism to national consciousness, the explosive growth of their native intelligentsias, and the rapid development of their economies are giving them an increasingly important role in Soviet internal affairs.

Dr. Rakowska-Harmstone, formerly on the staff of the Human Relations Area File Project on Soviet Central Asia, Washington, D.C., and currently Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, provides in the initial chapters of her book a broad overview of the geography, history, and social and cultural development of Soviet Tadzhikistan. The real interest of the volume lies, however, in the subsequent chapters, which describe in detail the techniques of Soviet rule in this republic, particularly in the first decade after World War II. She clearly demonstrates the inferior role assigned to Tadzhik nationals in this political process. All

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

basic decisions affecting Tadzhikistan were made in Moscow, where the Tadzhiks could not make their voice heard. At the republic level, the power structure comprised a mixture of Asian and European (Russian) officials. Local nationals occupied the highest official positions in party, government and "representative" bodies. In every case, however, the Tadzhik official was closely seconded by a Russian "subordinate." The actual management of affairs—the control function—rested in the hands of these Russians.

It is not surprising that, as the author contends, the frustrations inherent in this "built-in system of ethnic discrimination" have combined with the development of a Tadzhik national consciousness to create a "nationalist potential" in the republic, a possible threat to political stability within the USSR. "Nationalistic" manifestations have so far been limited to demands for greater recognition and satisfaction of the economic needs of the republic, for accommodation of Tadzhik interests and leaders *within* the existing power structure, and for more cultural autonomy. Dr. Rakowska-Harmstone's prognosis is ambiguous: on the one hand, she claims that the Soviet system cannot assimilate this growing nationalism, while on the other hand she professes to see no evidence of a revolutionary potential in Tadzhikistan.

The volume also suffers from a neglect of Tadzhik-language materials and of certain essential Western and Soviet sources. For example, the stenographic report of the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Tadzhik SSR,[1] held in February 1961, reveals that in the course of the Congress First Secretary Tursunbai Uldzhabaev commented strongly on the need to promote Tadzhik cadres. Thus, one may surmise that *nationalism*, in addition to falsification of crop statistics for the republic, lay behind his ouster in April 1961. Western sources have also traced a plausible link between the April 1961 Tadzhik purge and the removal of the prominent Uzbek leader Nuritdin Mukhitdinov from the CPSU Central Committee Presidium at the end of 1961.[2]

Dr. Rakowska-Harmstone is also imprecise in suggesting that Dzhabar Rasulov disappeared "into oblivion" from the time he was removed from the chairmanship of the Tadzhik Council of Ministers in 1955 until he became a secretary of the Tadzhik party central committee in 1958. Actually, he served during this period as a USSR Deputy Minister of Agriculture, representing the Soviet Union on trips to India, Burma, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Despite these shortcomings, in part a result of her concentration on a somewhat narrow time frame, the author has significantly enriched the growing literature on Soviet Central Asia, particularly by elucidating the political system used to control Soviet Tadzhikistan.

Allen Hetmanek

[1] *XIII sezd kommunisticheskoi partii Tadzhikskoi SSR: stenograficheskii otchet.* Stalinabad, Tadzhikskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1961.

[2] *Moscow's Colonial Problems in Central Asia*, April 1966, which points out that Mukhitdinov had earlier praised two of the Tadzhik officials ousted in the 1961 purge.

The Futurists

VLADIMIR MARKOV: *Russian Futurism: A History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968.

OF ALL MAJOR literatures, the literature of Soviet Russia is probably the most conservative in language and style. There is no disputing the fact that the tedium of the primitive didacticism that characterizes the bulk of Soviet Russian writing is compounded by the sterile, old-fashioned, academic realism of its form. An ossified adherence to artistic modes that were fresh and daring more than half a century ago is also the norm in most modern Soviet painting and, to a lesser extent, in ballet. Even Moscow's famous Art Theater has turned into a museum of sorts—spectators flock to its performances in order to see reasonably faithful facsimiles of the first productions of turn-of-the-century plays.

Things were not always so. Before the deadening impact of state-sponsored art was felt in the early 1930s, Russian literature—as well as painting, music, theater, and other forms of artistic expression—had enjoyed nearly four decades of feverish activity that left an indelible imprint on Western art and letters, though, ironically, least of all on Russia's own. For a number of years, St. Petersburg and Moscow were the Mecca and Medina of the artistic *avant garde*, rivaling even Paris. Literary movements rose and fell, having either spent themselves or succumbed to other, more powerful forces. Some of the movements were simply fads, though nearly all attempted to achieve the status of a major artistic school by establishing a journal or at least publishing a proclamation blasting their rivals and predecessors as reactionary and irrelevant.

Russia's Futurists made their appearance in 1912 with a manifesto entitled "A Slap in the Face of Public Taste." The Futurists were not given to understatement:

The past is crowded. The Academy and Pushkin are more incomprehensible than hieroglyphics. Throw Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, *et al.*, overboard from the Ship of Modernity. . . . Wash your hands, you who touched the filthy slime of the books written by all those innumerable Leonid Andreyevs. All those Maxim Gorkys, Kuprins, Bloks, Sologubs, Remizovs, Averchenkos, Chernyis, Kuzmins, Bunins, etc., etc., need only a *dacha* on a river. Tailors are rewarded by destiny in this way.

We look at their nothingness from the height of skyscrapers!

The four signers of the manifesto were David Burliuk, Aleksander Kruchenykh, Velemir Khlebnikov, and Vladimir Maiakovsky. Of the four, only Kruchenykh still survives in the Soviet Union: Khlebnikov died in 1922, Maiakovsky committed suicide in the USSR in 1930, and Burliuk lived to a ripe old age in America. The Futurist movement itself disintegrated during World War I.

While Maiakovsky was the only great poet who directly joined the Futurists, the movement influenced a number of other masters of Russian verse, including Pasternak in his early years. The chief achievement of Russian Futurism was the debunking or at least challenging of a number of sacred cows of Russian writing—both literary figures and customs. They successfully revived accentual verse, previously tolerated only in folklore; they won many battles in their effort to "urbanize" poetic imagery (liberating verse from its traditionally bucolic settings) and to make it more masculine. They enriched the Russian poetic lexicon with scores of new coinages, colloquial and other-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wise, and, more importantly, made the creation of neologisms eminently acceptable.

Prof. Markov (of the University of California at Los Angeles) has written an immensely erudite and interesting book, one which makes a major contribution to the study of 20th-century poetry in general and which also fills a huge gap in our knowledge of Russian literature. Based largely on materials never before made available, this book goes further than any previous effort in documenting the history of Russian Futurism.

Maurice Friedberg

Little Brother

J. F. BROWN: *Bulgaria under Communist Rule.* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1970.

PUTTING TO USE his years of experience as an observer of Bulgarian affairs, Mr. Brown has produced an informative study of Communist Bulgaria which concentrates on the years 1953-68. The book is contemporary history in the broadest sense, covering, in a felicitous English, the whole spectrum of Bulgarian society—ranging from the domestic and foreign politics of the regime through party factionalism, literary ferment, educational reform, *et cetera.* Perhaps the most absorbing passages are those devoted to the abortive April 1965 conspiracy to overthrow Todor Zhivkov and replace him with a leader less subservient to Moscow's whims.

The unswerving obedience of the Zhivkov regime to the Muscovite master is a paramount theme in Mr. Brown's account. He holds that Sofia has been forced to pursue policy lines not convergent with the true interests of the Bulgarian people—interests which he implies would be better served by reconciliation, or even federation, with Yugoslavia at the cost of recognizing the existence of a separate Macedonian nation. The author does not deny that the Bulgarian regime has made some progress toward modernizing industry and raising living standards; he also gives it credit for such accomplishments as free university education and comprehensive social security. He contends, however, that the price in human suffering and frustration has been too high, and he ascribes Sofia's anxious imitation of Soviet models to its need for Moscow's continuing support to offset grave internal weaknesses.

This reviewer, however, feels that the evidence so carefully arrayed by Mr. Brown in support of his thesis lends itself at least equally well to the contrary view that the Communist regime of Bulgaria is strongly rooted, its vigorous orthodoxy reflecting the country's continuing backwardness and isolation from its Balkan neighbors. According to this interpretation, Bulgaria's "Great Leap Forward," which began in 1958 with a move to amalgamate farms into giant collective units, and proceeded with campaigns to accelerate industrialization and decentralize and debureaucratize administration, rather than being an initiative which Sofia inexplicably failed to clear fully with Moscow, was in fact the culmination of stubborn resistance by the Bulgarian regime to the destalinization policies of Khrushchev, a resistance which took its cue from the Chinese Communists. The colossal failure of the Bulgarian Great Leap and the Soviet decision to subsidize construction of an enormous steel combine at Kremikovtsi helped bring this deviation from Moscow under control, though it was to flare up again in the April conspiracy.

As for Macedonia, the reader would have been better served had he been informed that it was the occupation of that province by the Royal Bulgarian Army which prevented the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) from organizing resistance activities there prior to 1944. Furthermore, in the event of any breakup of Yugoslavia after Marshal Tito's demise, Bulgaria would appear to have a better than even chance of getting control of the coveted Macedonian territory. This aspiration is much more than a reflection of the competing interests of the Soviet camp and Yugoslavia; it is conceived as a vital state interest grounded in well-established Bulgarian tradition. Such interests of state, rather than any internal weaknesses, also account for Sofia's generally close cooperation with Moscow—a cooperation which is threatened only when Moscow requires too much destalinization on the part of the BCP.

We must be grateful to Mr. Brown for packaging so attractively such diverse and hard-to-find data on a complex and relatively obscure Communist regime, even if many readers may disagree with the interpretation he has put on these data.

R. V. Burks

The Yugoslav Way

WAYNE S. VUCINICH, ED.: *Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969.

YUGOSLAVIA HAS BEEN open to Western scholars for more than a decade, yet there is still a dearth of in-depth studies illumining that country's political, economic, social and cultural evolution since the Communists came to power. Hopefully such studies will be forthcoming in the 1970's. In their absence, we must rely on such vehicles as the symposium, which brings together specialists on a variety of subjects bearing on a common theme—in the case of the present volume, Yugoslavia since 1919.

The eight essays in the collection, which were presented by seven authors at a conference at Stanford University in December 1965, are sound, well-researched and informative. Though occasionally repetitive and not of equal originality or quality, they do constitute a welcome addition to the existing literature on Yugoslavia.

In "Interwar Yugoslavia" Professor Vucinich, the editor of the volume, carefully maps the tortuous byways of Yugoslav politics and alignments from 1920 to 1941. He highlights the ethnic, political, and personal rivalries which dogged the leadership of that time and discusses the conflict between centralism and federalism, which continues to plague the leadership today. He depicts constitutional crises, the precarious existence of the Communist Party, and nationality tensions in encyclopedic detail.

One must concur in editor Vucinich's description of Prof. Jozo Tomasevich's essay on "Yugoslavia During the Second World War" as "the finest short treatment of the enormously compli-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cated Yugoslav war scene currently available." In a dispassionate account of a passionate and tragic four years, Tomasevich analyzes the political crucible within which the Chetniks, Ustashe, and Partisans fought each other and vied for power. The Partisans' success in developing as a national force and emerging triumphant is attributed to their "resolute and uncompromising" struggle against the Axis and domestic collaborators, their promulgation during the war of a policy for national and nationality unity, their able leadership, and their broader appeal to the young, the underprivileged, and the intelligentsia.

Prof. Woodford McClellan provides a somewhat pedestrian account of Yugoslavia's "Postwar Political Evolution." More than half of the essay reviews the familiar developments of the 1945-1952 period. He discusses the key provisions of the 1963 Constitution, but offers no commentary on how they are functioning in practice. For example, there is no coverage of the decisions of the Constitutional Court, though these are readily available and have had a considerable effect on the operation of the Federal Assembly and the Communes. And while he has appended to his original paper a discussion of the Rankovic affair of 1966, he does not probe its impact on the Serbian Communist Party or on the political prospects for an orderly transfer af authority after Tito.

Dr. Phyllis Auty treats "Yugoslavia's International Relations (1945-1965)" in a competent and straightforward manner. While agreeing with her general assessment, the reviewer would argue that Tito was more militant and less Western-oriented in the years between 1944 and 1948 than Dr. Auty implies; that the Yugoslavs did not have the degree of influence on Moscow in the halcyon days of the 1955-1967 period that she attributes to them; and that she pays insufficient attention to the influence of the Sino-Soviet rift on Yugoslav policies. Furthermore, she ignores the important use which the Yugoslav leadership has made of the United Nations in its courtship of the non-aligned countries.

Prof. George Macesich is incisive in his discussion of "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia." Economic data are evaluated with clarity and political insight. His treatment of the background of the important 1965 economic reforms and of their initial impact on the economy is excellent. Prof. Macesich is less than sanguine about the future of the Yugoslav economy, basing his views on the official policy of favoring industry over agriculture and of placing political constraints on the Workers' Councils.

In "Nationalism and Communism," Prof. Vucinich examines the nationality issue in a rather formalistic manner. The stress is on statutes and official speeches, with little attention paid to the ways in which economic change and political evolution have actually affected nationality relations.

The theoretical aspects of Titoism are analyzed by Prof. M. George Zaninovitch in "The Yugoslav Variation on Marx." He notes that theory is not a Yugoslav specialty, yet proceeds as if it is; the result is a valiant effort to link Yugoslav philosophical abstruseness to the political pragmatism that has been the hallmark of the Tito era.

The final essay by Prof. Joel M. Halpern discusses the impact of modernization on the primarily peasant population of Yugoslavia. He examines the resulting changes in family ties, in the status of women, and in the values which the society seeks to instill in its children.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Through Soviet Eyes

By Merle Fainsod

EDITORS' NOTE: Below, Mr. Fainsod introduces us to SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia *(USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology), a new magazine published in Moscow by the Institute on the United States, USSR Academy of Sciences. Analyzing the contents of the first six issues (January-June 1970), he describes the image of the US which is projected in the journal and which presumably reflects the most advanced research on this country done in the Soviet Union.*

Nearly 15 years ago in a report to the 20th CPSU Congress, A. I. Mikoyan observed:

We are seriously lagging in the study of capitalism's contemporary stage; we do not study facts and figures deeply: we often restrict ourselves for agitation purposes to individual facts about the symptoms of an approaching crisis or about the impoverishment of the working people, rather than making an all-round and profound evaluation of the phenomena of life abroad. . . . Before the war we had the Institute of World Economy and World Politics, but that was done away with, and the Academy of Sciences' only economic institute does not and cannot cope with the task of profoundly studying the economies of both the socialist and the capitalist countries.[1]

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 18, 1956.

Director of the Harvard University Library and Professor of Government at Harvard, Mr. Fainsod is an eminent specialist on the Soviet political system and author of numerous works, including Smolensk Under Soviet Rule *and* How Russia Is Ruled *(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press,* 1958 and 1963).

By way of contrast, he pointed out that in the United States more than 15 scientific institutions were engaged in the study of the Soviet Union and that "an immense number of economists were 'sifting' materials on the Soviet Union and studying its economic development."

In the wake of Mikoyan's speech, the Institute of World Economy and World Politics, formerly headed by Academician Yevgeni Varga, was reestablished under the slightly changed name of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and the USSR Academy of Sciences began to spawn a whole system of research institutes specializing in problems of the economics and politics of foreign countries. But, despite Mikoyan's injunction, studies of the United States lagged. It was not until the late 1960's that the decision was taken to establish a specialized Institute on the United States of America within the framework of the USSR Academy of Sciences. G. A. Arbatov, who had earlier worked closely with the veteran party and Comintern official Otto Kuusinen, and whose political credentials were unimpeachable, was named director; under his able and energetic lead-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ership a staff was recruited from such diverse sources as the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet United Nations Mission, and Soviet Americanists previously employed in other Soviet educational and scientific institutions. Beginning in January 1970, the Institute launched its own publication, *USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology*, a magazine published monthly and having an initial circulation of 25,000 copies.[2] Despite reports from staff members that every copy of the new magazine is eagerly gobbled up by readers as soon as it is placed on sale, the author of this article can testify that in late July 1970 all back numbers of the journal except the first issue were freely available for purchase at the bookshop of the Academy of Sciences on Moscow's Gorky Street.

Six numbers of the journal are now before us, perhaps enough to give some measure of the degree to which the Institute is meeting Mikoyan's long-standing demand for "an all-around and profound evaluation of the phenomena of life" in the United States. The primary concerns of the journal are American foreign policy (with particular emphasis on Soviet-American relations), the American military posture, and internal developments in the American political, economic, and technical-scientific arenas.

The accompanying table provides a more detailed breakdown of the contents of the first six issues. As indicated, the largest number of pages are devoted to American foreign policy and Soviet-American relations, obviously a central interest of the new institute. The articles in this category run the gamut from the historical to the contemporary. Among articles in the historical category, L. A. Gvishiani's treatment of the Bullitt mission of 1919 in the first number is particularly noteworthy for its scholarly use of both Western and Soviet sources. Other articles of historical interest include reminiscences of the meeting at the Elbe and of wartime collaboration with the American military, to which Marshal Ivan Konev, Generals A. Zhadov and A. Lagovsky, and Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov contribute in the fifth number.

The articles on contemporary American foreign policy, as might be expected, faithfully mirror the current party line. But, within these limits, one cannot fail to note that primitive sloganeering has given way to better-informed and more sophisticated analysis of the forces and factors that shape American foreign policy. This is particularly noticeable in Arbatov's article in the first issue on "American Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the 1970's." With greater knowledge, however, also comes greater uncertainty. Thus, while Arbatov is not prepared to predict "a reduction in Washington's overseas military and diplomatic commitments . . . as if they were accomplished facts," he also rejects the view "that basically nothing has changed and that nothing can change, that US policy will remain the same." His conclusion is the epitome of caution:

One might say that a complex and apparently not very stable balance of political forces prevails in the USA today. The struggle among these forces is intensifying, and its course will be determined in large part by the subsequent development of American foreign policy.

In other words, we shall simply have to wait to see what happens.

The many articles in the journal devoted to Leniniana can be treated as part of the outpouring of obligatory piety which has characterized all Soviet publishing in this year of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. But in most cases, a special effort has been made to connect the themes of the Lenin articles to the USA. In the third number, for example, M. I. Trush contributes some interesting historical footnotes to Lenin's "Letter to the American Workers," an appeal for help written in 1918 when the future of the Soviet regime appeared in extreme danger. The same number also contains a useful summary by P. M. Malakhin of Lenin's efforts to establish economic links with the USA in the early postrevolutionary period. A substantial part of the fourth number records the proceedings of a theoretical conference at the institute held to commemorate the Lenin centenary. In most cases, the members of the institute use the occasion as a jumping-off point to discuss more contemporary topics. Thus, Y. I. Bobrakov, a former secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, provides a factual account of some aspects of the work of the Federal Reserve System, a subject on which he had also written in the previous issue. Other contributors to the same symposium address such varied themes as the relation of monopoly capital in the US to scientific-technical progress, US research on the foreign-policy process, US capital abroad, American agricultural developments, Soviet-American trade, and American contributions to the science of management.

[2] As reported in early issues of the journal.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trends in the American economy and American management experience provide one of the central themes of the journal. Particularly worthy of note in the management field are the articles of D. M. Gvishiani and M. A. Menshikova. Gvishiani's piece in the fourth issue on "The Historical Fate of Taylorism" reveals a thorough knowledge of American management literature, and Menshikova's article on "Vertical Integration in Livestock and Poultry Production" in the sixth issue is based on a careful field study of American developments in that area. Mention should also be made of an article in the first issue by B. Z. Milner, entitled "New Trends in Management," which undertakes, as its title indicates, to summarize some of the most recent developments in management practice, such as PPB (planning-programming-budgeting), systems analysis, and the use of the computer in decision-making. The notes on current economic development, while propagandistic in tone and heavily weighted to emphasize the defects of America's "capitalistic" economy, nevertheless make extensive use of American statistical sources and register a familiarity with America's leading economic indicators.

The discussions of science and technology are more objective in tone and appear designed, like the management articles, to acquaint the Soviet reader with innovations which he may adopt, or adapt, for his own purposes. The third number, for example, contains an interesting piece entitled "Think Tank," an account of the activities of the consulting firm of Arthur D. Little, Inc. in promoting the development of progressive organizational and technical practices. Other articles in the same vein include "Cybernetics in the US Steel Industry" by A. F. Myrtsymov in the fourth issue, "Computer Time Sharing" by M. M. Kreisberg in the fifth issue, and G. P. Gorshkov's "Solving the Riddle of Earthquakes" in the sixth issue.

The treatment of American military developments embraces two broad categories: (1) *Pravda*-like denunciations of American military "crimes" and "aggression" in Southeast Asia and (2) informational articles which provide data on the American defense establishment, American military strategy, and advances in military technology. Obviously the latter group holds greater interest. The articles include a highly technical description of the Safeguard system by M. V. Belousov in the fifth issue, an interesting analysis of the strategic debate over the place of anti-ballistic missiles and MIRV in the American defense posture by V. V. Larionov in the third issue, a well-informed discussion of the new men in the Pentagon by B. N. Liuberatskaia in the same issue, a careful description of the Nixon administration's reorganization of the National Security Council by Y. A. Shvedkov in the second issue, and a brief analysis of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by G. P. Melnikov in the first issue. Although all of these articles are not without their ideological overtones, their emphasis is on factual reporting. In their totality,

Subject Classification of Six Issues (by pages)

Categories	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Foreign Policy, Soviet-American Politics	27	22	18	4	65	22	158
Lenin Centenary	14	16	6	58	—	—	94
Economic Trends, Management Problems	11	17	16	10	8	32	94
Science and Technology	4	6	12	6	22	5	55
Military Developments	4	10	22	8	5	3	52
Political Developments	10	14	3	—	3	12	42
Russian Studies in the US	—	—	—	5	—	—	5
Libraries in the US	—	—	—	—	—	5	5
Medical Services in the US	—	—	—	6	—	—	6
Crime in the US	—	—	—	—	10	—	10
US Theater and Business	—	—	—	—	—	11	11
Interviews	5	6	4	—	—	3	18
Translations and Documents	16	9	10	8	13	8	64
Book Reviews	11	9	17	11	8	4	60
Miscellaneous Informational Notes	1	10	6	6	1	6	30

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they provide a striking indication of the care with which the new institute is scrutinizing American military discussions and developments.

The reportage on American internal political developments reflects a thorough scanning of the American press, but, as perhaps might be expected, the tendency is to be selective and to stress negative phenomena. The first issue contains a review by S. I. Sergeev of the work of the 91st Congressional session; his conclusion is that the Congress of the United States "cannot unravel the Gordian knot of the political, economic, and moral problems facing the nation." In the second issue, Valerian Zorin addresses himself to the "Crisis of the Two-Party System." After an analysis which places heavy stress on internal cleavages in both of the major parties, the conclusion is relatively cautious. In the author's view, "long-standing traditions" and the interest of "monopoly capital" in preserving the stability of the political system "reinforce the tendency to preserve the two-party mechanism." On the other hand, the United States is entering a period of growing social-political ferment and polarization. "If these processes continue to develop," Zorin concludes, "they may destroy many political forms." In the same issue, V. A. Matveev, writing on "Aggression in Vietnam and American Society," returns to the theme of polarization and by skillful, if tendentious, quotations from American journals, undertakes to document the "crisis of confidence" and the "growth of anti-militant moods," not only among the students, youth and the blacks, but also in labor and even business circles. In the third issue, V. S. Rogov, in an article on "The Battlefront of Classes," adduces the strike statistics of 1969 to support the thesis that the "fighting spirit" of the American working class is on the increase and that "the mass of unorganized workers," particularly blacks and Mexicans, are "enlisting in the class struggle." Notes on the Black Panthers in the first issue and on a convention of the Young Workers' Liberation League, the relatively insignificant youth branch of the American Communist Party, in the fourth issue, undertake to reinforce the impression of rising labor militancy in the United States.

The need or desire to portray life in America in unfavorable terms finds expression in a series of articles on medical services, crime, and hunger in the United States. V. S. Anichkina's article in the fourth issue on "The System of Medical Service," while noting such recent developments as Medicare and Medicaid, places primary stress on the inadequacies of American medical care, the shortage of physicians, their maldistribution, the high costs of medical service, and the neglect of the medical needs of the poor, and particularly the blacks. In the fifth issue, the technique employed is one of American self-indictment. Extracts from the Report of the Citizens' Committee for the Study of the Problem of Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States (chaired by the late Walter Reuther) are quoted to document the proposition that more than 10 million Americans suffer from hunger or malnutrition. B. S. Nikiforov's article on "Crime and Politics" in the sixth issue not only holds the capitalist system responsible for rising American crime rates but also argues that the real targets of the current "law and order" movement in the United States are workers, blacks, and representatives of "progressive" organizations, rather than the criminal classes.

After these hard-hitting indictments, it is a welcome relief to discover an occasional article which reflects more favorably on the American scene. Thus, one can only salute the straightforward objectivity of V. N. Orlov's account of "Libraries in the United States" in the sixth issue. The same number also contains a well-informed discussion of "The Theater and Business" by Z. V. Voinova. Despite her over-heavy emphasis on the commercialism of the American theater, she provides a knowledgeable guide to the intricacies of play production on Broadway, off Broadway, off-off-Broadway, and in the regional theaters.

One article and a book review are devoted to Sovietology and Russian area centers in the United States. Both are viewed in a highly unfavorable light. V. P. Filatov, in an article on "Russian Centers in the USA" in the fourth issue, dismisses them as propaganda centers of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. Their activities, he contends, have "clearly harmful consequences," since the recommendations of their allegedly knowledgeable scholars "disorient the responsible political leaders of the United States." At the same time, he also adds that "one cannot deny" that some scholars in these centers do undertake objectively to understand and describe what is happening in the Soviet Union, oppose "anti-Soviet hysteria," and support the peaceful coexistence of the two systems. "Up to this point," he concludes, "the influence of these scholars is not very great. But the successes of the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union, the growth of its authority in the international arena, will in time compel Americans to listen to their voice." M. P. Nikolaev's review in the second issue of B. I. Marushkin's *History and Politics* (1969), perhaps the most ambitious review and critique of American Sovietology so far published in the Soviet Union, emphasizes the same themes. Anti-communism is viewed as the guiding conception of American Sovietologists, though it is conceded that a few have developed more "realistic" perspectives.

There are still other features of the new journal which deserve to be noted. Perhaps the most striking is the serialization of chapters from Theodore H. White's "The Making of the President 1968," which runs through all six issues. Whatever may have been the reason which inspired the decision to make White's book available to readers of the journal, there can be little doubt that it will contribute significantly to their understanding of the complexities of the American political process.

Another interesting departure of the journal is the publication of occasional interviews with both Soviet and American personalities, directed toward various aspects of Soviet-American relations. In the first issue, the publication of the 19th Pugwash Conference statement is accompanied by an interview with its president, M. D. Millionshchikov, Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences, who places special stress on the usefulness of the Pugwash forum for an unofficial exchange of views on questions of international security and disarmament. The same issue also contains an interview with Academician L. I. Sedov on the future of space exploration, in which he undertakes to justify the immense expenditures involved as contributing to peace and progress but, perhaps significantly, makes no mention of the possibility of a pooled Soviet-American effort. There are three interviews in the second issue: one with the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov, who reports that the people whom he met in the USA in late 1969 no longer believe that the Soviet Union wants a war with the United States; the second with US industrialist Cyrus Eaton, who calls for a quick end to the Vietnamese War, expresses admiration for Soviet achievements, and voices hopes for an improvement in Soviet-American relations; the third with Professor E. I. Kandel, a prominent Soviet neuropsychiatrist, who records his impressions of two world medical congresses held in New York in September 1969 and reports very favorably on the quality of the American clinics which he visited. The third issue features an interview with Senator Eugene McCarthy in Moscow in January 1970. There are no surprises in it; it essentially reiterates views which the Senator had expressed on numerous occasions in the United States. The sixth issue contains an interview with Dr. Carlton Goodlett, an American black representative on the Presidium of the World Peace Council. Dr. Goodlett, who describes himself as a one-time close associate of Martin Luther King, sees the struggle for peace and freedom in the United States as the road to the realization of Lenin's ideals.

Each issue of the journal also contains a substantial book review section, which undertakes to cover both Soviet and American books on the United States. While the editors are to be congratulated on abandoning the old Stalinist practice of reviewing only "progressive" literature, their tendency is still to emphasize books critical of one or another aspect of American society. For the rest, they demonstrate a special interest in works on national defense, foreign policy, the "military-industrial complex," the management of science and industry, and intellectual trends in the United States.

Mention should also be made of the miscellaneous informational notes appended to each number. These range from a list of the 500 largest American corporations (serialized over several issues) to encyclopedia-like descriptions, with maps, of the various states of the Union, and a political dictionary in which American terms such as isolationism, grass roots, pork barrel, Solid South, Soul Brother, limited war, deterrence, and flexible response are explained for the benefit of the Soviet reader. The cumulative effect of these informational notes should contribute to a broader understanding of the American scene.

How then shall we summarize the impact of this new journal? What purposes does it serve? What picture of the United States emerges from its pages?

To begin with, the establishment of the new Institute on the USA and the appearance of its journal represent a recognition, however long delayed, that the leading so-called imperialist power must be studied with the same care and attention that American scholars have long devoted to the Soviet Union. The journal is designed to provide an outlet for the work of Soviet Americanists and to bring their findings to the attention of a wider circle of those professionally concerned with following political and economic developments in the United States. As

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

noted earlier, the circulation of the journal is presently limited to 25,000 copies; even if it were quadrupled, it would fall far short of competing with the mass media, which undertake to shape the Soviet citizenry's views of the outside world in more simplistic terms. As a journal of limited circulation, *USA* is addressed to a relatively select audience which requires more information and a more sophisticated view of American developments than the mass media provide.

Yet it cannot be said that in essence the new journal significantly modifies the stereotypes about the USA purveyed by the mass media. Like the journals of mass circulation, it portrays America as the leader of the imperialist world, dominated by finance capital and the military-industrial complex, determined to extend its military and economic power into every corner of the so-called "free world," and dedicated to anti-communism and "subversive activity aimed at destroying the socialist commonwealth and undermining the socialist social system." Like the mass media, *USA* also presents America as a house divided, beset by problems of inflation and recession, its black community disaffected, its students disenchanted, its urban ghettos neglected, and its millions of poor suffering from hunger and malnutrition.

Yet to stop there is to present an incomplete picture. For *USA* also suggests that within America's so-called "ruling circles" there are also forces working to cut back military expenditures, to limit foreign commitments, and to reorder American priorities to cope with pressing domestic problems. It sees these "more moderate circles of the American bourgeoisie" as taking a more "realistic" attitude toward the Soviet Union and acknowledging the necessity "of adapting to the conditions of the peaceful coexistence of states with different systems." While it does not consider that these forces are currently very powerful, it appears to believe that their influence will grow. Beyond this recognition of division of views within the so-called "ruling circles," *USA* clearly recognizes that the leader of the capitalist world has still not exhausted its capacity for technical and scientific innovation and that the Soviet Union has much to learn from the United States in such fields as automation, computers, and management practice. It visualizes itself as a channel to alert the Soviet elite to such American advances and to stimulate their adoption by the Soviet Union.

In this, as in all other aspects, *USA* remains faithful to the Leninist tradition—implacable hostility to the capitalist system, combined with admiration for its technical and organizational achievements.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Index to Vol. XIX

Annual indices for Volumes IV-XVIII appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954). Numbers appearing to the right of the columns below refer to bimonthly issues.

THE SOVIET UNION

Et Resurrexerunt: How Writers Rise from the Dead, by Hugh McLean 2
Art and Artists of the "Underground," by Arsen Pohribny 2
Soviet Diplomacy in Asia, by Hemen Ray 2
Documents 2
Politics in the Kremlin, by Sidney I. Ploss 3
Observations on the Soviet Census, by Murray Feshbach 3
Soviet Approaches to SALT, by Thomas W. Wolfe 5
Soviet Technology: System *vs.* Progress, by Gertrude E. Schroeder 5
Politinformator or Agitator: A Decision Blocked, by Aryeh L. Unger 5
The Intelligentsia in Opposition, by Lewis S. Feuer 6
The Plight of Soviet Jews, by Maurice Friedberg 6
Ballads from the Underground, by Misha Allen 6
Through Soviet Eyes, by Merle Fainsod 6

EASTERN EUROPE

Economics and Politics
- Poland: End of an Era? by A. Ross Johnson 1
- The Polish Economy in Transition, by Michael Gamarnikow 1
- Progress in Hungary, by Harry G. Shaffer 1
- Hope and Caution, by E. Sandor 1

East Germany Today
- The SED Leadership in Transition, by Peter C. Ludz 3
- The Limits of Reform Communism, by Heinz Lippmann 3

Security Priorities in Eastern Europe, by Wolfgang Klaiber 3
Bulgarian Economic Reform—Advance and Retreat, by L.A.D. Dellin 5
Czechoslovakia: The Return to "Normalcy," by Edward Taborsky 6

LATIN AMERICA

Currents in Latin America
- Fragmentation of the Marxist Left, by Luis E. Aguilar 4
- Castro: The Limits of Charisma, by Edward Gonzalez 4
- Che in Bolivia: The "Revolution" That Failed, by Robert F. Lamberg 4
- The Communist Parties of Latin America, by Robert J. Alexander 4
- The Rise and Fall of a Party: The Cuban CP (1925-29), by Boris Goldenberg 4

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Myths, Perceptions, and Policy: A Symposium
- "Monolithic" *vs.* "Crumbling" Communism, by Andrew Ezergailis 1
- Sovietology and Its Critics, by Michel Tatu 1
- Decline and Durability, by Hugh Seton-Watson 1
- What's in a Label? by Bernard S. Morris 1

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Dangers Within, by Rodger Swearingen 1
"Polydoxy" *vs.* "Monodoxy," by Klaus Mehnert 1
The Way the Cookie Crumbles, by Alec Nove 1
Faiths Eroded, by Donald W. Treadgold 1
The Japanese CP: An Instructive Paradox, by Masamichi Inoki 1
The Australian CP: Causes of Disarray, by Rex Mortimer 1
The Prospects of Evolution, by Joseph Starobin 1
Ideological Cobwebs, by William E. Griffith 2
Precision and Distortion, by Seweryn Bialer 2
A Problem of Semantics, by Tibor Szamuely 2
Complexities Simplified, by Renato Mieli 2
Myths *vs.* Non-Myths, by Leo Labedz 2
In Reply, by Andrew Ezergailis 2

MARXISM-LENINISM

The Thought of Roger Garaudy, by Maurice Cranston 5

HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

The Life and Afterlife of a Bolshevik Jurist, by Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-soon Tay 1
The Politics of the Avant-Garde, by Vahan D. Barooshian 2

BOOK REVIEWS

Stalin and His Generals—Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II, Seweryn Bialer, Ed.—J. H. Huizinga .. 1
Stalin, Hitler, and Europe, 1933–1939: The Origins of World War II, by James E. McSherry—Vladimir Petrov 1
Literatura i zhizn (Literature and Life), by Vera Alexandrova—Vera S. Dunham 1
The Soviet Police System, Robert Conquest, Ed.—Lothar Metzl 1
The First Bolshevik: A Political Biography of Peter Tkachev, by Albert L. Weeks—Deborah Hardy 1
Prelude to Revolution. The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising, by Alexander Rabinowitch—Peter Kenez 1
Politicheskiie deiateli Rossii, 1850-ykh—1920-ykh gg (Russian Political Figures from the 1850's to the 1920's), by David Shub—James Critchlow 2
Pobedonostsev, His Life and Thought, by Robert F. Byrnes—Harold Shukman 2
Britain and the Russian Civil War, November 1918-February 1920, by Richard H. Ullman—Stanley W. Page 2
The Future of Communism in Europe, R. V. Burks, ed. —Melvin Croan 2
War Between Russia and China, by Harrison E. Salisbury —William J. Parente 2
Social Welfare in the Soviet Union, by Bernice Q. Madison —Robert J. Myers 2
The Chornovil Papers, compiled by Vyacheslav Chornovil —Vladimir Petrov 2
The German Democratic Republic, by Arthur M. Harnhardt, Jr.; *The Other Germany*, by John Dornberg; *Germany Beyond the Wall*, by Jean Edward Smith—Melvin Croan 3
Soviet Preschool Education, Vol. I: Program of Instruction, Henry Chauncey, ed.; *The Career Plans of Youth*, M. N. Rutkevich, ed.—Harold J. Noah 3
Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed.—Hugh Seton-Watson 3
My Testimony, by Anatoli Marchenko—Ludmilla Thorne. 3
The Fall of Khrushchev, by William Hyland and Richard Wallace Shryock—James Critchlow 3
Soviet Ethics and Morality, by Richard T. De George—Eugene Kamenka 3
Journey Into Revolution: Petrograd, 1917-1918, by Albert Rhys Williams—John H. L. Keep 3
Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara, John Gerassi, ed.; *Black Man in Red Cuba*, by John Clytus; *The Youngest Revolution: A Personal Report on Cuba*, by Elizabeth Sutherland—William J. Parente 4
Tradition and Revolt in Latin America and Other Essays, R. A. Humphreys, ed.; *Marxism in Latin America*, Luis E. Aguilar, ed.; *Roads to Power in Latin America*, by Luis Mercier Vega—Karl M. Schmitt 4
Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, by James Petras; *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, Claudio Veliz, ed.; *The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World*, by Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt—Arpad J. von Lazar 4
Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, by Andre Gunter Frank: *Latin American International Politics*, Carlos A. Astiz, ed.; *The Losers*, by Paul D. Bethel; *El socialismo en Mexico, Siglo XIX*, by Gaston Garcia Cantu; *Las clases sociales en las societadas agrarias*, by Rodolfo Stavenhagen; *Historia y etnologia de los movimientos mesianicos*, by Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz; *El crimen del miedo*, by R. A. Sosa Ferreyro; *Poder laico*, by Manuel Magaña—Victor Alba.. 4
Latin American Radicalism. A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist Movements, Irving L. Horowitz, Josue de Castro, John Gerassi, eds.—James W. Rowe.. 4
Fidel Castro Speaks, Martin Kenner and James Petras, eds.—Jaime Suchlicki 4
The Communist Party of Venezuela, by Robert J. Alexander—Kempton B. Jenkins 4
University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920-1968, by Jaime Suchlicki—Carmelo Mesa-Lago 4
A Rebel in Cuba: An American's Memoir, by Neill Macaulay—John N. Plank 4
Fidel Castro, by Herbert L. Matthews—William E. Ratliff 4
Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1964-1968, by Thomas

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

B. Larson; *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs*, by William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott —Matthew P. Gallagher 5
Justice and the Legal System in the USSR, Robert Conquest, ed.; *Soviet Penal Policy*, by Ivo Lapenna; *Soviet Administrative Legality—The Role of the Attorney General's Office*, by Glenn G. Morgan—Klaus Westen.. 5
East Germany, by David Childs; *Parteien im Blocksystem der DDR. Funktion und Aufbau der LDPD und der NDPD* (Parties in the Bloc System of the GDR. Function and Structure of the LDPD and the NDPD), by Roderich Kulbach, Helmut Weber, and Eckart Förtsch; *Die sozialistische Agrarverfassung—Ein Ausnahmebereich im Wirtschaftsystem der DDR* (The Socialist Agrarian Constitution—A Special Case in the Economic System of the GDR), by H. Jörg Thieme—Eberhard Schinke 5
The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, by Robert C. Tucker—Eugene Kamenka 5
Political Terror in Communist Systems, by Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer—Carl J. Friedrich... 6
Essential Writings of Karl Marx, David Caute, ed.; *Harold J. Laski on the Communist Manifesto*, foreword by T. B. Bottomore; *Philosophy in the Soviet Union: A Survey of the Mid-Sixties*, Ervin Laszlo, ed.; *The Categories of Dialectical Materialism: Contemporary Soviet Ontology*, by Guy Planty-Bonjour—George L. Kline 6
Marx and the Authentic Man, by Henry J. Koren; *Le Marxisme et L'Individu*, by Adam Schaff; *Marxism and Christianity, A Symposium*, Herbert Aptheker, ed.; *Marxism and Christianity*, by Alasdair MacIntyre—Edmund Demaitre 6
The Economics of Education in the USSR, Harold J. Noah, ed. and trans.—Nicholas DeWitt 6
Agricultural Workers in the USSR, Robert Conquest, ed. —Nancy Nimitz 6
Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan, by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone—Allen Hetmanek 6
Russian Futurism: A History, by Vladimir Markov 6
—Maurice Friedberg 6
Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, by J. F. Brown—R. V. Burks 6
Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment, Wayne S. Vucinich, ed.—Alvin Z. Rubinstein. 6

CONTRIBUTORS' INDEX

Aguilar, Luis E.—Fragmentation of the Marxist Left... 4
Alba, Victor—review 4
Alexander, Robert J.—The Communist Parties of Latin America 4
Allen, Misha—Ballads from the Underground 6
Barooshian, Vahan D.—The Politics of the Avant-Garde.. 2
Bialer, Seweryn—Precision and Distortion 2
Burks, R. V.—review 6
Cranston, Maurice—The Thought of Roger Garaudy.... 5
Critchlow, James—reviews 2,3
Croan, Melvin—reviews 2,3
Dellin, L.A.D.—Bulgarian Economic Reform—Advance and Retreat 5
Demaitre, Edmund—review 6
DeWitt, Nicholas—review 6
Dunham, Vera S.—review 1
Ezergailis, Andrew—"Monolithic" *vs.* "Crumbling" Communism 1
In Reply 2
Fainsod, Merle—Through Soviet Eyes 6
Feshbach, Murray—Observations on the Soviet Census.. 3
Feuer, Lewis S.—The Intelligentsia in Opposition 6
Friedberg, Maurice—The Plight of Soviet Jews 6
review 6
Friedrich, Carl J.—review 6
Gallagher, Matthew P.—review 5
Gamarnikow, Michael—The Polish Economy in Transition 1
Goldenberg, Boris—The Rise and Fall of a Party: The Cuban CP (1925-59) 4
Gonzalez, Edward—Castro: The Limits of Charisma 4
Griffith, William E.—Ideological Cobwebs 2
Hardy, Deborah—review 1
Hetmanek, Allen—review 6
Huizinga, J. H.—review 1
Inoki, Masamichi—The Japanese CP: An Instructive Paradox 1
Jenkins, Kempton B.—review 4
Johnson, A. Ross—Poland: End of an Era? 1
Kamenka, Eugene (co-author) Life and Afterlife of a Bolshevik Jurist 1
reviews 3,5
Keep, John H. L.—review 3
Kenez, Peter—review 1
Klaiber, Wolfgang—Security Priorities in Eastern Europe 3
Kline, George L.—review 6
Labedz, Leo—Myths *vs.* Non-Myths 2
Lamberg, Robert F.—Che in Bolivia: The "Revolution" That Failed 4
Lippmann, Heinz—East Germany: The Limits of Reform Communism 3
Ludz, Peter C.—East Germany: The SED Leadership in Transition 3
McLean, Hugh—*Et Resurrexerunt*: How Writers Rise from the Dead 2
Mehnert, Klaus—"Polydoxy" *vs.* "Monodoxy" 1
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo—review 4
Metzl, Lothar—review 1
Mieli, Renato—Complexities Simplified 2
Morris, Bernard S.—What's in a Label? 1
Mortimer, Rex—The Australian CP: Causes of Disarray. 1
Myers, Robert J.—review 2
Nimitz, Nancy—review 6
Noah, Harold J.—review 3
Nove, Alec—The Way the Cookie Crumbles 1
Page, Stanley W.—review 2
Parente, William J.—reviews 2,4
Petrov, Vladimir—reviews 1,2
Plank, John N.—review 4
Ploss, Sidney I.—Politics in the Kremlin 3
Pohribny, Arsen—Art and Artists of the "Underground". 2
Ratliff, William E.—review 4
Ray, Hemen—Soviet Diplomacy in Asia 2
Rowe, James W.—review 4
Rubinstein, Alvin Z.—review 6
Sandor, E.—Hope and Caution 1
Schinke, Eberhard—review 5

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Schmitt, Karl M.—review 4
Schroeder, Gertrude E.—Soviet Technology: System *vs.* Progress 5
Seton-Watson, Hugh—Decline and Durability 1
review 3
Shaffer, Harry G.—Progress in Hungary 1
Shukman, Harold—review 2
Starobin, Joseph—The Prospects of Evolution 1
Suchlicki, Jaime—review 4
Swearingen, Rodger—The Dangers Within 1
Szamuely, Tibor—A Problem of Semantics 2
Taborsky, E.—Czechoslovakia: Return to "Normalcy".... 6
Tatu, Michel—Sovietology and Its Critics 1
Tay, Alice Erh-soon (co-author)—Life and Afterlife of a Bolshevik Jurist 1
Thorne, Ludmilla—review 3
Treadgold, Donald W.—Faiths Eroded 1
Unger, Aryeh L.—Politinformator or Agitator: A Decision Blocked 5
von Lazar, Arpad J.—review 4
Westen, Klaus—review 5
Wolfe, Thomas W.— Soviet Approaches to SALT 5

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED